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 Understanding earnings quality: 
A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences 
 
Patricia Dechow 
Weili Ge 
Catherine Schrand 
 
Over the years, researchers have devised various measures of “earnings quality” to represent 
decision usefulness in specific decision contexts.  These measures, however, have become 
proxies for “earnings quality” in a generic sense, absent a decision context.  The result is that 
some papers use a proxy for earnings quality that does not match the hypothesized form of 
decision usefulness in their study, but they nonetheless find results that are consistent with their 
hypothesis.  Other papers are intentionally agnostic and find robust results across multiple 
proxies for earnings quality.  The fact that researchers find consistent and robust results across 
proxies suggests that there is common component to the various measures of quality, which is 
the firm’s fundamental earnings process.  Existing research does not clearly distinguish the 
impact of a firm’s fundamental earnings process on the decision usefulness (“quality”) of its 
earnings from the impact of the application of accounting measurement to that process.  
Research attention has focused on earnings management that reduces the reliability of earnings 
rather than on the ability of specific features of an accrual-based accounting system to provide a 
more decision-useful measure, conditional on the firm’s fundamental earnings process. 
 
September 2009 
 
Thanks to Michelle Hanlon (the editor), Shiva Rajgopal, Terry Shevlin, Nemit Shroff, Richard Sloan, and Rodrigo 
Verdi for helpful comments.  The framework for this review is based on Schrand’s discussion of earnings quality at 
the April 2006 CARE Conference sponsored by the Center for Accounting Research at the University of Notre 
Dame. 
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Understanding earnings quality: 
A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences 
 
We begin with a definition of “earnings quality” that sets the scope of our review.  Higher 
quality earnings more faithfully represent the features of the firm’s fundamental earnings process 
that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker.  Our definition implies 
that the term “earnings quality” is meaningless without specifying the decision context, because the 
relevant features of the firm’s fundamental earnings process differ across decisions and decision 
makers.  Consistent with this broad definition, we review approximately 350 published papers on 
earnings.1  We do not require that the researcher use the term earnings quality. 
This broad scope is motivated by the varied and often imprecise use of the term “earnings 
quality” by practitioners (including regulators, enforcement agencies, and courts), the financial 
press, and academic researchers.  Lev (1989) popularized the adjective “quality” as a descriptive 
characteristic of earnings for academic researchers when he stated that one explanation for low R2s 
in earnings/returns models is that: “No serious attempt is being made to question the quality of the 
reported earnings numbers prior to correlating them with returns.”  Lev’s statement implicitly 
suggests that he defines earnings quality as decision-usefulness in the context of equity valuation 
decisions. 
This use of the term “quality” is consistent with O’Glove’s practitioner-oriented financial 
statement analysis textbook, Quality of Earnings, published in 1987, and even with Graham and 
Dodd’s use of the term in Security Analysis, published in 1934.  Graham and Dodd describe the Wall 
                                                 
1 We searched four journals starting with the first issue (in parentheses) through 2008: Contemporary Accounting 
Research (1984), Journal of Accounting and Economics (1980), Journal of Accounting Research (1964), and Review of 
Accounting Studies (1996).  We searched The Accounting Review from 1970 through 2008.  We added articles from 
other journals and working papers to the extent we are aware of them, but we did not perform a systematic review to find 
them. 
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Street equity valuation model as earnings per share times a “coefficient of quality” where the quality 
coefficient reflects firm-specific characteristics such as dividend policy, as well as “size, reputation, 
financial position and prospects,” the nature of the firm’s operations, and macro factors including 
“temper of the general market.” 
Accounting researchers continue to use the descriptor quality in reference to the 
decision-usefulness of earnings in equity market valuation, but use of the term has been 
extended to other contexts as well, likely because of our conversational understanding of the 
term quality as an indication of superiority or excellence.  This evolution of a term such as 
earnings quality to its current state of ambiguity is not unique.  Schelling (1978) describes the 
phenomenon: 
Each academic profession can study the development of its own language.  Some 
terms catch on and some don’t.  A hastily chosen term that helps meet a need gets 
initiated into the language before anybody notices what an inappropriate term it is.  
People who recognize that a term is a poor one use it anyway in a hurry to save 
thinking of a better one, and in collective laziness we let inappropriate terminology 
into our language by default.  Terms that once had accurate meanings become 
popular, become carelessly used, and cease to communicate with accuracy. 
 
Our approach in this review is to embrace the fact that earnings quality is a multi-faceted 
term.  We therefore expand the scope of the review beyond studies of the decision-usefulness of 
earnings in an equity valuation context.  We identify the various proxies that have been used to 
measure earnings quality, evaluate the various attributes of decision usefulness (i.e., “quality”) that 
researchers have measured, and point out the strengths and weaknesses of each measure.  We also 
identify circumstances where researchers obtain conflicting results because of ambiguity in what is 
meant by “quality” or differences due to the choice of earnings quality proxy.2 
                                                 
2 A number of survey papers of earnings quality and/or earnings management predate this review: Healy and Wahlen 
(1999); Dechow and Skinner (2000); McNichols (2000); Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001); Imhoff (2003); Penman 
(2003); Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2003); Schipper and Vincent (2003); Dechow and Schrand (2004); Francis, Olsson, 
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An important feature of our review is the method we use to organize our discussion of the 
papers.  We apply the approach that Chronbach and Meehl (1955) suggest to assess the validity of a 
latent construct in general to the specific case of earnings quality.  For each paper, we identify its 
proxy for earnings quality.  We use three broad earnings quality (EQ) categories: (i) statistical 
properties of earnings; (ii) investor responsiveness to earnings; and (iii) external indicators of 
financial reporting quality.  The properties of earnings category includes: a) persistence and accruals, 
b) earnings smoothness, c) asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition; and d) benchmarking, 
in which the distance of earnings from a benchmark is viewed as a measure of its quality (e.g., small 
profits).  The investor responsiveness to earnings category includes papers that use an earnings 
response coefficient (ERC) as a measure of earnings informativeness or earnings quality.  The 
category for external indicators of financial reporting quality includes: AAERs, restatements, and 
internal control procedure deficiencies reported under SOX.  Table 1, Panel A, lists the EQ proxies 
and the sections of this survey in which we discuss them.  Exhibit 1 provides a brief summary of the 
intuition behind each measure and comments on its use as a proxy for earnings quality.  By 
juxtaposing the papers against other papers that examine the same EQ proxy, we are able to draw 
conclusions about the contexts in which the proxy is decision-useful. 
We then classify the papers into two groups according to whether they provide evidence on 
1) the determinants of the earnings quality proxy, or 2) the consequences of the earnings quality 
proxy.  Table 1, Panels B and C, list the categories of determinants and consequences.  The 
determinants papers propose or test theories about features of the firm (or the firm’s environment) 
that cause an earnings outcome; the earnings quality proxy is the dependent variable in the analysis.  
The consequences papers propose or test theories about earnings quality that cause an outcome; the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
and Schipper (2006); Lo (2008).  These reviews typically provide a definition of earnings quality in an equity valuation 
context and discuss only the literature related to that definition. 
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earnings quality proxy is the independent variable in the analysis.3  We perform a second sort of the 
papers by either the hypothesized determinant or the hypothesized consequence of earnings quality.  
Juxtaposing the papers against other papers that examine the same determinant (or the same 
consequence) provides an efficient means to informally assess the convergent and divergent validity 
of the proxies.  That is, we can examine whether determinants that should be related to the various 
proxies in the same way are, and whether the proxies that should not be related are not.  The double 
sorting therefore allows us to more easily identify patterns of mixed and missing evidence.  Figures 
1 and 2 provide an overview of the studies we have reviewed.   
In Section 2, we summarize our key findings about the literature taken as a whole and our 
conclusions for each specific earnings quality proxy.  We also provide a list of ten additional 
findings, some of which offer suggestions for future research.  The detailed discussions of the papers 
that support the conclusions follow in Sections 3 through 6.  Readers that want to view the evidence 
organized by the EQ proxy should read Sections 3 and 4.  Readers that want to view the evidence 
organized by determinant or consequence should read Sections 5 and 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Summary of findings 
Figure 1 (Figure 2) reports the number of papers that examine the various determinants 
(consequences) of each earnings quality proxy.  Figure 3 combines the information in Figures 1 and 
2 to give a quick preview of the various links that have been examined by researchers.  Figure 4 
provides a graphical representation of whether researchers validated their earnings quality proxy by 
showing that the proxy was also correlated with another proxy (e.g., documenting that SEC 
                                                 
3 Chronbach and Meehl (1955) describe the determinants and consequences as part of the nomological network in which 
a construct occurs.  The nomological network is the interlocking system of laws which may relate (a) observable 
properties or quantities to each other; or (b) theoretical constructs to observables; or (c) different theoretical constructs to 
one another which set forth the laws in which the construct occurs.   
 5
enforcement firms have high discretionary accruals).  The conclusions below are based on the 
review of the literature represented in Figures 1 through 4. 
 
2.1 Overall conclusions 
A somewhat unsatisfying feature of this survey for readers is that we do not suggest that 
there is a single best proxy for earnings quality that is appropriate for all decision contexts.  In fact, 
an overriding message of the survey is that earnings quality is context-specific, and thus our 
assessment of the ability of each measure to capture decision usefulness is also context specific.  The 
commonly used proxies for EQ, however, vary with respect to the degree to which they measure 
decision-usefulness across different types of decisions, and hence there is no overall best measure.  
Our review of the proxies provides evidence on which types of useful information each EQ proxy 
captures. 
All of the proxies for earnings quality that involve earnings (i.e., properties such as 
persistence as well as the ERCs) have at their core the reported accrual-based earnings number.  
Reported accrual-based earnings are a function of “fundamental” earnings (X), which are 
unobservable, as well as the accounting system that imperfectly measures X: 
 
Reported Earnings = Function of (X) + error induced by accounting system (e) 
 
Fundamental earnings (X) represents the output of the firm’s production function or business 
model and can be thought of as the expected cash flows generated during the period that could be 
annuitized to obtain the fundamental value of the firm, alternatively referred to as perpetual earnings.  
Throughout the review, we use the term “fundamental earnings process” to represent X.  The quality 
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of fundamental earnings will be a function of the operating cycle, macro business condition, 
investment opportunity set, managerial skill, and other features of the firm.  The “error” term 
represents the ability of the accounting system to measure the firm’s fundamental earnings process.  
There may be a feedback loop: the accounting measurement system could influence management’s 
behavior that in turn changes “fundamental” earnings and its quality.  For example, not requiring the 
expensing of stock options could result in greater stock option usage than otherwise would occur, 
which could affect risk taking behavior, which will in turn affect the fundamental earnings process. 
Since all of the EQ proxies involve reported earnings, they all are affected by both the 
fundamental earnings process as well as the ability of the accounting system to measure the process.  
There are multiple reasons that the accounting measurement system captures the fundamental 
process with error.  The standard setters are working with a different measurement system in mind 
(e.g., focusing on fair valuing assets and liabilities and measuring earnings as the change in wealth).  
Management make poor forecasts that affect accrual estimation (e.g., forecasting the level of returns 
incorrectly) or that affect real decisions (e.g., overinvesting in inventory or PPE, requiring a 
subsequent write down).  Items that should be expensed are ignored (e.g., expected environment 
liabilities, bad investments).  Firms structure transactions to get around undesirable accounting 
implications (leasing, securitizations, stock options). 
As accountants, one important area of research should evaluate the ability of the accounting 
system to measure different types of earnings processes.  That is, we should focus on the “e” term.  
Another important area of research should examine when reported earnings, in total, are of higher 
quality.  Both types of research are important for understanding earnings quality.   
Our point is that the current research does not adequately recognize the distinction between 
the fundamental earnings process and the measurement of the process, which limits the conclusions 
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we can make, as a profession, to statements about the quality of the earnings as a whole rather than 
about the contribution of accounting measurement to the quality of reported earnings.  We turn to 
Graham and Dodd for a lucid characterization of this issue and to emphasize the essential nature of 
the problem: 
Most important of all, the analyst must recognize that the value of a particular 
kind of data varies greatly with the type of enterprise which is being studied.  The 
five-year record of gross or net earnings of a railroad or a large chain-store 
enterprise may afford, if not a conclusive, at least a reasonably sound basis for 
measuring the safety of the senior issues and the attractiveness of the common 
shares.  But the same statistics supplied by one of the smaller oil-producing 
companies may well prove more deceptive than useful, since they are chiefly the 
resultant of two factors, viz., price received and production, both of which are 
likely to be radically different in the future than in the past.  (p. 33/34) 
 
To better understand this deficiency in the literature, we estimate correlations between the 
commonly used earnings quality proxies.4  Table 2 shows that the correlations between most of the 
EQ proxies are positive and statistically significant, but they are not generally economically 
significant.  For example, the correlation between timely loss recognition and persistence is less than 
two percent.  Moreover, all EQ proxies have a negative correlation with the smoothness proxies. 
These correlations suggest that there is a common driver of the EQ proxies, which at least in 
part will be the firm’s unobservable fundamental earnings process.  The degree to which the 
unobservable fundamental earnings process affects each proxy varies, as does the degree to which 
the proxy is affected by the accounting measurement system.  All of the proxies reflect both 
elements, but the proxies are not equally affected by these two factors.   
Given the fundamental component of the proxies, studies that examine determinants and 
consequences of the EQ proxies, measured using reported earnings, cannot identify the unique 
                                                 
4 For illustrative purposes, we measure each variable using a common specification.  All proxies are defined to be 
increasing in “quality.”  For example, we use the additive inverse of the Dechow/Dichev abnormal accruals measure 
because, in the literature, larger absolute errors are assumed to represent lower quality. 
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contributions of the fundamental component from the ability of the accounting system to measure 
the process.  For example, studies predict and find a negative relation between large absolute 
discretionary accruals and both the number of independent directors of a firm and auditor size, 
suggesting that both independent variables are determinants of earnings quality.  The prediction 
assumes that these parties affect EQ through their influence on the financial reporting process.  
While the studies make various attempts to control for the fundamental earnings process, they 
generally cannot reject the hypothesis that they are finding a correlation between their hypothesized 
determinant or consequence and the fundamental component of quality. 
For example, the most significant area of research in terms of the sheer volume of published 
papers is on the determinants and consequences of abnormal accruals derived from accrual models.  
Exhibit 2 provides a summary of the most commonly used approaches to measuring abnormal 
accruals.  The accruals models attempt to control for the accruals that are related to the firm’s 
fundamental earnings process, calling them normal, non-discretionary, or innate accruals.  But, many 
of the controls that are used are measured by reported accrual-based earnings associated with the 
process (growth in sales revenue, for example).  Thus, the accruals models may distinguish normal 
accruals from the component that represents discretion, but the normal or innate accruals do not 
necessarily adequately capture the fundamental earnings process.   
Researchers could make positive predictions about how determinants would differentially 
affect specific quality proxies or about different consequences of the proxies.  The testable 
hypotheses are generally derived from decision models and the models suggest a specific form of 
decision usefulness (i.e., earnings quality).  Most theories would not predict a relation with all 
proxies, or at least would not predict an equally strong relation with all.  But researchers typically do 
not conduct such analyses.  In fact, the studies that test theories by examining multiple proxies for 
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earnings quality often suggest that the study’s findings are robust to alternative specifications of 
earnings quality.  The results are consistent across the proxies, but we question whether they should 
be. 
In summary, our wide-ranging finding across all the EQ proxies is that we have not 
adequately separated the unobservable dimension of quality related to the fundamental earnings 
process from the ability of the accounting measurement process to contribute to the quality of 
reported earnings.  The research attempts to separate abnormal accruals from normal accruals, but 
the distinction between the normal accruals and X as a source of reported earnings quality is still an 
open question. 
In the remainder of this section, we summarize our specific findings on each individual EQ 
proxy (Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.3).  Detailed discussions of the papers and justification for the 
conclusions are discussed in the survey section noted.  Exhibit 1 provides an overview of each 
proxy, its strengths and its weakness, and how fundamentals and measurement error in the 
accounting system are likely to affect the proxy.  In Section 2.3, we outline additional conclusions 
based on our survey of the entirety of the network of studies, with some suggestions of future 
research opportunities. 
 
2.2 Specific findings on each EQ proxy 
2.2.1 Properties of earnings 
Earnings persistence and accruals (Section 3.1.1): A considerable number of studies provide 
evidence on the ability of reported earnings, and various components of earnings, to predict future 
cash flows relative to cash flows or other earnings metrics.  Another set of studies examines earnings 
persistence directly, typically using an approach that measures the incremental contributions of 
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accruals, in total or individually, and cash flows to earnings persistence.  Researchers have 
partitioned the accruals in many ways in an attempt to characterize the effect of accruals on 
persistence.  For example, researchers have examined normal vs. abnormal accruals, extreme 
accruals (in magnitude), more vs. less reliable accruals, operating vs. investment accruals, short-term 
vs. long-term accruals, and even specific accounts.  A broad summarization of the findings is that the 
cash flow component is more persistent than the accrual component of earnings, and that the 
abnormal accrual component is less persistent than the normal accrual component of earnings.  (See 
Section 3.1.1.) 
The research on persistence does not generally separate the contributions of the fundamental 
earning process (X) and the measurement of the process (e) to the persistence of reported earnings.  
The studies that examine the incremental persistence of accruals to cash flows are not sufficient to 
segregate the effects of “X” from “e” because current cash flows do not represent the fundamental 
earnings process, and in fact, the premise of accrual-based accounting is that accrual-based earnings 
should provide better information about fundamental earnings than current cash flows.  Several 
studies do provide direct evidence on how the application of accounting measurement rules to 
specific earnings processes (or features of a process) affects EQ outcomes.  Penman and Zhang 
(2002), for example, show that expensing costs that have future benefits will lead to higher future 
earnings as the future benefits are “realized” in earnings, but the slowing of these expensed 
“investments” can lead to transitory boosts in earnings.  As a consequence, increases in capitalized 
investments will likely lead to errors such that the currently observed return on assets is not 
sustainable.  Lev and Sougiannis (1996) suggest that the expensing of R&D can lead to an earnings 
stream that does not reflect growth in the fundamental earnings process. 
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In summary, while we may be able to characterize earnings persistence and conclude that 
firms with more persistent earnings have more accurate equity valuations, which implies greater 
decision usefulness, we have relatively less to say about the importance of the measurement process 
in reaching these conclusions.  By clarifying and distinguishing between fundamentals and the 
accounting measurement system, more insights could be obtained about the role of the measurement 
system itself.  
 
Earnings smoothness (Section 3.1.2): As noted in the introduction, the commonly-used smoothness 
proxies are negatively correlated with the other EQ proxies (Table 1).  Because smoothness is based 
on the reported earnings number, it will have a fundamental component that represents the 
smoothness of the firm’s fundamental earnings process.  The other EQ proxies such as persistence, 
timeliness, or value-relevance, however, also are affected by the fundamental earnings process and 
the application of the measurement system to that process.  Hence, the negative correlation suggests 
that the application of accounting measurement to the fundamental process does not have the same 
impact on resulting smoothness properties of reported earnings as it does for the other proxies.5  
Another finding that is different for smoothness than for the other EQ proxies is that the limited 
literature that has examined the use of discretionary accruals to artificially smooth earnings (by U.S. 
firms) suggests that smoothing is value-relevant rather than opportunistic (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996, 
and Tucker and Zarowin, 2005).   
                                                 
5 Ewert and Wagenhofer (2009) just recently distributed a working paper that models a firm’s accounting choices over a 
single earnings process and measures various properties of the reported earnings including smoothness, persistence, and 
value relevance.  Each of these commonly used proxies for earnings quality is evaluated relative to an unobservable but 
known construct in their model that represents the reduction in the variance of the terminal value in an equity valuation 
model associated with reported earnings.  Likewise, Basu (1997) shows that persistence, asymmetric timeliness, and 
ERCs are related properties.   
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While we identify these contradictions between smoothness and the other EQ proxies, we are 
short on explanations.  There is little research that attempts to ascertain the “normal” component of 
smoothness that results from unbiased application of an accrual process to the firm’s unobservable 
fundamental earnings process.  As shown in Figure 1, only three papers in our database examine 
fundamental firm characteristics and smoothness proxies and one finds negative evidence.  
Smoothness has generated more consistent results as a proxy for earnings quality, and in particular 
for earnings management, in cross-country studies.  The international evidence suggests that there is 
a significant component of smoothness that is artificial and that represents opportunistic earnings 
management.  This finding, which contrasts with the limited findings in the U.S., may result from 
the ability to create a smoothness proxy that captures cross-sectional variation in artificial smoothing 
or earnings management.  In international studies, researchers typically benchmark earnings 
smoothness against the smoothness of operating cash flows (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).  
In these settings, the cross-sectional variation in the discretionary component of smoothness may 
dominate the measurement error in the fundamental component of smoothness, which makes the 
“abnormal smoothness” measure a reasonable proxy for earnings management.  More research could 
be done to explain the inconsistencies between the firm-level results in the U.S. versus the country 
level results. 
In summary, the ability of smoothness to capture 1) the smoothness of a firm’s fundamental 
earnings process, 2) the smoothness induced by the unbiased application of an accounting 
measurement system to that process, and 3) the effect of intentional distortions on smoothness, is 
still very much an open question. 
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Timely loss recognition/Asymmetric timeliness (Section 3.1.3): Timely loss recognition measures 
get more at the heart of the distinction between the quality of the fundamental earnings process (X) 
and the ability of the accounting system to measure the process (e) than the other EQ proxies.  A 
stronger association of earnings with negative stock returns is more likely to be related to the 
application of financial reporting rules to a fundamental earnings process than to be a feature of the 
process itself (since stock returns are not an output of the accrual accounting system).  However, 
differences in timely loss recognition within countries (or regions) with the same standards or legal 
origin suggest that timely loss recognition has an endogenous component related to firms’ reporting 
incentives.  It is not driven purely by a country’s accounting system. 
Using the returns-based measure of timely loss recognition as proxies for quality, however, 
requires that the researcher consider two significant issues.  First, variation in asymmetric timeliness 
may reflect variation in the ability of earnings to capture value relevant information, as generally 
predicted, or it may be evidence of variation in the ability of returns to reflect value relevant 
information.  The assumption of market efficiency that underlies the interpretation of returns-based 
metrics as a measure of earnings informativeness is not likely to hold equally across markets, which 
will induce omitted correlated variables bias.  This issue is of particular concern in cross-country 
studies due to significant differences in market microstructure and macroeconomic conditions.6  
Second, returns reflect all information, not just information in earnings.  If more conservative 
accounting, conditional or unconditional, is correlated with the production or dissemination of 
alternative information sources (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer, 2001), then again the researcher faces an 
omitted correlated variables problem.   
                                                 
6 Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) emphasize the benefits of their sample – within East Asia – to mitigate the concern that 
cross-country variation in ERCs reflects variation in the return generating process rather than differences in earnings 
quality.   
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 Proxies for asymmetric timeliness based on the tendency of accruals to reverse avoid the 
above noted problems associated with returns-based metrics.  (Section 3.1.3 discusses these metrics, 
proposed by Basu, 1997, and implemented in studies such as Ball and Shivakumar, 2005.)  Similar 
to the concern raised about accruals models, this attempt to control for the fundamental earnings 
process is based on reported accrual-based earnings associated with the process (growth in sales 
revenue, for example). 
 
Benchmarking (Section 3.1.4): The benchmarking studies use small positive differences between 
reported earnings and any benchmark as a measure of earnings quality.  This literature includes 
studies that examine the “kink” in the distribution of reported earnings around zero (e.g., Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997), as well as studies of firms that report small positive profits or avoid small losses, 
or “meet or beat” forecasts. 
A common but controversial interpretation of the kink in the earnings distribution around 
zero is that firms with small (unmanaged) losses intentionally manage earnings just enough to report 
a small profit.  The evidence on whether the kink in earnings around zero implies that small profits 
likely contain a managed component is mixed at best.  The relation between small profits and 
earnings management proxies is supported mostly in accrual-specific studies.  Taken together, these 
results suggest that the use of small profits as a proxy for earnings management is setting-specific 
and not generalizable. 
Evidence that earnings are likely managed when firms just meet or beat an external target is 
more persuasive.  An important caveat to this evidence is that firms that are constrained in their 
ability to manage earnings may not meet or beat a target (Barton and Simko, 2002).  Thus, meeting 
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or beating a target represents a censored measure of earnings management.  In addition, the analyst 
forecast target can also be managed. 
The evidence on the quarterly patterns in earnings distributions are somewhat conflicting.  
Kerstein and Rai (2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) find that the kink in earnings around zero is 
strongest in the fourth quarter.  Both papers emphasize their finding as evidence that the kink implies 
earnings management because the incentives to manage earnings are greatest in Q4.  Brown and 
Pinello (2007), however, find that avoiding small negative analyst forecast errors is strongest in 
interim quarters.  They emphasize their result as evidence of greater earnings management in interim 
quarters when the opportunities are greatest.  The first two studies examine small profit firms while 
Brown and Pinello (2007) examine firms that avoid missing analyst forecast targets.  Differences in 
the incentives and opportunities to meet these targets may explain the seemingly conflicting results. 
 
2.2.2 Earnings response coefficients (Section 3.2) 
Liu and Thomas (2000) conclude that the ERC can be viewed as a measure of higher quality 
earnings (p. 73) based on the finding that the observed ERC will be high when the correlation 
between unexpected earnings and forecast revisions is high.  Their conclusion about the ERC as a 
proxy for earnings quality is in the sense of Graham and Dodd (1934) in that a higher ERC is 
associated with predictability of the fundamental earnings process.  However, researchers should not 
take the Liu and Thomas (2000) conclusion out of their context and assume they can use the ERC, or 
the R2 from the ERC regression, as a proxy for quality in any context.  Liu and Thomas (2000) 
indicate, for example, that the degree to which the ERC captures quality is sensitive to the degree of 
heterogeneity of the correlation between unexpected earnings and forecast revisions within the 
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sample.  Hence, sample specific characteristics that affect within-sample heterogeneity, such as 
growth, are important. 
For three reasons, researchers must be cautious when using the ex post observed ERC (or the 
regression R2) as a proxy for ex ante earnings quality, interpreted as the ability of the financial 
reporting system to capture relevant economic activities.  First, because of the relation between 
earnings quality and voluntary disclosure, the observed ERC does not reflect the cross-sectional 
variation in ex ante earnings quality.  This same criticism was discussed for asymmetric timeliness 
and returns-based metrics in general.  Second, the prediction that a more precise earnings report will 
yield higher ERCs (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988) does not anticipate sources of variation in 
investor estimates of precision unrelated to the earnings number, such as the heightened uncertainty 
during a proxy contest (Collins and DeAngelo, 1990) or variation in the ability of equity markets to 
assess quality (i.e., markets are not equally efficient).  Finally, returns, which are the other element 
of ERCs besides earnings, can exhibit cross-sectional and time-series variation (Johnson, 1999; 
Hoitash, Krishnan, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2002).  Hence, ERCs may work as a proxy for earnings 
quality in a differences-in-differences analysis that can control for these alternative sources of 
variation in the ERCs, but these problems generally pose significant challenges in most research 
settings/designs. 
 
2.2.3 External indicators of financial reporting quality (Section 3.3) 
Studies using AAERs, restatements, and SOX internal control deficiency reports as proxies 
for earnings quality help to validate various proxies for earnings quality.  They are also a useful 
setting to validate the theoretical determinants and consequences of quality that are investigated in 
other contexts.  Each sample, however, has limitations as a measure of earnings quality, in general, 
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or of earnings management.  The AAER sample includes earnings management cases that are 
typically outside of GAAP and are identified by the SEC.  This sample is likely to contain only the 
most egregious misstatements and excludes many firms that are likely to be managing earnings.  The 
restatement sample includes some immaterial misstatements, corrections of unintentional errors, and 
applications of some new pronouncements (e.g., SAB 101 required retroactive restatement).  The 
sample of firms that disclose internal control deficiencies could be affected by manager and auditor 
incentives to discover and disclose the weaknesses.  The restatement sample offers an opportunity to 
explore variation in the implications of unintentional versus intentional misstatements in various 
decision-making contexts, although that variation has not been exploited, with the exception of 
Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008). 
The relation between internal control procedures and external auditors is not adequately 
explored.  An exception is Hogan and Wilkins (2008), who document that audit fees in the year 
prior to the disclosure of an internal control deficiency are higher than the fees for a matched sample 
that does not report deficiencies.  One explanation for this finding is that auditors charge higher fees 
for the extra audit effort required to audit firms with weak controls.  In this case, we would observe 
an association between fees and weak internal controls, but not necessarily between fees and 
earnings quality.  Another explanation is that auditors charge higher fees when the assessed audit 
risk is higher, and weak controls are correlated with audit risk assessments (i.e., the fees represent a 
pure risk premium).  In this case, we would observe a relation between internal controls and earnings 
quality.  Hogan and Wilkins emphasize the second explanation while admitting that they cannot rule 
out the risk premium story.   
The studies that investigate the determinants and consequences of the external indicators of 
financial reporting quality emphasize the incentives and opportunities for intentional and 
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unintentional misstatements, which are two of the three elements of the fraud triangle, but they do 
not investigate the third element: attitude.  Recently, several studies have tried to examine the role of 
executive characteristics in financial reporting decisions, including accounting fraud (Hribar and 
Yang, 2007; Schrand and Zechman, 2009; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang, 2009). 
2.3 Overview of the network and research opportunities 
This section summarizes ten additional research-related conclusions. 
1) Some studies treat the earnings quality proxies as substitutes and test hypothesized predictions 
about a determinant or consequence of “earnings quality” using a proxy for earnings quality that 
does not appropriately measure the theoretical construct.  That is, not all studies carefully register 
that the testable hypotheses about the determinants and consequences of earnings quality come from 
decision models and the models suggest a specific form of decision usefulness (i.e., earnings 
quality).  We observe some mixed results that appear to be driven by a mismatch between the 
theoretical construct for decision-usefulness and the proxies.  A good example is the studies of 
accrual quality (see Section 2.1.1.4).  There is strong (mixed) [weak] evidence that internal control 
procedures (audit quality) [governance characteristics] affect accrual quality.  The order of the 
strength of the evidence is consistent with the order of construct validity.  Internal control procedures 
are meant to detect and/or prevent both the ability to manipulate earnings as well as mistakes or 
errors, and the accrual proxies used in these studies generally represent the types of errors that 
internal controls could prevent.  An auditor’s responsibility, however, is only to report on whether 
the financial statements conform to GAAP, and the prediction that audit quality (typically measured 
by a proxy for independence) would be associated with abnormal accruals is less compelling.  
Finally, the predicted association between governance quality and accrual quality is particularly 
tenuous.  It is not clear why some commonly used indicators of governance quality, for example 
 19
number of outside directors, should, can, or will have a detectable influence on the accounting 
reporting system, in general, and the accrual process, in particular. 
This construct validity issue extends to all the measures of earnings quality.  When a paper 
provides a model of the accrual process, or of persistence, or of ERCs as a direct proxy for earnings 
quality, and states that the proxy exhibits “high quality” characteristics, researchers from that point 
forward use the measure as a proxy for “quality” and it becomes accepted.  The researchers that 
originally developed the measure typically emphasize its short comings and conclude on its 
decision-usefulness in a specific decision context, but the use of the proxy gets extended 
inappropriately.  Interestingly, Ball and Foster (1982) expressed a similar concern about the use of 
size as a proxy for political costs. 
 
(2) Two facts that are independently recognized in the literature are that (i) firms face multiple 
objectives associated with reported earnings but they are constrained to report only one earnings 
number,7 and (ii) firms can choose a set (or portfolio) of accounting choices to meet their objectives.  
Equity markets are an obvious source of incentives, but research on the determinants of accounting 
choices recognizes the financial reporting incentives that result from explicit or implicit contracts 
with parties other than equity holders such as litigation, debt contracting, proprietary costs, 
compensation, and internal information needs.  Studies that recognize these non-equity market 
incentives for financial reporting, however, typically examine their effects on accounting choices 
independently, and predict an accounting choice, rather than examining the trade-offs among 
multiple objectives. 
                                                 
7 See Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) for a well-articulated discussion of this issue. Theory that incorporates multiple 
users predicts variation in accounting choice or contracting arrangements in the presence of financial statement users 
with different information needs (e.g., Demski, 1973; Evans and Sridhar, 1996; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang, 2007).  
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Empirical studies have examined multiple incentives (most commonly financial reporting, 
tax and regulatory objectives for financial institutions), but they typically examine accounting choice 
related to one particular account (e.g., loan loss provisions).  The studies do not consider the 
alternative mechanisms that firms might use to achieve the firm’s multiple earnings objectives.  On 
the flip side, empirical studies have examined multiple accounting choices to achieve a single 
objective (e.g., real earnings management vs. discretionary accruals), although studies of this type 
are relatively limited. 
There is almost no evidence on whether firms optimize over a set of accounting choices to 
meet multiple objectives, despite variation across accounting choices, such as methods and accrual 
estimations, with respect to their ability to meet a firm’s objectives.8  Certain accrual choices, for 
example, may be sufficient to avoid debt covenant violation, but they also may produce a less 
persistent earnings number, which affects the decision usefulness of earnings for equity markets.   
Theory papers seem more progressive on this dimension than the empirical studies (e.g., 
Evans and Sridhar, 1996; Liang, 2004; Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang, 2007), including variations on 
the optimal contracts with outsiders that affect the choice (Sridhar and Magee, 1996).  However, 
even these models are generally concerned with the implications of multiple objectives on a single 
accounting choice, and they do not also address the issue that the firm makes a portfolio of choices 
that in the aggregate affect earnings.  Christensen, Feltham, and Sabac (2005), however, recognize 
this issue: “Increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are 
generally desirable for valuation, but not for contracting. Eliminating transitory components of 
earnings is generally desirable for valuation, but not necessarily for contracting.”  Kirschenheiter 
                                                 
8 Notable exceptions are Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1996) and Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) examines both 
multiple tools and multiple incentives.  
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and Melumad (2002) similarly emphasize the important trade-off between reporting high “real” 
levels of income, which are suggested to be more informative, and earnings smoothness. 
 
(3) A consistent finding across studies that test a variety of theories in different settings and using 
different proxies for EQ is that when investors are able to observe, or rationally infer, increased 
estimation error (intentional or unintentional), they internalize its effect on price.  Therefore, where 
the manipulation is more transparent or where the incentives are more obvious, investors will 
anticipate and discount potential earnings management or accounting distortions.   
Numerous examples support this statement.  For example, investors discount upward 
earnings management when banks are highly levered and close to capital market constraints.  
Investors discount downward earnings management when they are aware that managers will be 
issued with repriced options.  Investors discount the discretionary accrual component of earnings 
when information on accruals is disclosed at the earnings release.  Investors in the property and 
casualty insurance industry understand and correctly price the accrual related to future payouts 
because there are extensive disclosures related to this accrual’s errors and corrections.  Meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts on an ad hoc basis does not lead to higher valuations, but meeting or 
beating regularly does.  See additional examples in the discussion of equity market consequences in 
Section 3.1.1.5. 
 
(4) Taken together, the previous two observations – that firms might tailor accounting mechanism 
choices to specific earnings objectives and that equity investors can rationally infer or observe 
earnings management – suggests predictable patterns in the portfolio of a firm’s accounting choices.  
If firms want to influence debt contracting outcomes but not at the expense of their cost of equity, 
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there are (in theory) predictable accounting choices that can meet both objectives.  For example, in a 
world of imperfect debt contracting, many types of gains can prevent covenant violation, but if they 
are made transparent, equity investors can undo their effect on earnings and they will not affect 
“information quality.”  This observation represents a research opportunity, but it also suggests that it 
is difficult to interpret the evidence of studies that focus on only one determinant of an accounting 
choice. 
Recognizing that the single reported earnings number is the outcome of a complicated 
number of choices, motivated by multiple incentives, has implications for understanding the 
consequences of earnings quality.  If equityholders understand a firm’s incentives for reporting 
earnings, and if they understand its constraint to report only one earnings number, and if they have 
the ability to interpret reported earnings and/or to substitute other information for reported earnings, 
then we may not observe positive market responses to earnings that are of high quality with respect 
to equity valuation decisions.  In fact, equity markets might respond negatively to firms that do not 
report a number that maximizes firm value, even if it distorts the ability of earnings to capture the 
firm’s fundamental earnings process.  In contrast, if equityholders do not recognize the earnings 
management to meet non-equity market objectives, accounting choices will have a spillover effect to 
the equity markets.  Studies of accounting choice generally do not emphasize the trade-off between 
the short-term benefits of opportunistic accounting choices at the time of an event (e.g., an IPO) and 
the potential long-term reputation loss due to these one-off earnings management decisions. 
 
(5) As noted previously, the determinants and consequences of abnormal accruals have received the 
most attention.  The literature tends to validate accruals models by showing that the abnormal 
accrual is correlated with hypothesized predicted determinants or consequence of abnormal accruals.  
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Other studies attempt to validate discretionary accruals from accruals models using external 
indicators of financial reporting quality such as restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and SOX 
internal control deficiency reports.  The type II error rate in these samples, however, is extremely 
high (most high discretionary accrual firms are not members of these samples).  Therefore, positive 
correlations are supportive evidence but far from conclusive. 
Few papers, however, validate the accruals models by examining the “normal” component of 
accruals.  Our understanding of earnings quality would benefit from more direct evidence on how an 
imperfect measurement system, when applied without intentional bias, distorts the measurement of a 
firm’s fundamental earnings process.  Examples of research along these lines include Landsman and 
Shakespeare (2005) who put securitizations back on the balance sheet; Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
who capitalizes and expenses R&D; Ge (2007) who capitalizes operating leases; and Dutta and 
Reichelstein (2005) who provide theoretical work on optimal capitalization policies. 
 
(6) While it has long been recognized that accounting choices can be motivated by opportunism or 
efficient contracting, we still do not have sufficient evidence on this issue (see Christie and 
Zimmerman, 1994, Bowen et al., 2008).  Again, the issue of multiple objectives arises, because a 
single accounting choice may appear opportunistic if hypothesized to be related to one objective, 
while the inference is invalid when allowing firms to have multiple objectives but constraining them 
to choose only one earnings number.  This issue was raised in studies that use properties of earnings, 
accruals, and ERCs as proxies for EQ, yet the research is inconclusive. 
 
(7) We are not aware of studies about a firm’s earnings-related accounting choices when the 
anticipated impact of the choice on earnings properties is expected to be limited because the property 
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is primarily driven by the firm’s fundamental earnings process.  In other words, if the firm cannot 
produce a persistent earnings number given the nature of operations, does it bother to make choices 
to produce the most persistent number possible?  Or, does the firm give up on producing a persistent 
earnings stream and instead optimize according to another goal?  Does the firm substitute for 
fundamentally low quality earnings with additional disclosure, along the lines examined in Francis, 
Nanda, and Olsson (2008)? 
 
(8) Few papers attempt classical construct validity analyses.  In fact, our database of papers contains 
only one study that employs classical methods for construct validation: Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2006), who perform a construct validity analysis of their “e-loading” proxy for accrual 
(earnings) quality.  Several studies run “horse races” across accruals models (e.g., Guay, Kothari, 
and Watts, 1996), or consider extensions and improvements to specific models (e.g., Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1996) and Leone, Kothari, and Wasley (2005) of the Jones model; McNichols (2002), 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005), and Wysocki (2008) on the Dechow/Dichev model).  
These studies improve our understanding of the models, but additional analysis on construct validity 
would be useful. 
 
(9) Most of the theory-testing papers test a prediction about either a determinant of quality or a 
consequence of quality, but not both.  Figures 1 and 2 show that researchers have individually 
established links between the various determinants and the EQ proxies, and separately between the 
EQ proxies and the consequences.  However, there is limited evidence on how a particular 
determinant affects earnings quality and then on the consequences of the resulting earnings quality.  
Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) provide a good example of this type of research.  They 
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examine both determinants (i.e., governance) and consequences (i.e., future performance) of 
earnings management to disentangle two alternative explanations for earnings management: 
unexpected managerial opportunism versus efficient contracting.  Their “complete path” approach 
offers insights that are not available from studies that examine only one side (i.e., determinant or 
consequence) of earnings quality.  In other words, external auditors and internal controls may both 
affect abnormal accruals, and abnormal accruals may affect the cost of capital, but is the impact of 
accruals on the cost of capital the same when the source is external auditors rather than controls?  
Other good examples are Xie (2001) and Liu and Thomas (2000). 
 
(10) Our survey indicates a number of inconsistencies in the tests of the determinants or 
consequences of earnings quality.  (Figures 1 and 2 reveal these inconsistencies.)  We highlight 
several in the following table: 
Research question Yes No 
Does incentive equity compensation provide 
incentives to manipulate earnings? 
Efendi et al., 2007 Armstrong et al., 2009 
Is better corporate governance associated with higher 
earnings quality? 
Klein, 2002 Larcker et al., 2007 
Does nonaudit service compromise audit quality? Frankel et al., 2002 Ashbaugh et al., 2003 
Are SOX 404 disclosures informative to investors? Ashbagh-Skaife et 
al., 2009 
Ogneva et al., 2007 
Does managerial opportunism or efficient contracting 
drive earnings management? 
Becker et al., 1998 
(opportunism) 
Bowen et al., 2008 
(efficient contracting) 
 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, studies that examine a particular consequence or determinant 
frequently use the same EQ proxy, so it is not differences in the quality proxy that lead to these 
mixed results.  A significant source of the differences appears to be differences in sample or 
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methodology.  Studies could make unique predictions across proxies.  The predictions may be in 
degrees: determinant X is predicted to have a stronger impact on quality proxy Y than on Z.  Or, the 
tests may be designed to assess divergent validity (i.e., counterfactual examples): determinant X is 
predicted to be associated with quality proxy Y but not with Z.  A greater focus on stronger 
identification strategies in research designs could help sort out the mixed evidence given the various 
methodological issues associated with distinguishing the fundamental component of earnings quality 
from the process. 
 
3. Proxies for earnings quality 
This section juxtaposes the studies according to the proxy they use for earnings quality (see 
Table 1, Panel A).  We define three categories of proxies: 1) Properties of earnings; 2) Earnings 
response coefficients (ERCs); and 3) External indicators of financial reporting quality (FRQ). 
 
3.1 Properties of earnings 
We distinguish four groups of earnings properties: Persistence, asymmetric timeliness and 
timely loss recognition, smoothness of earnings, and “benchmarking.”  Section 3.1.1 discusses 
research that examines the persistence of earnings and accrual models.  Studies that use the term 
predictability and examine earnings usefulness to predict future cash flows are included in this 
section as well.  Section 3.1.2.examines research on earnings smoothness and variability.  The 
benchmarking category (Section 3.1.4) includes measures of earnings relative to any benchmark. 
 
 27
3.1.1 Persistence of earnings and models of accruals 
Studies of earnings persistence and cash flow predictability are motivated by an assumption 
that persistence (or predictability) improves decision-usefulness in an equity valuation context, in 
particular in models that are variants of neoclassical discounted dividend (DD) models.  Model 
variants based on dividends, cash flows, and earnings are theoretically equivalent under specific 
assumptions about the relations between dividends, cash flows, and earnings (Penman, 1998; 
Penman and Sougiannis, 2000; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001).  While theoretically equivalent, the 
models deviate in their ability to predict fundamental firm value in practice.  The deviations depend 
on the degree of conformity of observable model inputs with the model’s underlying assumptions 
and on the sensitivity of the valuation to this conformity.  In particular, the computation of the 
terminal value, which is a significant component of the valuation, depends critically on assumptions 
about growth and persistence. 
Penman and Sougiannis (1998) provide evidence on the comparative decision usefulness of 
the models, which in turn has implications for assessing the benchmark that should be used to 
evaluate the decision usefulness of an earnings number.  In summary, they conclude that over 
various time horizons, in models with and without a terminal value assumption, models that apply 
simple forecasting assumptions to earnings provide a better forecast of current market value than 
models based on cash-flow or dividend forecasts.  However, the point is that an assessment of 
whether cash flow predictability or earnings persistence is a better measure of decision usefulness in 
equity valuation depends as much on the proxy as it does on the decision model.  In other words, 
being able to predict one-year-ahead cash flows may be an irrelevant measure of quality if cash flow 
based equity valuation models produce high prediction errors.   
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The discussion of earnings persistence and predictability is organized as follows.  Section 
3.1.1.1 discusses research that examines the usefulness of earnings and accrual components to 
predict expected future cash flows, where future cash flows are measured in a variety of ways, such 
as one year-ahead cash flows, or market value.  Section 3.1.1.2 discusses research that examines 
earnings persistence, motivated by the notion that it is important to understand earnings persistence 
as an input to equity valuation.  The determinants and consequences of persistence are discussed in 
Sections 3.1.1.3 and 3.1.1.4.  Finally, Sections 3.1.1.5 and 3.1.1.6 discuss accruals models and 
interpretation issues related to these models, as the resulting measures of abnormal accruals are a 
large and distinct part of the literature.  We leave a detailed discussion of the determinants and 
consequences of abnormal accruals to later sections of the paper.   
 
3.1.1.1 The usefulness of earnings and accrual information to predict future cash flows  
Research that characterizes the predictive ability for future cash flows is motivated by the 
assumption that the prediction of cash flows as inputs to equity valuation models will be useful.  
Hence, a common measure of cash flow is one-year or two-year-ahead cash flows.  The researcher 
compares the R2s or the coefficients from models that include current earnings to those of models 
that include other measures of performance such as dividends, cash from operations, or earnings 
excluding various accruals (e.g., earnings before depreciation and taxes). 
Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001) find that cash flows are superior to earnings at predicting 
future cash flows, and Bowen et al. (1986) find that earnings are at least not superior.  Greenberg et 
al. (1986), however, find that the predictive ability of aggregate earnings is superior to cash flows.  
Finger (1994) finds that earnings and cash flow have similar predictive ability for longer horizons, 
but cash flow is slightly superior to earnings for short horizons.  A cash flow prediction model that 
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disaggregates the working capital and other accrual components of earnings results in lower cash 
flow forecast errors and improved predictability (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998; Barth et al., 
2001).9 
 
3.1.1.2 The usefulness of earnings to predict future earnings 
Research that characterizes the persistence of earnings is motivated by the assumption that 
more persistent earnings will yield better inputs to equity valuation models.  A simple model 
specification estimates earnings persistence as: 
Earningst+1=α+β1Earningst+εt 
Researcher can add other financial statements elements or variables outside the financial statements 
(e.g., market based measures or disclosures from the footnotes) to examine to examine their 
incremental explanatory power to predict future earnings: 
Earningst+1=α+β1Earningst+β2components of financial statements or other informationt + εt 
If β2 is significant in either direction, then the researcher has identified a determinant of 
future earnings that provides incremental information beyond current earnings.  Alternatively, 
researchers can decompose earnings into its components and examine whether the components have 
different implications for future earnings.  For example, Sloan (1996) examines two components of 
earnings: 
Earningst+1=α+β1CFt+β2Accrualst+εt 
                                                 
9 Some studies use this framework, measuring relative predictive ability, but model future earnings. These studies 
consistently find that special items as a subset of accruals do not improve the ability of accrual earnings to predict future 
earnings relative to cash based earnings (e.g., Barth et al., 2001; Dechow and Ge, 2006).  Other studies model 
contemporaneous stock returns (Ball and Brown 1968, Dechow 1994) or market value (Penman and Sourgiannis 1998).  
Stock based measures generally find that accruals help improve earnings ability to reflect value (except if earnings 
includes  large write-downs or special items). 
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and documents that β2 < β1, which implies that the cash flow component of earnings is more 
persistent than the accrual component. 
As noted in the introduction, reported earnings represents the firm’s fundamental earnings 
process (X) and the measurement of that process (e).  Thus, when researchers add financial 
statement ratios to the incremental predictability model above, the ratios they add are generally 
computed using reported accounting numbers.  Thus, they do not disentangle the unobservable 
fundamental earnings process (X) from the measurement of the process.  Likewise, any 
decomposition of accruals into its components decomposes them based on their reported amounts.  
Clearly, we recognize the constraint that researchers face when they attempt to measure an 
unobservable construct like the fundamental earnings process.  By highlighting this issue, we hope 
that researchers can search for better instruments than reported numbers to capture the effects of the 
persistence of “X” on the persistence of earnings. 
 
3.1.1.3 Determinants of persistence 
This section discusses studies 1) that model the incremental explanatory power of variables 
over current earnings for future earnings, and 2) that document the predictive ability of earnings 
components as determinants of persistence.  While it was just noted that predictability of future 
earnings is likely to be driven to a large extent by the business in which the firm operates, there is 
little work that uses the approach above to test for such determinants.  Lev (1983) associates 
persistence with product type, industry competition, capital intensity, and firm size, generally 
motivating these variables as proxies for uncertainty of the business process.  Baginski, Lorek, 
Willinger, and Branson (1999) find that the relations documented in Lev (1983) are weak using 
persistence metrics from lower-order time series models but exist when the measure of persistence is 
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a differenced, higher order model.10  Several studies predict and find that firms that differentiate their 
products (measured by higher margins and lower turnover) have more persistent earnings than firms 
following a cost leadership strategy (i.e., lower margins and higher turnover).  See, for example, 
Nissim and Penman (2000), Fairfield and Yohn (2001), and Soliman (2008).  These results suggest 
that creating barriers to entry by having a technology such that the firm can sell its product at lower 
cost is more sustainable than creating a unique product to satisfy consumer desires.  However, the 
benefits of cost leadership are likely to be highly contextual.   
Accruals, in various forms, as a component of earnings are the most studied determinant of 
persistence.  Sloan (1996) documents that the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than 
the cash flow component of earnings.  His definition of accruals is non-cash working capital accruals 
plus depreciation.  Richardson, Solimon, Sloan, and Tuna (2005) provide a more comprehensive 
measure of accruals (intuitively, the change in net operating assets or the difference between 
earnings and free cash flows) and show that this measure of “total accruals” is less persistent than 
cash flows.   
There have been further break-downs of accruals into various components, using similar 
methodologies to assess predictability for future earnings.11  For example, Lev and Thiagarajan (LT, 
1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (AB, 1997) focus on inventory and accounts receivable.  With 
respect to inventory accruals, the quality metric, which measures poor quality, is significantly 
negatively associated with future changes in EPS (AB, 1997) and contemporaneous returns (LT, 
                                                 
10 Early studies that analyzed the statistical process that underlies earnings include Foster, 1977; Watts and Leftwich, 
1977; Albrecht, Lookabill, and McKeown, 1977; Beaver, 1970; and Griffin, 1977.  Baginski, Lorek, Willinger, and 
Branson (1999) emphasize that time-series modeling assumptions can create significant differences in parameter 
estimates, and lead to different economic conclusions about persistence. 
11 Melumad and Nissim (2008) provide an analysis of earnings quality by looking at specific accrual line items.  We 
discuss these examples to emphasize the conflicting evidence. 
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1993).12  The studies find conflicting evidence on accounts receivable accruals.  LT (1993) find a 
negative relation between abnormal accounts receivable (receivables changes less sales changes) and 
contemporaneous returns, and they interpret this result as evidence that disproportionate A/R 
changes indicate difficulties in selling the firm’s products, related credit extensions, and premature 
revenue recognition.13  AB (1997), however, find an unexpectedly positive relation between 
abnormal receivables and one-year ahead earnings changes, which they interpret as evidence that 
receivables growth indicates sales growth and not reliability or customer collection problems.  More 
research is needed to resolve these conflicting findings.  
Dechow and Ge (2005) suggest that large negative accruals are less persistent than cash 
flows because large negative accruals often reflect write-offs and impairment charges that “correct” 
the balance sheet (see also Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn 1996).  They show that low accrual firms 
have proportionally greater levels of special items, and that these non-recurring charges play an 
important role in the lower earnings persistence for these firms.  Nissim and Penman (2001) also 
suggest that unusual items affect earnings persistence. 
Researchers also suggest that the sources and uses of cash flows affect earnings persistence.  
Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2005) show that retained cash flows have very similar implications 
for persistence to accruals.  Cash flows related to the payment or issuances of equity are the major 
determinant of the higher persistence of the cash flow component of earnings relative to accruals.  
Nissim and Penman (2003) decompose return on assets into an operating leverage component and a 
financial leverage component.  They suggest that an increase in operating leverage is likely to 
                                                 
12 Thomas and Zhang (2002) do not assess whether changes in inventory are a less persistent component of earnings 
directly.  However, the do find that the change in inventory is the strongest driver of accrual anomaly hedge returns.  
LaFond (2005) also documents that inventory accruals explain hedge returns in 13 out of 17 countries.  Allen, Larson, 
and Sloan (2009) do show that growth in inventory result in less persistent earnings.  Their results suggest that 
measurement error plays an important role since write-downs of inventory is a key driver of the lower persistence.   
13 LT also find no relation between the abnormal component of the provision for doubtful receivables and 
contemporaneous returns, which they describe as surprising.  
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depress current earnings but lead to future improvements in earnings.  An increase in financial 
leverage, however, tends to have an incrementally negative effect on future earnings (scaled by 
equity). 
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003a) suggest that growth and conservatism in accruals 
could be determinants of the lower persistence of the accrual component of earnings.  They show 
that the change in PPE has similar implications for persistence as working capital accruals.  
However, the measurement of PPE is itself a product of the accrual accounting system and the 
growth in this variable could also reflect accounting measurement problems (see Zhang, 2007).  
Richardson et al. (2005) further investigate growth.  They decompose the change in net operating 
assets (total accruals) into a growth component (proxied by sales growth) and an efficiency 
component (net operating asset turnover ratio) and an interaction effect.  They show that declines in 
efficiency and growth both play a role in the lower persistence of the accrual component.  While 
their paper suggests that growth is not a complete explanation for the low persistence parameter on 
accruals, it suffers from the same criticism that sales growth, as a proxy for growth, is itself a 
product of the accrual accounting system. 
Researchers have also attempted to directly examine whether forecast errors made by 
management (that will affect the magnitude of accruals) and their subsequent corrections have 
implications for earnings persistence.  Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a measure of accrual 
quality based on accruals modeled as a function of past, present, and future cash flows (discussed 
later in this section).  Holding the magnitude of accruals constant, earnings persistence is negatively 
associated with the Dechow/Dichev accruals quality measure.  In contrast, holding the accruals 
quality measure constant, the association between persistence and the magnitude of accruals is much 
weaker. 
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Xie (2001) uses the Jones model (discussed later in this section) to decompose accruals into a 
normal and abnormal component.  The abnormal component is likely to contain more measurement 
error and managerial discretion.  He finds the persistence parameters on cash flows, normal accruals, 
and discretionary accruals are 0.73, 0.7, and 0.57.  This result indicates that discretionary accruals 
are less persistent than either normal accruals or cash flows, consistent with reliability and 
measurement issue concerns.  Richardson et al. (2005) develop a model of reliability and argue that 
operating assets and liabilities are less reliably measured than financial assets and liabilities.  
Consistent with their predictions, they find that working capital (operating) accruals have the lowest 
reliability, accruals related to financial assets and liability have the highest, and long-term operating 
accruals are in the middle.  Broadly speaking, they find a positive relation between their ex ante 
reliability rankings and return on assets.   
Internal control violations under the Sarbanes Oxley act are suggestive of measurement error 
and problems with the accounting system.  Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007a) find that firms that 
disclose they have at least one material weakness during the 2002-2005 period, have less persistent 
earnings.  Finally, Wang (2006) finds a positive association between founding family ownership and 
proxies for accrual quality and earnings persistence. 
 
3.1.1.4 Consequences of persistence 
 The vast majority of papers on consequences of persistence examine equity market 
consequences.  A few papers discuss consequences that we refer to collectively as other-than-equity-
market consequences. 
Equity market consequences: Researchers hypothesize two distinct equity market consequences of 
persistence.  The first prediction is that more persistent earnings will yield a higher equity market 
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valuation and, therefore, that increases in estimates of persistence will yield positive 
(contemporaneous) equity market returns.  Early research by Komendi and Lipe (1987), Collins and 
Kothari (1989), and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) provide evidence that more persistent earnings 
have a stronger stock price response and association. 
However, subsequent research on the accrual anomaly suggests that investors do not fully 
price the implications of the cash and accrual components for future earnings.  (See Richardson, 
Tuna, and Wysocki, 2009, for a complete review.)  Sloan (1996) documents that a hedge strategy 
that is long in low accrual firms and short in high accrual firms earns approximately a 12 percent 
return per year.  Subsequent studies have provided several explanations for the hedge returns 
including (i) investor misunderstanding of abnormal accruals (Xie, 2001); (ii) investor 
misunderstanding the extent of errors in accruals or reliability (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and 
Tuna, 2005; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003); (iii) investor misunderstanding of the growth reflected in 
accruals (Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2004; Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003a; and 
Zhang, 2007); and (iv) mismeasurement of expected returns or other research design issues (Khan, 
2008; Kraft, Leone, and Wasley, 2006).   
Researchers have also examined whether equity market consequences to the persistence of 
accruals varies with an investor’s information processing ability or with the availability of outside 
information.  Louis and Robinson (2005) find that stock split announcements add credibility to 
accruals.  Levi (2008) finds that the accrual anomaly exists only for firms that delay the release of 
accrual information to their 10-Q and do not include cash flow and balance sheet information in 
press releases.  Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003) find that firms with a high level of institutional 
investors and a minimum threshold level of active institutional traders have stock prices that more 
accurately reflect the persistence of accruals.  While Collins et al. (2003) suggest that these 
 36
sophisticated investors do understand differences in accrual quality, Richardson (2003) finds no 
evidence that short-sellers are clustered in high-accrual firms, which one would expect if they 
understand that high accrual firms have less persistent earnings and lower future returns.  However, 
his sample period is 1990 to 1998, and the accrual anomaly did not become widely known until after 
the publication of Sloan in 1996. 
Researchers have also investigated how investors respond to investments that are expensed 
rather than capitalized (such as R&D) since these decisions will have differing implications for 
future earnings.  The results suggest that investors do view R&D expenditures as assets but they do 
not perfectly price the full implications of the R&D investment on future earnings (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996, and Penman and Zhang, 2002).  Similarly, off-balance sheet items such as leases 
are valued by investors, but their implications for future earnings are not perfectly incorporated into 
prices (Ge, 2007).  This line of research suggests that investors appear to react to predictable changes 
in earnings induced by different accounting treatments for investments.   
There is also an extensive line of research examining the implications of write-offs (i.e., large 
negative special items) that are transitory and hence reduce earnings persistence.  Bartov, Lindahl, 
and Ricks (1998) summarize the findings from the literature on write-offs through 1998.  The early 
research documented negative stock market reactions to the announcement of special items, but the 
negative reactions were small (around one percent) and announcement period returns were positive 
if the write-off was associated with a restructuring or an operational change.  Bartov et al. (1998) 
question the small stock price response at the announcement date and examine a sample of 317 
write-offs in 1984 and 1985.  They find annualized negative abnormal returns of -21% over a two-
year period following the announcements of the write-off, robust to various risk adjustments.  As 
previously discussed, Dechow and Ge (2006), however, find that firms with large negative accruals 
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driven by special items have positive future returns, which suggests that investors overweight these 
accruals. 
Several studies also examine the consequences related to industry-specific loss accruals.  
Beaver and Engel (1996) find that the normal component of banks’ allowances for loan loss reserves 
is negatively priced and the abnormal component is incrementally positively priced.  They interpret 
the positive coefficient on abnormal accruals as follows: “…positive effects on security prices can 
occur because discretionary behavior alters the market's assessment of the expected net benefits of 
discretionary behavior or conveys management's beliefs about the future earnings power of the 
bank.”  McNichols and Beaver (2001) find that investors correctly price the loss reserve accrual even 
though they incorrectly price other accruals in a manner consistent with Sloan (1996).  Their finding 
suggests that the extensive disclosures about loss reserve accruals of P&C insurers help investors to 
estimate the persistence and valuation implications of this component. 
Finally, Francis et al. (FLOS, 2005) find that firms with more persistent earnings have a 
lower cost of debt and equity capital.  FLOS use multiple earnings proxies and so for ease of 
exposition and to reduce repetition, we provide an extensive review of the literature that predicts the 
cost of capital as a consequence of earnings quality in Section 6. 
 
Other than-equity-market consequences: Two papers examine compensation decisions as a function 
of earnings persistence.  Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1998) find that earnings persistence increases the 
positive relation between unexpected earnings and the annual change in various components of 
compensation.  Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) find that firms with less persistent earnings have 
lower weight placed on earnings relative to cash flows in compensation.  Both papers attempt to 
distinguish persistence driven by firm fundamentals from persistence associated with accounting 
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measurement.  Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) measure earnings persistence relative to cash flow 
persistence.  Baber et al. (1998) include stock returns in the model. 
Evidence on other consequences is limited.  Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) 
document that sell-side analysts’ forecasts do not fully incorporate the predictable earnings declines 
associated with high-accrual firms.  In addition, high-accrual firms are not more likely to get 
qualified audit opinions or to have auditor changes.  Bradshaw et al. confirm that the high-accrual 
firms indeed have subsequent earnings declines.  Thus, they interpret their findings as evidence that 
analysts and auditors do not appear to be aware of quality issues for high-accrual firms.  Bhojraj and 
Swaminathan (2007) find that bond investors misprice high and low accrual firms in a similar 
manner to equity investors. 
 
Related to persistence: Li (2008) documents that firms that have more readable financial reports have 
more persistent earnings.  Li recognizes causality as an unanswered question, and acknowledges that 
the explanation for the relation is beyond the scope of his paper.  It is an interesting question, and 
one that the developing text analysis software may help us to resolve.  Researchers also have 
investigated the role of management guidance and earnings sustainability.  The results generally 
suggest that managers of firms with more volatile earnings are less likely to provide guidance (see, 
for example, Verrecchia, 1990; Waymire, 1985, and Tucker, 2008). 
 
3.1.1.5 Models of the accrual process 
The objective of accruals models is to dissect accruals into a component that measures 
accrual-based earnings that will be associated with the firm’s fundamental earnings process from 
abnormal accruals, which are assumed to represent accruals that are discretionary or that are the 
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result of intentional or unintentional accounting errors.  Higher levels of accruals that are not 
associated with the firm’s fundamental earnings process are assumed to reduce the quality of 
earnings.  As reported in Figures 1, 2, and 3, abnormal accruals have been used as a proxy to test 
predictions in almost all of the determinants and consequences categories, hence we discuss the 
models.  Exhibit 2 summarizes the most widely used accruals models.   
Jones (1991) explains working capital accruals and depreciation as a function of sales growth 
and PP&E.  The explanatory power of the Jones model is low, explaining only about 10% of the 
variation in accruals. Consistent with the assumption that the residual represents greater discretion, 
as mentioned earlier, Xie (2001) documents that the residuals from the Jones model have lower 
predictive ability for year-ahead earnings than the non-discretionary (i.e., “normal”) accruals.  On 
the downside, the residuals are highly (80%) positively correlated with total accruals (Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna, 2005), and they are positively correlated with earnings performance and 
negatively correlated cash flow performance (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).  These 
correlations are an important concern when the residuals are used to test theories of the determinants 
or consequences of earnings quality, in which performance is an important potential omitted 
correlated variable.  In addition, Dechow, Larson, Ge, and Sloan (2009) show that discretionary 
accruals are generally less powerful than total accruals at detecting earnings management in SEC 
enforcement releases.  This finding suggests that the discretionary accruals modeling process could 
include some accruals representing earnings management in “normal” accruals. 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) modify the Jones model to adjust for growth in credit 
sales.  Credit sales are frequently manipulated, thus this modification increases the power of the 
Jones’ model to yield a residual that is uncorrelated with expected (i.e., normal) revenue accruals 
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and better reflects revenue manipulation.14  However, this model suffers from the same performance-
related problems as described above for the Jones model. 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) and Leone, Kothari, and Wasley (2005) suggest ways 
to combat concerns about the correlation between performance and the residuals from the Jones 
model and modified Jones model.  They both suggest controlling for the normal level of accruals 
conditional on ROA.  Leone et al. (2005) identify a firm from the same industry with the closest 
level of ROA to that of the sample firm and deduct the control firm’s discretionary accruals (i.e., 
residuals) from those of the sample firm to generate “performance-matched” residuals.  Because the 
models of normal accruals that generate the residuals explain only 10% - 12% of the variation in 
accruals, this approach is likely to add noise to the measure of discretionary accruals and it is best 
applied when correlated performance is an important concern.  In addition, the performance 
matching can extract too much discretion when earnings are being managed, resulting in low power 
tests.15 
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) view the matching function of accruals to cash flows as being of 
primary importance and thus model accruals as a function of current, past, and future cash flows 
because accruals anticipate future cash collections/payments and reverse when cash previously 
recognized in accruals is received/paid.  The R2s from their specification are higher than those of the 
modified Jones model (47% at the firm-level, 34% at the industry level, and 29% at the pooled 
level).  The standard deviation of the residuals from the model is their proxy for earnings quality.  
                                                 
14 The modified Jones model has many variants and adaptations.  DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) estimate the 
regression by industry rather than by firm to lessen firm-year requirements.  Chambers (1999) suggests adding lagged 
accruals to the model to capture predictable reversals.  Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) estimate the normal 
relation between credit sales and total sales to control for nondiscretionary credit sales.  They also add future sales 
growth to capture accruals made in anticipation of future growth.  Their adjustments increase the R2 from around 9% to 
20%.  Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) provide a comparison of various models. 
15 For example, assume ROA is 20% for firm A and B, with firm A using discretionary accruals to boost its ROA by 2% 
to report 20%.  Firm B is not manipulating earnings; it has achieved 20% ROA because it has higher non-discretionary 
accruals than firm A.  Matching firm B to firm A would suggest that firm A’s level of non-discretionary accruals should 
be the same as firm B, but this match is incorrect since the correct match should be a firm with ROA of 18%. 
 41
They show that firms with larger standard deviations have less persistent earnings, longer operating 
cycles, larger accruals, and more volatile cash flows, accruals and earnings.  They are smaller firms 
and the firms are more likely to report a loss.  They suggest that these firm characteristics are 
indicative of a greater likelihood of estimation error in accruals and thus lower accrual quality. 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) modify and extend the Dechow and Dichev 
model in two ways.  First, as suggested by McNichols (2002), they add growth in revenue and PP&E 
to the model of normal accruals.  Second, they decompose the regression residual into firm-level 
measures of innate estimation errors and discretionary estimation errors, such that the discretionary 
error is meant to represent the outcome of “managerial choices” (i.e., intentional errors).  
Specifically, FLOS (2005) estimate their accruals prediction model by industry-year and calculate 
the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm j in year t [σ(εj)t] based on the value of εj in 
year’s t-4 through year t (five years).  The standard deviation of the residuals σ(εj)t is a measure of 
accrual quality (AQ); higher standard deviations are lower quality.  To decompose AQ into an innate 
component and a discretionary component, FLOS model AQ as a function of firm characteristics 
identified in Dechow and Dichev (2002): 
 
σ(εj)t = λ0,j+λ1,jSizej,t-1+λ2,jσ(CFO)j,t + λ3,jσ(Sales) j,t + λ4,jOperCyclej,t + λ5,jNegEarnj,t + νj,t 
 
The predicted value of σ(εj)t represents the quality of accruals associated with the inherent 
ability of an accrual system to capture the firm’s fundamental earnings process, and the residual (νj,t.) 
represents discretionary accrual quality.  An argument can be made that each of the innate 
characteristics could also reflect estimation errors and corrections that would reduce the power of νj,t 
(or induce bias) as a proxy for discretion.   
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All of the accruals models can be estimated at the firm-level, which allows variation across 
firms in the determinants of normal accruals.  Firm-level estimation, however, assumes time-
invariant parameter estimates and typically imposes sample survivorship biases.  The models often 
are estimated at the industry-level.  This specification assumes constant coefficient estimates within 
the industry.  Thus, some firms may have large residuals because of variation induced by industry 
classification rather than because of earnings management or errors.  Measurement error in the 
residual will be related to industry characteristics, which can be a concern in some contexts.  For 
example, the model may have a poorer fit in growth industries and growth may be correlated with 
the hypothesized determinant or consequence. 
Several studies develop models of specific accruals and for homogeneous samples in order to 
test the determinants or consequences of accrual quality.  The motivation behind the research design 
is that a better model of the normal component of an accrual generates a less noisy estimate of the 
abnormal component (i.e., model residual), resulting in more powerful tests.  As an example, Miller 
and Skinner (1998) and Schrand and Wong (2003) both model the economic determinants of the 
valuation allowance for deferred tax assets (DTAs) required under SFAS 109.  Miller and Skinner 
(1998) do not find much evidence of earnings management using the residual from their model 
estimated for firms with large DTAs.  Schrand and Wong (2003), however, are able to find evidence 
of earnings management using a model of the DTA allowance specifically designed for banks.  Of 
course, the construct validity benefits of modeling specific accruals, especially within specific 
industries, come at the expense of generalizability. 
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3.1.1.6 Determinants and consequences and interpretation of discretionary accruals proxies 
If “normal” accruals are the predicted value from a regression model of accruals associated 
with the firm’s fundamental earnings process, then abnormal accruals represent estimation errors, 
which can be intentional or unintentional.  Almost one hundred papers in our database use abnormal 
accruals as a measure of earnings quality and test predicted determinants or consequences.  These 
studies test the joint hypothesis that the residual from an accruals model reflects earnings 
management and that the predicted determinant induces earnings management or that earnings 
management has a predicted consequence.  For ease of exposition and to reduce the amount of 
repetition in this survey, we discuss the results of such tests in the relevant determinant or 
consequence section.  
In this section, however, we emphasize several general findings.  First, while abnormal 
accruals are less persistent than normal accruals, they do have positive persistence.  Xie (2001) finds 
that discretionary accruals have a significantly positive persistence coefficient of 0.57.  In addition, 
Subramanyam (1996) uses the modified Jones model to measure abnormal accruals and finds 
incremental information content in abnormal accruals, which he interprets as evidence that abnormal 
accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate private information about equity value.  
Also using the modified Jones model to measure abnormal accruals, Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis 
(1996) suggest that discretionary accruals smooth earnings and they interpret their finding as 
evidence that discretionary accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate information 
about the firm's long-term (permanent) earnings to equity markets.  Subramanyam (1996) and 
Chaney et al. (1996) assume that investors are able to isolate the abnormal accrual component.  If 
investors are naïve and fixate on earnings, then a positive stock price reaction could be documented 
even if the accrual component is not value relevant. 
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Second, investors seem to recognize the distinction between abnormal accruals and normal 
accruals, but they do not fully incorporate the implications into price.  DeFond and Park (2001), find 
that abnormal accruals suppress the magnitude of market reactions to earnings surprises, suggesting 
that investors do not find them as reliable as normal accrual components.  However, even though 
investors realize that abnormal accruals are less reliable, they still overreact to the information (i.e., 
the abnormal accrual component is negatively associated with future stock returns). Xie (2001) finds 
that the accrual anomaly hedge returns are stronger for hedge portfolios based on abnormal accruals 
measured using the Jones model.   
Third, research that examines the complete path from a determinant of abnormal accruals 
through to the consequences for future period earnings comes to a different conclusion than most 
studies that independently study the links.  Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) find an 
association between lax governance and abnormal accruals,16 where governance quality is measured 
by an overall governance score and by the “usual suspects” of individual governance characteristics.  
Bowen et al. (2008) also find, however, that the accounting discretion associated with lax 
governance is positively related to future performance (ROA), which they interpret as evidence that 
abnormal accruals reflect future performance expectations, not opportunism. 
 
3.1.2 Smooth earnings 
Earnings smoothness or its inverse, variability, is a firm-specific time-series construct.17  
While the concepts statements do not state that “smoothness” is a desirable property of earnings or 
an objective of the accruals process, SFAC No. 1 does recognize that accrual earnings help mitigate 
problems associated with a “mismatch” of cash receipts and payments when reporting accounting 
                                                 
16 Bowen et al. (2008) use an aggregate index of accounting discretion.  The use of abnormal accruals is one component 
of the index, along with a measure of accrual-based smoothing and the tendency to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
17 Early discussions and analyses of smoothing include Beidleman (1973) and Ronen and Sadan (1975). 
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information for finite periods, and it concludes that accrual earnings will provide “…a better 
indication of an enterprise’s present and continuing ability to generate favorable cash flows than 
information limited to the financial effects of cash receipts and payments.”  Hence, predictability is 
the objective, not smoothness, but the concepts statement suggests that the earnings process is 
smoother than the cash collection/payment process.  In other words, smoothness is a means to an 
end. 
Smoothness that improves predictability of fundamental earnings is of higher quality, ceteris 
paribus, in an equity valuation context.  The term “smooth” however, comes with baggage.  
Earnings that are smooth relative to uninformative cash flow variation are more decision useful 
under the assumption that the firm’s fundamental earnings process is smoother than the cash 
receipt/payment process.  But smoothed earnings or “artificial” smoothness in which the reported 
earnings have less volatility than the fundamental earnings process, represent distortions.  Theories 
suggest that firms have incentives to make accounting choices that create smooth earnings including 
choices of real activities (Lambert, 1984) or accruals (Demski, 1998; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 
2002).   
Determinants of smoothness:  
Beidleman (1973), Barefield and Comiskey (1971), and Dharan (1987) document how 
unbiased application of specific GAAP methods affects earnings smoothness.  Beidleman (1973) 
measures smoothness as the difference between reported earnings and “normal” earnings, where 
normal earnings is an average earnings level, estimated based on historical earnings and a constant 
growth rate.  Dharan (1987) is a simulation analysis that uses the variance of the simulated earnings 
stream as a measure of smoothness.  These papers suggest methods for which accrual earnings in 
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fact improve predictability relative to cash earnings assuming, like the concepts statement, that the 
fundamental earnings process is smoother than the cash receipt/payment process.   
Most studies, however, explore the relation between incentives for smoothing and specific 
accounting choices (or real activity choices) that generate smoother earnings.  The focus is on the 
mechanisms used to smooth earnings, but the analyses are joint tests of the incentives and of the 
mechanism choice (e.g., White, 1970; Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan, 1976; Moses, 1987; Chaney, Jeter, 
and Lewis, 1998; Hand, 1989).  Studies of accrual choices frequently investigate specific accounts, 
or even employ industry-specific small sample case studies (e.g., Dascher and Malcolm, 1970; 
McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, Yang, 2004).  Smoothing is treated as a period-
specific accounting choice, thus these papers typically measure smoothing as the negative 
correlation between a proxy for unmanaged earnings (e.g., non-discretionary accruals), and the 
“discretionary accrual” that is being used to smooth earnings. 
 
Consequences of smoothness:  
The majority of the consequences studies examine the implications of smoothness in a cross-
country context.  Section 4.2 discusses these studies.  The advantage of the cross-country analyses is 
the researcher’s ability to create a smoothness proxy that represents artificial smoothing or earnings 
management.  Smoothness has both a fundamental component, which is predicted to increase 
quality, and an artificial component, which is predicted to decrease quality.  The predicted 
consequences of the two components are different, thus the research necessitates distinguishing non-
discretionary (normal) smoothness from discretionary (abnormal) smoothness.  In the cross-country 
studies, the notion is that the measurement error in the model of the fundamental component of 
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smoothness is dominated by the cross-sectional variation in the discretionary component, which 
makes the “abnormal smoothness” measure a reasonable proxy for earnings management. 
Within the U.S., studies of the consequences of smoothness, artificial or otherwise, are 
limited.  Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that smoothness improves earnings informativeness.  The 
analysis splits firms into a high smoothing group, defined as firms that have a stronger negative 
correlation between discretionary accruals and unmanaged earnings (total earnings – discretionary 
accruals), and a low smoothing group.  Their measure of earnings informativeness is the extent to 
which changes in current stock returns are reflected in future earnings, following Collins, Kothari, 
Shanken, and Sloan (CKSS, 1994).  The high smoothing group has a stronger CKSS relation.  This 
result holds after various controls for the smoothness of the fundamental earnings process.  Their 
conclusion is that the net smoothing effect of accrual accounting, which they predict would lead to 
greater informativeness if accruals smooth noise but to reduced informativeness if managers 
artificially smooth earnings relative to the fundamental process, is to improve informativeness and 
not to garble earnings. 
 
3.1.3 Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition 
We include in this section any studies that measure separately the timeliness of loss 
recognition and profit recognition.  A more timely recognition of losses is often associated with a 
“conservative” accounting system (Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999).  More recent studies 
distinguish conditional conservatism, which is more timely recognition of bad news than of good 
news in earnings, from unconditional conservatism, which describes an ex ante policy that results in 
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lower book values of assets (higher book values of liabilities) in the early periods of an asset or 
liability life.18  
 The most frequently used measure of timely loss recognition is the reverse earnings-returns 
regression from Basu (1997).   
Earningst+1=α0 + α1Dt + β0Rett+β1Dt Rett + εt 
where D = 1 if Ret < 0, and a higher β1 implies more timely loss recognition.  The specification is 
reported in Exhibit 1.  Basu (1997) provides a second measure that is not based on returns. 
ΔΝΙτ =α0 +α1NEGDUM+α2ΔΝΙτ_1+α3(NEGDUM*ΔΝΙτ_1) + ετ 
where ΔNIt is the change in income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total assets, 
and NEGDUM is an indicator variable equal to one if ΔNIt-1 is negative.  If bad news is recognized 
on a more timely basis than good news, negative earnings changes will be less persistent and will 
tend to reverse more than positive earnings changes.  This translates into a prediction that α3 < 0, 
and Basu (1997) finds support for this prediction.  This tendency-to-reverse measure is used in some 
papers when equity returns are not available (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), and it is used in 
other papers to check the robustness of the results.19  
Our review of the asymmetric timeliness literature focuses on studies of the determinants and 
consequences of asymmetric timeliness, specifically when it is a suggested measure of quality.  Ryan 
(2006) provides a recent and thorough review of the literature on conservatism, more generally 
including measurement issues. 
 
                                                 
18 Basu (1997) uses the term conditional to describe his measure of conservatism, but he does not specifically call it 
“conditional conservatism.” 
19 The use of this measure to check the robustness of the results based on the Basu (1997) reverse regression measure has 
increased since the publication of Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007), which suggests that the reverse regression measure 
is biased.  Ryan (2006) questions the magnitude of the bias, but also provides some possible solutions. 
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Determinants of asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition:20 The first determinant we 
discuss is accounting standards.  Loss recognition is more timely in common law than code law 
countries (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000, BKR).  Using the Basu (1997) reverse regression, BKR 
find that the R2 of the regression is higher and the β1 coefficient is lower in common law countries, 
which suggests greater asymmetric timeliness recognition.  Within bad news observations, loss 
recognition is more timely in common law countries.   
 Loss recognition is more timely for firms that use IAS (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008).  
Using logit analysis, Barth et al. (2008) compare IAS adopters to non-adopters.  The model includes 
a dummy explanatory variable for large negative reported earnings and control variables for other 
determinants of the choice to follow IAS.  The coefficient on the indicator variable is positive.  Barth 
et al. (2008) also estimate a logit regression within the sample of IAS adopters with the dependent 
variable equal to one if the observation is post IAS adoption and equal to zero pre-adoption.  The 
coefficient estimate on the indicator variable is positive, so IAS adoption is associated with a greater 
frequency of reported losses within the same sample of firms across time.  
 Loss recognition is more timely when equity market incentives demand it.  This conclusion is 
based on four studies.  Ball and Shivakumar (2005), using the Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse 
measure, find that loss recognition is more timely in U.K. public companies than U.K. private 
companies.  Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008), using the R2 and β1 coefficient estimate from the Basu 
(1997) reverse regression (as in BKR), find that loss recognition is more timely for firms in countries 
with greater prominence of debt markets relative to equity markets.  Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003), 
also using the BKR metrics, find that East Asian countries, which share a common law origin but are 
asserted to have lower equity capital markets incentives, do not have more timely loss recognition 
                                                 
20 Many of the studies of the determinants of asymmetric timeliness are cross-country studies, which also are discussed 
in Section 4.  
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than code law countries.  The differences in timely loss recognition within countries (or regions) 
with the same standards or legal origin suggest that timely loss recognition has an endogenous 
component related to firms’ reporting incentives.  It is not driven purely by a country’s accounting 
system.  Pae, Thornton, and Welker (2005), also using the BKR metrics, find that firm-level price-
to-book ratios are a determinant of timely loss recognition and that the negative association is 
correlated with the accrual component of earnings, which again supports the conclusion that equity 
incentives, and not just mechanical application of accounting principles, are associated with 
observed timely loss recognition.  
Loss recognition is more timely when enforcement, either internal or external, is stronger.  
Francis and Wang (2008) find that the positive association between common law countries as a 
proxy for greater investor protection and timely loss recognition is higher only for firms with Big-
four auditors.  García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between 
commonly used governance proxies for effective monitoring and timely loss recognition.  Chung and 
Wynn (2008) find that D&O liability insurance coverage for Canadian firms is negatively associated 
with timely loss recognition.  One paper provides negative evidence: within a sample of U.S. firms, 
Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006) find no relation between non-audit services, which could 
impede independence and reduce auditor monitoring, and timely loss recognition.  All four studies 
use the Basu (1997) reverse regression to measure timely loss recognition; Chung and Wynn (2008) 
and García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) additionally check the robustness of the results to 
the use of the Basu (1997) tendency-to-reverse measure. 
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3.1.4 Benchmarking 
This section covers studies that use small positive differences between reported earnings and 
any benchmark as a measure of earnings quality.  A significant component of this literature is related 
to the “kink” in the distribution of reported earnings around zero: a statistically small number of 
firms with small losses and a statistically large number of firms with small profits (Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  A common but controversial interpretation of this pattern is that 
firms with unmanaged earnings just less than the heuristic target of zero intentionally manage 
earnings just enough to report a small profit.  Thus, small profits (or avoiding small losses) are a de 
facto indication of earnings management.  Likewise, small earnings increases are a proxy for 
earnings management based on the finding in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) of a statistically 
unusual number of firms with small decreases in earnings, and meeting or beating an analyst 
forecast is a proxy for earnings management based on the finding in Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 
(2001) of a “kink” in earnings around consensus analyst forecasts.   
The consequences studies frequently use small positive surprises (or avoidance of negative 
surprises) as a proxy for managed earnings, and the authors make predictions about the 
consequences of the assumed diminished quality.  In the determinants studies, the most common 
research question is whether the assumption that is made in the consequences studies – that small 
positive surprises are more likely to represent managed earnings – is justified. 
 Determinants of small positive profits: Several studies suggest that small profits are not 
evidence of earnings management.  Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), in a large-sample study, 
find no relation between realizations of small profits and increases in discretionary accruals.  Beaver, 
McNichols, and Nelson (2007) suggest that asymmetric taxes, rather than opportunistic choices, can 
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explain the kink.  Durtschi and Easton (2005) suggest that the kink is due to statistical and sample 
bias issues. 
Several types of results, however, suggest a relation between small profits and other 
recognized proxies for earnings management.  First, there is a correlation between small profits and 
discretionary accruals in industry-specific and/or account-specific studies.  Beaver, McNichols, and 
Nelson (2003) find a positive correlation between earnings management of loss reserves and small 
profit realizations at P&C insurers.  Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) find an association between 
deferred tax expense and avoiding losses.  In both studies, the results are subject to the caveat that 
neither the accruals metric nor small profits represent earnings management, but the two variables 
are correlated, perhaps as explained in Beaver et al. (2007).  Firms that were able to use more 
aggressive revenue recognition techniques, which might provide greater opportunities for earnings 
management, are more likely to report small profits and are less likely to report small losses 
(Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 2005).  Second, the kink is strongest in the fourth quarter when 
studies assert that the incentives for earnings management are predicted to be higher (Kerstein and 
Rai, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007).  Third, low audit effort measured by hours worked, which 
might mitigate opportunities for earnings management, is associated with small positive profits 
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). 
Determinants of meeting or beating targets: The literature on the determinants of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings increases includes three types of analyses.  In 
the first type, the study focuses on the mechanisms/tools that firms use to produce earnings that just 
meet or beat a target.  Firms make accounting choices such as managing tax expense (Dhaliwal, 
Gleason, and Mills, 2004); managing the classification of items within the income statement 
(McVay, 2006); and managing the creation and reversal of restructuring charge accruals/cushions 
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(Moehrle, 2002).  Firms also make real decisions such as repurchasing stock (Hribar, Jenkins, and 
Johnson, 2006) or selling fixed assets or marketable securities (Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas, 2003) 
or repurchasing shares (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003).  Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung (2006), 
following the basic approach of Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), assess the relation between 
discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst forecasts and reporting small earnings 
increases.  They find some evidence consistent with an association between earnings management 
through the use of accruals and these targets. 
In the second type of analysis, the study focuses on firms’ equity market incentives to meet or 
beat a target.  Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms with greater incentives, primarily given their 
ownership structure, are more likely to just meet or beat a target.21  Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) 
find that public banks are more likely to use discretionary bank-specific accruals to report small 
profit increases.  Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that managers with high equity incentives are more 
likely to just meet or beat a target, and McVay, Nagar, and Tang (2006) find insider trading 
subsequent to just meeting or beating.  Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) indirectly link earnings 
management activities to equity market incentives assuming that analyst stock recommendations – 
not meeting or beating a forecast – proxy for incentives. 
In the third type of analysis, the study focuses on opportunities to meet or beat a target.  
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find a positive (negative) correlation between non-audit (audit) 
fees as proxies for auditor quality and independence and small earnings increases and the likelihood 
of meeting or beating analyst forecasts.  Brown and Pinello (2007) show that firms are more likely to 
avoid negative earnings surprises relative to an analyst forecast at interim quarters when they 
hypothesize the greatest opportunities to manage earnings.  Barton and Simko (2002) find that firms 
                                                 
21 She supports this indirect evidence with direct tests that the firms appear to meet or beat via abnormal accruals and by 
managing the forecast down. 
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with overstated net asset values are constrained in their opportunities to manage earnings and are 
less likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  
Consequences of small earnings surprises: Three papers suggest that meeting or beating 
targets has positive market consequences.  Two papers document that firms that consistently report 
earnings increases relative to the prior year or relative to the same quarter of the prior year receive a 
price premium (e.g., Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007).  These 
studies do not provide evidence on whether the strings are achieved by artificial smoothing.  Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn (2002) find that meeting or beating analyst forecasts is associated with a higher 
contemporaneous quarterly return.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that greater opacity, which he 
measures as an increasing function of loss avoidance, is associated with a higher average cost of 
equity and a lower level of trade, however, the loss avoidance proxy alone is not a significant 
determinant. 
The positive market consequences are mitigated if earnings management is suspected.  
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that meeting or beating on an ad hoc basis does not lead to 
higher valuations, but that meeting or beating regularly does.  Gleason and Mills (2008) show that 
when earnings management is more obvious and detectable, and thus investors are more able to 
differentiate meeting or beating that represents earnings management from that which represents 
value-relevant good news, there is a market discount for beating.  Patterns in analyst forecasts/stock 
recommendations as a consequence of meeting or beating targets, however, suggest that analysts do 
not detect/anticipate earnings management to meet or beat targets (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). 
A final consequence paper uses a unique measure of “surprise.”  Affleck-Graves, Callahan, 
and Chipalkatti (2002) compute an earnings predictability “score” based on analyst forecast errors 
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and analyst forecast dispersion at the timing of the filing of the year y-1 10-K filing.  The paper 
predicts and finds that the high category of “surprise” firms has a greater conditional increase in 
abnormal adverse selection costs measured using functions of short window bid-ask spreads around 
quarterly earnings announcements. 
 
3.2 Earnings response coefficients (ERCs) 
Prior to Ball and Brown (1968) academic accounting research focused on evaluating the 
“quality of earnings” in terms of conformity to a consistent measurement system or conceptual 
framework.22  Beaver (1968), Ball and Brown (1967; 1968), and Martin (1971) changed the 
perspective of academic research in terms of how “quality” was evaluated.  They showed that 
earnings news was correlated with various equity market attributes (long-window returns and 
volume and volatility changes around earnings announcements).  Because these outcomes result 
when investors change their equity valuations, they conclude that information in earnings is 
correlated with the information used by investors in their valuation decisions.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that a returns-based earnings response coefficient is a candidate proxy for decision-
usefulness or earnings quality.  (See Exhibit 2 for the regression model commonly used to estimate 
the ERC). 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as a 
direct proxy for earnings quality.  We make a distinction between these studies and studies that use 
returns to infer the quality of earnings.  The studies that use the ERC as a direct proxy for earnings 
quality test a theory that predicts a determinant of quality (e.g., governance characteristics) or a 
consequence of it (e.g., voluntary disclosure).  The analyses are joint tests of market efficiency and 
                                                 
22 Much of the debate focused on whether earnings should be measured using historical cost with matching (e.g., Daines, 
1929; Littleton, 1956; Paton and Littleton, 1940); replacement cost or entry values (e.g., Sterling, 1970); future 
discounted cash flows (e.g., Fisher, 1907, 1930); or net realizable values or exit costs (e.g., Chambers, 1956, 1965). 
 56
earnings quality.  The studies specifically state (or at least strongly imply) that the ERC is a direct 
proxy for earnings quality. 
The studies commonly cite Holthausen and Verrecchia (HV, 1988) as the theoretical basis for 
their prediction that ERCs are positively correlated with earnings quality.  In the HV model, an 
information signal communicates the true value of a firm’s liquidating dividend with noise, and the 
variance of the noise term reflects the “quality” (HV’s term) of the information signal. 
The assertion that ERCs measure precision of earnings information has some empirical 
support.  Imhoff and Lobo (1992) find a negative relation between ERCs and analyst forecast 
dispersion, which they interpret as evidence that higher quality earnings are associated with lower ex 
ante inherent uncertainty about earnings and the information the firm has provided to analysts.  
Kinney, Burgstahler, and Martin (2002) also find a negative association between analyst forecast 
dispersion and ERCs.   
Liu and Thomas (2000) specifically state that the ERC can be viewed as a measure of higher 
quality earnings (p. 73).  They show that the ERC (coefficient estimate) and the R2 of the ERC 
regression are affected by the relation between unexpected earnings (UE), measured as actual 
earnings for t minus the forecast of period t earnings in t-1, and earnings forecast revisions for future 
periods (FR), measured using information available at time t.  When the correlation between UE and 
FR is high, the observed ERC will be high.  They attribute low values of the regression R2 to 
heterogeneity of the correlation between UE and FR within the sample.  Hence, the ERC captures 
the notion of earnings quality in the sense of Graham and Dodd (1934), in that a higher ERC is 
associated with predictability of the fundamental earnings process.   
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Determinants of ERCs: 
3.2.1 Accounting methods 
Five papers examine the cross-sectional or longitudinal relation between earnings measured 
under alternative methods and the resulting ERCs.23  Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber (2005) show that 
firms that are required to significantly change their revenue recognition policies because of SAB 101 
exhibit a decline in earnings informativeness.  In the pre-adoption period, the SAB 101 firms have 
significantly higher ERCs than matched sample firms with similar revenue generation processes.  
The post-adoption ERCs do not appear to be different.  Loudder and Behn (1995) compare ERCs for 
a sample of R&D intensive firms that capitalized R&D costs pre-SFAS No. 2 and were forced to 
expense after SFAS No.2 to the ERCs of a matched sample of firms that expensed R&D both pre- 
and post-SFAS No. 2.  The capitalizing firms have significantly higher ERCs relative to the matched 
sample in the pre-adoption period.  Their ERCs decline when they are forced to expense.  Collins 
and Salatka (1993) document an increase in ERCs of multinational firms after adoption of SFAS No. 
52 (accounting for translation gains and losses), which they suggest made earnings less noisy, but 
not necessarily more or less aggressive. 
Dharan and Lev (1993) find that firms that move to income-increasing methods have lower 
R2s and ERCs in the year of the change relative to a control sample of non-change firms and a 
sample of firms that move to income-decreasing methods.  Pincus (1993) characterizes a portfolio of 
accounting choices related to inventory, depreciation, investment tax credits, and leases with respect 
                                                 
23 Early papers examined differences in market responses to earnings measured under different accounting methods 
(Mlynarczyk, 1969; Gonedes, 1969; Ball, 1972; Cassidy, 1976), with a general notion of exploring the degree of market 
efficiency.  They did not assert that the earnings number under one method or another was more decision useful.  Rather, 
they assumed that both earnings numbers were different representations of the same firm performance and the research 
question was whether markets understood this.  These studies generally did not control for endogeneity of method 
choice.  
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to conservatism, which is defined as whether the methods are primarily income-accelerating.24  
While there is some evidence that the ERCs of conservative and non-conservative firms differ, 
Pincus acknowledges that it cannot be attributed to the methods per se. 
The standard academic debate is whether managerial discretion over accounting method 
choice, in the presence of information asymmetry, improves efficient capital allocation because 
managers use the discretion to convey private information to investors (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 
1993) or whether the discretion decreases efficiency because managers use it to bias financial 
reporting.  The papers discussed above provide inconclusive evidence on this debate.  Dharan and 
Lev (1993) interpret their evidence as suggesting that changing to income-increasing methods may 
be a warning sign that there are fundamental problems at the firm that are being masked by the 
accounting methods, which supports the bias story.  Loudder and Behn (1995) and Altamuro et al. 
(2005), however, suggest that earnings measured under the more “aggressive” policy, in the sense 
that earnings recognition is earlier rather than later or expense recognition is delayed, is associated 
with a higher market response.  These studies challenge the premise that earnings aggressiveness 
should be viewed as de facto evidence of lower quality. 
Many studies examine whether ERCs have changed over time for the US economy.  The 
general finding is that the value relevance of earnings has declined over time.25  Conservatism in 
accounting standards associated with intangible assets, and the increase in intangible-intensive firms, 
is one explanation (e.g. Lev and Zarowin 1999).  Another explanation is the increase in fair value 
accounting (e.g. asset impairments, the recognition of pension liabilities), which results in the 
                                                 
24 Pincus (1993) is an example of a paper that specifically motivates his paper as one that investigates the “quality of 
earnings” and cites Lev (1989) as the source of his inspiration. 
25 See Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997); Francis and Schipper (1999); Lev and Zarowin (1999); Brown, Lo, and Lys 
(1999); Givoly and Hayn (2000); Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002); Landsman and Maydew (2002); Core, Guay, 
and VanBuskirk (2003); Ryan and Zarowin (2003); Dontoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004); Beaver, McNichols, and 
Rhie (2005); Kim and Kross (2005); Collins, Li, and Xie (2007); Jorion, Shi, and Zhang (2007); Dichev and Tang 
(2008).   
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recognition of more transitory losses in earnings (e.g., Givoly and Hayn 2000).  Johnson (1999) 
however, shows that the association between earnings and stock returns is larger in economic 
expansions and smaller in economic recessions.  This result raises the question of whether it is the 
“return” component of ERCs or the “earnings” component of ERCs that is changing.  If market 
structures and asset pricing patterns are time-variant, one might observe time variation in ERCs in 
the presence of stable earnings quality (Hoitash, Krishnan, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2002). 
 
3.2.2 Firm characteristics 
Governance characteristics:  Using both short and long-window ERCs, Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent (2005) find that earnings are less informative for firms with dual class shares.  Further 
analysis suggests that markets view the earnings of firms with a dual class structure as less credible 
primarily because of the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights, although the firms with 
dual class shares also tend to have greater managerial ownership.  Using long-window ERCs, Wang 
(2006) finds a positive association between founding family ownership and earnings 
informativeness, measured as the regression coefficient in an annual returns-earnings model.26   
Debt Characteristics:  Our database includes Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher (1991) and Core and 
Schrand (1999), which find that leverage is associated with non-linearities in ERCs.  Both papers 
recognize that equity is a call option on the value of the firm and predict the shape of the earnings-
returns relation as a function of the firm’s debt structure.  These papers present researchers with a 
measurement issue to consider when using ERCs as a measure of quality. 
Auditors: Teoh and Wong (1993) report higher ERC coefficients for firms with Big-8 auditors, 
which they use as a proxy for audit quality.  Francis and Ke (2006) find that non-audit fees, which 
                                                 
26 Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) document a similar relation between managerial ownership and an identical 
specification of the ERC, based on the same theoretical arguments.  Warfield et al., however, use the term “earnings 
informativeness” rather than “earnings quality” to motivate the test. 
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they assert proxy for lower independence, are negatively related to ERCs.  Hackenbrack and Hogan 
(2002) find that the average short window (2-day) ERC for the two annual earnings announcements 
after an auditor change that likely indicates a credibility decrease (e.g., to lower fees, because of a 
disagreement over fees, or because of a disagreement with the auditors) is lower than the ERC for 
the two annual pre-change earnings announcements.  However, the average ERC is higher for firms 
that switch for reasons that the authors classify as service related.  Manry, Tiras, and Wheatley 
(2003) report that quarterly returns have a stronger association with contemporaneous earnings 
levels for firms that have timely auditor reviews of their interim earnings, but they have a stronger 
relation with lagged earnings for firms that have retrospective auditor reviews.27   
 
3.2.3 Information environment 
Concurrent disclosure of non-earnings information generally improves the earnings-returns 
relation for firms with poor earnings informativeness (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).  Baber, 
Chen, and Kang (2006) reach a similar conclusion based on a finding that the market discount that 
investors apply to earnings that are likely to be upwardly managed declines when balance sheet 
information is disclosed concurrent with the earnings announcement.28  Amir and Lev (1996) confine 
the analysis to an industry in which financial information “informativeness” is likely low – 
independent cellular companies – and document that non-financial indicators (e.g., POPS, which is a 
measure of population density) are value-relevant.  Amir, Harris, and Venuti (1993), however, 
characterize their evidence as “mixed” on whether 20-F earnings reconciliations improve earnings 
informativeness using both long and short-window ERCs. 
                                                 
27 Due to data constraints, sample size limits the power of the tests.  There are 328 observations with timely reviews and 
84 retrospective reviews.  The authors are unable to address selection issues and the authors acknowledge that the results 
are “mixed” across quarters and specification of the earnings variable in levels or changes. 
28 This analysis incorporates the findings of Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002), which models the firm’s decision to 
voluntarily disclose balance sheet information in earnings announcements. 
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Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) find a significant positive cross-sectional association 
between abnormal returns to analyst announcements (aggregated over all announcements prior to the 
earnings announcement) and the market response to subsequent quarter earnings.  Evidence on the 
association between mean abnormal returns and ERCs, however, is mixed.  They interpret the 
totality of their evidence as providing little support for the view that competing information from 
analysts erodes the informativeness of earnings. 
Collins and DeAngelo (1990) find that the market is more responsive to earnings during a 
proxy contest.  This finding rejects one proposed hypothesis which is that earnings during this period 
are less precise because they are likely to be opportunistically managed.  Rather, they interpret their 
finding as evidence that a proxy contest is a period of heightened uncertainty and that the earnings 
number is especially useful for valuation. 
In summary, firms appear to supplement poor fundamental earnings informativeness with 
additional information (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002).  However, 
management forecasts are associated with historically stronger earnings informativeness (higher 
ERCs), so the relation between disclosure and ERCs is not generalizable. 
 
Consequences of ERCs 
Figure 2 indicates that the only examined consequence of ERCs as a proxy for earnings 
quality is voluntary disclosure.  Two papers find that firms voluntarily disclose non-earnings 
information when earnings are less informative.  Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002) find that when 
earnings informativeness is low or uncertain, firms have a greater propensity to voluntarily disclose 
balance sheet information in earnings announcements.  Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that 
firms with low historical ERCs are more likely to voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings.  One 
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paper, however, finds that firms are more likely to issue management forecasts of earnings when 
earnings are more informative (Lennox and Park, 2006).  Their explanation for the result is that 
managers’ propensity to forecast is increasing in the manager’s confidence about forecast accuracy, 
given reputation concerns.   
 
3.3 External indicators of financial reporting quality (FRQ) 
The external indicators of financial reporting quality that we review are: 1) SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), 2) Restatements, and 3) Internal controls.  We term 
these external measures of financial reporting quality because the researcher does not measure a 
characteristic of earnings to determine its quality, but rather obtains evidence from an outside source 
(the SEC, or the management team themselves in the case of restatements, or the auditor in the case 
of internal control disclosures).  Two important distinctions of these variables as proxies for EQ is 
that they often provide information about the quality of the financial statements as a whole, not just 
earnings, and that they each involve potentially significant selection issues, as discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 AAERs as a proxy for earnings management 
The SEC issues accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) after it completes an 
investigation and takes action against a firm, manager, or the auditor of the firm.  Samples of 
AAERs used in accounting research typically consist of cases where the SEC alleges that the firm 
has misstated or overstated earnings.  Samples usually exclude cases against auditors and pure 
disclosure cases.  Almost half of the AAER firms have overstated revenue, but overstatements of 
inventory and other assets are also common (Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2009).  In most AAER 
cases, the SEC typically accuses managers of intentionally misstating financial statements, which is 
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the definition of fraud in SAS No. 99.  In some cases, however, the SEC alleges that managers were 
negligent (i.e., “reckless in not knowing” of the misstatement). 
Because the AAER sample includes cases of egregious and intentional misstatements (i.e., 
earnings management), it is likely to have a lower Type I error rate than samples identified using 
other methods such as abnormal accruals models.  One issue of concern, however, is the potential for 
selection bias related to how the SEC identifies the misstating firms.  Given a constrained budget, 
the SEC may not pursue cases that involve ambiguity and that it does not expect to win.  The SEC 
states that it will scrutinize firms that restate earnings because the firm has already admitted to 
making a mistake.  The SEC also states that it is concerned with market impact because their role is 
to protect investors.  Therefore, they scrutinize firms with large market capitalizations as well as IPO 
firms and firms raising public debt or equity.   
 
Determinants of AAERs 
Managerial compensation: Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) do not find an association 
between the existence of an earnings-based bonus plan and the likelihood of accounting 
manipulations.  Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) find that AAER managers face stronger incentives 
from unrestricted stocks than those of control firms, however, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2006) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2009) do not find a positive association between 
stock-based incentive compensation and the likelihood of accounting fraud.  Dechow et al. (1996) do 
not find abnormally higher stock sale activities for the officers and directors of the AAER firms 
during the manipulation years, but two subsequent studies find that insiders of fraud firms tend to 
engage in more stock sales during the manipulation period (Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Beneish, 
1999). 
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Debt covenants: Dechow et al. (1996) find that manipulation firms have higher leverage ratios and 
are more likely to violate debt covenants during and after the manipulation period than control firms.  
Beneish (1999), however, does not find statistically significant differences between manipulation 
firms and control firms in either leverage ratios or default risk.29 
Capital market incentives: Dechow et al. (1996) find that manipulation firms have higher ex ante 
external financing demands and higher ex post external financing activities than non-manipulation 
firms.  Beneish (1999) again provides conflicting evidence, but Dechow et al. (2009) confirm the 
result using a more comprehensive sample of AAER firms.   
Board of directors and CEOs: AAER firms tend to have a smaller percentage of outside members on 
the board of directors, are more likely to have a CEO who also serves as chairman of the board or 
founder of the company and are less likely to have an outside blockholder than control firms (e.g., 
Dechow et al, 1996; Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005).  In addition, Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2009) 
provide evidence suggesting that CFOs become involved mainly under CEO pressure rather than for 
their own immediate financial benefits.  
Audit committees and auditors: Dechow et al. (1996) find that AAER firms are less likely to have an 
audit committee, but Beasley (1996) does not find a significant association.  Farber (2005) shows 
that fraud firms tend to have fewer audit committee meetings and fewer financial experts on the 
audit committee.30  He does not, however, find an effect of audit committee independence on 
accounting fraud.  Neither Dechow et al. (1996) nor Beneish (1999) finds a significant difference 
between the auditor quality of misstatement firms and control firms, using Big 4 status as an 
                                                 
29 Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999) find conflicting results in several cases.  A possible explanation is the 
difference between the samples.  Beneish’s sample includes 10 “fraud” firms identified from a search of the financial 
press that were not the subject of AAERs (yet, he argues).  Dechow et al.’s sample consists of just over 90 AAER firms, 
all of which overstate earnings. 
30 McDaniel, Martin, and Maines (2002) in an experimental setting find that financial experts help audit committees 
focus on monitoring more important financial reporting issues.   
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indication of audit firm quality, but Farber (2005) finds that fraud firms are less likely to have Big-4 
audit firms using a more recent sample.  Geiger, Lennox, and North (2008) do not find empirical 
evidence that auditor independence is associated with fraud, while Joe and Vandervelde (2007), in 
an experimental setting, suggest that it is. 
 
Consequences of AAERs 
Manager turnover: Feroz et al. (1991) find that 42 of 58 AAER firms between 1982 and 1989 (72.4 
percent) have management turnover (i.e., firing or resignation) after the public disclosure of the 
misstatement.  Beneish (1999) documents that only 35.9 percent of misstatement firms have CEO 
turnover subsequent to the discovery of accounting misstatements (during the year of discovery and 
four years following the discovery) for AAER firms between 1987 and 1993.  Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin (2008) find that 93 percent of the individuals identified by the SEC as the responsible party 
leave the company by the end of the enforcement period, and these culpable individuals suffer 
serious legal penalties (e.g., criminal charges) and monetary losses. 
Firm value: Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996) find a stock return of -9 to -10 percent on 
the first announcement day of the accounting misstatements (see also Miller, 2006a).  Dechow et al. 
(1996) document a significant increase in bid-ask spreads and a significant decline in analyst 
following after the discovery of accounting misstatements.  Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b) find 
that the enforcement firms on average lose a total of 38 percent of their market values measured over 
all announcement dates related to the enforcement action.  They suggest that two thirds of the 
decline represents lost reputation, which they define as “the decrease in the present value of future 
cash flows as investors, customers, and suppliers are expected to change the terms of trade with 
which they do business with the firm.”  The remaining one-third represents legal penalties, and 
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readjustments in valuations associated with the “restated” financial information.  Farber (2005) finds 
that only firms that improve their corporate governance (e.g., by increasing the percentage of outside 
members on the board) experience improved stock market performance in the three-year post-
detection period after controlling for changes in operating performance. 
Auditors: Feroz et al. (1991) find that large auditors of the AAER firms are less likely to be censured 
by the SEC and suffer lighter penalties than small auditors.  They suggest two explanations: large 
auditors are associated with less extreme cases and/or large auditors can afford more resources to 
negotiate with the SEC to lower penalties.  Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998) document that 
auditors face litigation in 38 percent of AAER firms in their sample.  The litigation risk for auditors 
is higher when the type of fraud occurs frequently across companies (i.e., common frauds) or when 
the fraud is caused by fictitious transactions.   
 
Conclusions based on studies of AAERs 
AAER firms would seem to be a powerful place for researchers to investigate incentives to 
manipulate earnings, but the evidence on the determinants of AAERs, and in particular on the role of 
governance in monitoring manipulations, is mixed and weak.  One explanation is large type II errors.  
That is, firms that manage earnings for similar reasons are not identified by the SEC or firms manage 
earnings just within the boundaries of GAAP and avoid SEC selection.  This problem inhibits proper 
matching.  Other explanations include (i) small sample sizes that lack power, (ii) differences in 
sample composition over time; or (iii) endogeneity of contracting variables (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
2009). 
There is consistent and compelling evidence that investors react negatively to discovery of a 
misstatement, but it is less clear how to interpret this result.  Keeping in mind that most samples of 
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AAERs consist of overstatement of earnings, there are at least four explanations for a negative 
market reaction.  First, investors could adjust their forecasts of future cash flow because the forecasts 
are based on historical earnings and the AAER reveals that historical earnings are lower than 
previously reported.  Second, investors could reassess the multiplier (persistence parameter) they 
apply to the firm’s fundamental earnings process (growth prospects) as well as change the discount 
rate.  Third, investors could increase the discount rate if the AAER causes them to revise downward 
their expectations about the precision of the firm’s accounting information.  Finally, investors might 
revise their expectations of future cash flows because they expect the AAER to create additional 
costs that the firm would otherwise not have incurred, such as litigation or reputation loss. 
The third potential source of negative returns – that investors change their assessment of the 
precision of the accounting measurement and reporting system – should be of particular interest to 
accountants, but it is difficult to disentangle this explanation from the others.  The AAER reactions, 
however, have advantages for documenting revaluations due to changes in information risk.  Many 
of the announcements are a surprise, the event window is fairly short, and the events are not 
clustered in calendar time.  Karpoff et al. took a useful first step toward differentiating among the 
possible explanations for the negative stock market reactions, and we would encourage the use of 
this sample to identify the pricing of earnings quality. 
 
3.3.2 Restatements as a proxy for earnings quality 
There are four important differences between firms that restate earnings and the AAER 
firms.31  First, restatement samples are significantly larger than samples of AAER firms in any given 
year, which adds power to the empirical tests.  Second, the restatement sample includes a wider 
                                                 
31 See Dechow et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of the comparison between different databases related to accounting 
misstatements. 
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range of misstatements and they are primarily earnings restatements.  Third, many restatements are 
caused by internal errors in applying accounting rules rather than intentional misreporting, and the 
proportion of such restatements in the database has increased in recent years (Plumlee and Yohn, 
2008; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008).  Fourth, the selection problem in the restatement sample 
differs from that in the AAER sample, although it is not clear which is a bigger concern.  Different 
selection criteria across the multiple sources that identify restatements might suggest that the 
selection problem simply creates noise in the analysis rather than bias, but knowing that the SEC 
selects the AAER cases may make it easier to control for the potential bias. 
 
Determinants of restatements 
Managerial compensation: Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option 
portfolio to stock price is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of restatements, but 
the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, (i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term 
incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus) is not related.  Efendi et al. (2007) find that the likelihood 
of restatements increases when the CEO has considerable holdings of in-the-money stock options.32  
However, Armstrong et al. (2009) do not find any significant association between CEO equity 
incentives and restatements after controlling for the compensation contracting environment.   
Board of directors and auditors: Restatement firms tend to have CEOs who serve as chairman of the 
board or have founder status, and have board or audit committee directors with financial expertise 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007).  Independence of the board or audit committee is 
not a determinant of the likelihood of restatement (Agrawal and Chadha, (2005).  Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007) find that only two out of fourteen dimensions of governance (insider 
                                                 
32 Efendi et al. (2007) also find that restatements are more likely when firms are constrained by an interest-coverage debt 
covenant and when they raise external financing.  This paper is the only one in our database that examines debt 
contracting and equity market incentives as determinants of restatements. 
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power such as percentage of insiders on board, and debt variables such as the ratio of book value of 
debt to the market value of equity) are associated with restatements. 
Non-audit fees, which are presumed to affect auditor independence and hence may 
compromise auditor quality, are not associated with restatements on average (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005).  Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) also find no association between fees for financial 
information systems design and implementation or internal audit services and restatements, but they 
find some association between fees for unspecified non-audit services and restatements.  When using 
a sample of U.K. firms, Ferguson, Seow, and Young (2004) find a positive association between non-
audit fees and restatements. 
 
Consequences of restatements 
Managers/Directors: Managers at restatement firms experience significantly higher turnover (Desai, 
Hogan and Wilkins, 2006; Hennes et al., 2008) and director turnover (Srinivasan, 2005) than control 
firms.  Desai et al. (2006) also find that it is more difficult for these displaced managers to find 
subsequent employment than displaced managers of control firms.  Srinivasan (2005) finds that 
director turnover rate is higher for more severe restatements and for audit committee directors. 
Firm value: Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) document an average market-adjusted return 
of -9.2 percent over a two-day restatement announcement window; the average is -20 percent for 
restatements associated with fraud.33  Lev, Ryan, and Wu (2008) document that the restatements that 
                                                 
33 Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) find that short sellers accumulate positions in restatement firms 
before restatement announcements and unwind these positions after stock prices decline due to the restatement. Their 
finding suggests that short sellers are able to identify firms that will likely restate in advance of the restatement 
announcement.  It does not, however, explain their assumptions regarding market efficiency.  One possibility is that the 
short sellers believe the stock is overpriced due to the valuation implications of the misstated earnings, they expect the 
restatement to reveal the mispricing and the price to correct.  Another possibility is that the short-sellers anticipate that 
markets will react negatively to restatements on average, regardless of the implications of the restatement for valuation.  
More research is needed to interpret the implications of this evidence for earnings quality.  
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significantly change the historical pattern of earnings (e.g., shortening histories of earnings growth) 
have more negative stock market consequences.  Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) find that 
restatement announcements cause stock price declines for non-restatement firms in the same 
industry.  Hribar and Jenkins (2004) document a significant increase in a firm’s cost of equity 
capital, measured based on the residual income model, in the month following a restatement.  Kravet 
and Shevlin (2009) document a significant increase in the pricing of information risk after 
restatement announcements.   
Litigation: Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 38 percent of restatements are associated with 
litigation, including litigation actions against the company, officers, directors, and auditors.  They 
document that the likelihood of litigation increases with the impact of restatements on earnings 
(magnitude) and the fraudulent nature of restatements.  Restatements of core earnings (i.e., recurring 
earnings from primary operations) and restatements that involve a greater number of accounts tend 
to result in a higher likelihood of lawsuits and larger payments by defendants.  Lev et al. (2008) find 
that restatements that curtail histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have a higher 
likelihood of class action lawsuits than other restatements. 
 
Conclusions based on studies of restatements 
Restatements measure both intentional and unintentional errors; they are not a good proxy for 
intentional earnings management.  In support of this conclusion, the compensation variables, that 
would provide incentives for intentional earnings management, and the monitors that would 
constrain such behavior, are not consistently associated with restatements.  Support for this 
conclusion also comes from a related study by Kinney and McDaniel (1989), which finds that firms 
that correct previously announced quarterly earnings are smaller, are less profitable, have higher 
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debt, are more slowly growing, and face more serious uncertainties.  They interpret their evidence as 
suggesting that accounting errors are the outcome of a weak accounting system (i.e., weak internal 
control procedures) rather than opportunistic earnings management.  The mixed results about the 
determinants of restatements, however, could be due to selection bias associated with detection of 
the accounting irregularity and the firm’s decision to report it. 
Restatements reflect errors that cause investors to revise their beliefs about information 
precision associated with the firm’s earnings (e.g., Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Kravet and Shevlin, 
2009).  We found no studies that provide similar evidence about the effects of AAERs on investor 
beliefs. 
The restatement samples might be useful to examine the complete path from a predicted 
determinant (i.e., weak internal control procedures) to a particular type of earnings quality and then 
to a predicted consequence because of the variation in the types of errors reflected in the 
restatements.  For example, one could address whether the market consequences of a misstatement 
are different if an internal control weakness rather than an agency problem causes it. 
 
3.3.3 Internal control procedures quality as a proxy for earnings quality34 
Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which became effective on 
August 29, 2002, management is required to certify in its 10-Qs and 10-Ks their conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the firms’ internal control procedures.  Section 404 of SOX, which became 
effective on November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers, requires companies to include management’s 
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures in its annual report; 
                                                 
34 Studies that examine whether internal control procedures are a determinant of another earnings quality proxy (e.g., 
discretionary accruals or persistence) are discussed in Section 5.2.3.  
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the firm’s public accountants must attest to this assessment.35  Prior to these reports, companies (with 
the exception of the banking industry) were required to disclose significant internal control 
deficiencies in 8-Ks only when disclosing a change in auditors (Ge and McVay, 2005; Krishnan, 
2005; Altamuro and Beatty, 2009).  Earlier research consisted primarily of case studies or analysis of 
survey data.  For example, Willingham and Wright (1985) survey audit firm partners and do not find 
an association between auditors’ assessment of internal control effectiveness and financial statement 
errors detected by auditors.36  A couple of studies have shown a positive association between internal 
control quality and various earnings quality measures such as discretionary accruals and earnings 
persistence (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008).  These studies provide some 
justification for using the internal control deficiencies reported under SOX as an indication of 
earnings quality. 
Determinants of internal control procedures: Krishnan (2005) finds that independent audit 
committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be 
associated with the incidence of internal control problems.  Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Doyle 
et al. (2007a) find that firms with higher control risk associated with organizational complexity and 
significant organizational changes are more likely to have internal control deficiencies.  The 
weakness firms also appear to be more constrained in their resources to invest in internal control 
systems (i.e., firm size, financial strength). 
 
Consequences of internal control procedures: Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare (2008) and 
Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008) find that disclosures of internal control weaknesses under 
                                                 
35 Internal control disclosures under Section 404 are available in machine readable form from Audit Analytics.  The early 
papers collected the reports from Compliance Week.  
36 Kinney (2000) also notes that lack of access to data was a barrier to research on internal control procedures.  Some 
very early work analyzed the design and tests of internal control system (e.g., Cushing, 1974; Kinney, 1975).  
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Section 302 are associated with negative stock price reactions.  In addition, Beneish et al. (2008) 
find that Section 302 disclosures are associated with a decrease in analyst forecast revisions and an 
increase in cost of equity capital.  However, disclosures of internal control weaknesses under Section 
404 are not associated with a negative stock price reaction, a decrease in analyst forecast revisions, 
or an increase in cost of equity capital (Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan, 2007; Beneish et 
al. 2008).  Only one study by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2009) documents a 
significant increase of the cost of equity capital following Section 404 disclosures, arguing that 
Ogneva et al.’s findings suffer from look-ahead bias in the classification of internal control quality.37 
 
Conclusions based on studies of internal control procedures 
The determinants and consequences of internal control deficiencies disclosed under SOX 
Section 302 exhibit predictable patterns that suggest that such deficiencies measure the propensity 
for misstatements.  The use of this variable to proxy for variation in EQ, however, is subject to a 
concern that disclosures of material weaknesses are correlated with manager and auditor incentives 
to discover and disclose internal control weaknesses (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2008). 
The mixed findings on the consequences of internal control disclosures based on Section 404 
reports cast doubt on whether the Section 404 disclosures are a source of information about financial 
reporting quality to investors.  There are several explanations for the difference in the consequences 
of Section 302 and Section 404 reports.  First, the threshold for Section 404 material weaknesses 
may be lower than that for Section 302.  Second, the Section 404 sample currently is limited to 
accelerated filers that have a richer information environment.  Third, there is ambiguity regarding 
                                                 
37 A related study by Chang, Chen, Liao, and Mishra (2006) finds that firms that have CEOs and CFOs certify their 
financial statements under SOX experience a decline in bid-ask spreads.   
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whether disclosure of material weaknesses is mandatory under Section 302, and as a result, less 
severe material weaknesses are not disclosed (Doyle et al., 2007b).  Fourth, the Section 404 
disclosures are made in the annual report, while the Section 302 disclosures can be made on dates 
without confounding announcements in the event window.  
There is a wide range of different types of internal control weaknesses (e.g., weaknesses 
resulting in restatements versus not, weaknesses resulting in accounting errors versus earnings 
management, weaknesses driven by various determinants such as organizational changes).  Thus 
firms with internal control weakness disclosures are also a sample that researchers could use to 
examine the complete path from a determinant to “earnings quality” to a consequence. 
 
4. Cross country studies 
This section discusses the papers in our database that examine determinants and 
consequences of cross-country variation in earnings quality.  Section 4.1 discusses studies on 
determinants of country-level earnings informativeness to equity markets, using proxies such as 
ERCs.  Section 4.2 discusses studies that examine determinants of country-level earnings 
management as a specific element of earnings quality.  Section 4.3 discusses studies on 
consequences of country-level earnings quality. 
 
4.1 Earnings informativeness proxies for earnings quality 
Four papers in our database examine variations in country-level value-relevance measures.  
Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) document cross-country variation in long-window 
ERCs and earnings-based hedge portfolio returns for 17 countries.  They do not test hypotheses 
about predictable differences in ERCs across countries.  Rather, they provide the reader with a 
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summary of important institutional cross-country differences (e.g., interim reporting frequency) to 
help interpret the results ex post.  Ali and Hwang (2000) compute the two measures of earnings 
informativeness (ERC and earnings-based hedge portfolio returns) from Alford et al. (1993), plus 
two additional measure – value relevance of accruals and combined value relevance of earnings and 
book value of equity – across partitions of 16 countries that they predict to exhibit variation in 
earnings informativeness ex ante.  They investigate six country-level institutional factors, but the 
results they emphasize are that earnings informativeness is lower in countries where financial 
systems are bank-oriented rather than market-oriented and where the accounting rules are less likely 
to be tilted toward preferences of equity markets because of the standard-setting process.  Hung 
(2000) uses earnings-based hedge portfolio returns to measure country-level earnings 
informativeness.  She finds across 21 countries that more extensive use of accrual accounting rather 
than cash accounting is associated with lower earnings informativeness only in countries with weak 
shareholder protection.38  DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007), for 26 countries, document a 
positive association between average country-level earnings quality, measured based on a score 
developed in Leuz et al. (2003), and abnormal return variance during a two day annual earnings 
announcement window.  They interpret this finding as evidence that a high Leuz et al. quality score 
implies greater earnings credibility and hence improves earnings informativeness.  They also find 
that abnormal return variance around earnings announcements is higher in countries with better 
enforced insider trading laws, strong investor protection, and less frequent interim reporting.   
Researchers commonly examine the variation in earnings quality between code law countries 
(i.e., those with a “stakeholder” corporate governance model) and common law countries (i.e., those 
                                                 
38 Hung (2000) develops her own country-specific accrual accounting intensity index based on the accounting treatment 
of: (1) Goodwill, (2) Equity method investments, (3) Deprecation, (4) Purchased intangibles, (5) Internally developed 
intangibles, (6) Research and development costs, (7) Interest capitalization, (8) Lease capitalization, (9) Percentage of 
completion allowances, (10) Pensions, and (11) Post retirement benefits.   
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with “shareholder” corporate governance model) countries.  Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) find 
that earnings are less timely in recognizing economic losses in code law countries than in common 
law countries, consistent with their prediction that institutions and practices in code law countries 
have developed over time such that the demand for decision-useful information is lower.39  Ball, 
Robin, and Wu (2003) examine a sample of firms in East Asian countries.  They assert that the 
accounting standards in these countries are of high quality (i.e., as they are more similar to U.K. or 
U.S. GAAP or IAS than they are to standards in code law countries), but that these countries have 
institutions with incentive structures more similar to those that evolve under the code law.  They 
show that earnings quality (measured by timely loss recognition) is lower in these countries and thus 
conclude that the institutional and governance environment of code-law countries diminishes 
managers’ and auditors’ incentives to provide high quality accounting information.  Guenther and 
Young (2000) similarly suggest that earnings quality is demand driven and institutional factors such 
as legal system and tax conformity affect earnings quality.  They operationalize earnings quality as 
the association between cross-sectional average return on assets in a country and its real economic 
growth measured by the percentage change in a country's real GDP.  They document that this 
association is high in the U.K., U.S. and Japan, and low in France and Germany. 
 
4.2 Earnings management as an element of earnings quality 
A common hypothesis in cross-country studies is that variation in investor protection affects 
the aggregate level of observed earnings management in a country.  Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003), who measure earnings management by accruals-based measures, smoothness, and small loss 
avoidance, find less earnings management for countries with developed stock markets, dispersed 
                                                 
39 Ball et al. (2000) also find that U.K. earnings are less timely than U.S. earnings in incorporating economic losses.  
Pope and Walker (1999), however, suggest that this result is sensitive to the consideration of extraordinary items.  They 
find that earnings after extraordinary items in the U.K. are more timely than U.S. earnings.     
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ownership, strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement.  The Leuz et al. (2003) artificial 
smoothness measures are commonly used in cross-country studies as a proxy for earnings 
management.  The first proxy, measured at the country-level, is the median of the firm-level standard 
deviation of operating earnings divided by the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations.  The second proxy is the contemporaneous correlation between changes in accounting 
accruals and changes in operating cash flows.  Both measures emphasize that smoothness represents 
earnings management when it is measured relative to inherent or fundamental smoothness of the 
firm’s operations.  Operating cash flow smoothness is used to control for inherent smoothness.   
 Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) compare the extent of earnings management between a 
sample of non-U.S. firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and a sample of U.S. firms.  They 
document that the cross-listed non-U.S. firms exhibit more evidence of smoothness, a greater 
tendency to report small profits, and less timely recognition of losses, and lower ERCs than U.S. 
firms and that this difference is greater for firms from countries with poor investor protection.40  
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) do not use the Leuz et al. (2003) measure of artificial smoothness; 
they develop their own measure of artificial smoothness that similarly attempts to control for 
smoothness of the fundamental earnings process.  They measure smoothness as the volatility of 
earnings scaled by total assets, where “volatility” is the variance of the residuals from a regression of 
annual scaled changes in net income on control variables for fundamental firm characteristics.  Their 
analysis also uses a matched sample design with matching based on past sales growth and industry, 
which is an effort to control for fundamental variability. 
 Three later studies extend Leuz et al. by providing evidence on how the interactions between 
different institutional factors influence the extent of earnings management.  Haw et al. (2004) 
document that earnings management (measured by the unsigned magnitude of discretionary 
                                                 
40 They use ERCs as one of their earnings management proxies. 
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accruals) that stems from the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
is lower in countries with high protection of minority shareholders’ rights and strong legal 
enforcement.  Francis and Wang (2008) find that earnings quality (measured by the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, the likelihood of reporting a loss, and timely loss recognition) is positively 
related to country-level investor protection, but only for firms with Big-four auditors.  They suggest 
that investor protection affects earnings quality through the incentives of Big-four auditors (i.e., 
litigation risk and reputation risk).  Finally, Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) document 
interactions between the effects of institutions on earnings management and the effects provided by 
public equity markets interact.  Using a sample of private and public firms from 13 European Union 
countries, they find that private companies manage earnings more, consistent with less pressure for 
earnings quality.  Stronger legal institutions curb earnings management.  The Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) earnings management measures are similar to those used in Leuz et al. (2003). 
 
4.3 Consequences of country-level earnings quality 
The three papers in our database that examine consequences of earnings quality at the 
country level focus on the earnings management element of earnings quality.  Bhattacharya, Daouk, 
and Welker (2003) find that high country-level earnings quality measured by earnings 
aggressiveness (i.e., accruals), loss avoidance, and earnings smoothness (measured following Leuz 
et al., 2003), are associated with higher country-level of cost of equity capital and lower trading 
volume.  Their hypothesis assumes that these features of earnings are associated with greater 
opacity.  Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) find that the accrual anomaly, while a global 
phenomenon, is concentrated in four countries, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S., all of which are common law countries.  The accrual anomaly is positively associated with the 
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Hung (2001) index of accrual accounting intensity and negatively associated with share ownership 
concentration.  Somewhat weaker evidence suggests that the occurrence of the accrual anomaly is 
negatively related to investor rights.  Pincus et al. (2007) interpret the results, taken together, as 
suggestive that earnings management is associated with the accrual anomaly.  Biddle and Hilary 
(2006) document that smoothness using the Leuz et al. (2003) measure is associated with lower 
investment efficiency as measured by investment cash flow sensitivity metrics (see also Verdi, 2006). 
 
4.4 Summary 
The cross-country studies allow inferences about the impact of certain control mechanisms 
that are not possible using a sample of U.S. firms because of a lack of variation in the control 
mechanism within the U.S.  This branch of studies generally concludes that earnings quality 
(including earnings management) is influenced by investor protection, bank versus market-oriented 
economy, code versus common law tradition, accounting standards, and managers’ and auditors’ 
incentives.  There is not much conflicting evidence.  The cross-country variation is generally 
asserted to proxy for very broad theoretical constructs such as differences in the demand for 
information or the ability of accounting rules to reflect fundamental value.  The cross-country 
studies are not designed to provide inferences about specific internal control mechanisms.   
The cross-country studies commonly use return-based earnings quality measures such as 
ERCs and timely loss recognition.  There are many differences across countries that can affect these 
returns-based metrics other than the institutional factors envisioned as determinants by the 
researchers.  The studies clearly recognize the potential for alternative explanations for the results, 
and most studies either use empirical methods to control for un-modeled sources of cross-country 
variation or model expected sources of variation such as industry concentration.  However, even 
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observable variables such as natural resource endowments and the level of economic development 
are not frequently modeled, and less consideration is given to unobservable cultural differences such 
as trust in governance mechanisms (Zingales, Sapienza, and Guiso, 2008).  Somewhat surprisingly, 
little effort is devoted to controlling for variation in the return component of the returns-based 
proxies for earnings quality, despite evidence of variation in the relation between economic and 
market development (Frost, Gordon, and Hayes, 2006). 
 
5. The determinants of earnings quality 
In this section, we juxtapose the studies according to the determinant of earnings quality that 
is examined (see Table 1).  There are six categories of determinants: 1) Firm characteristics, 2) 
Financial reporting practices, 3) Governance and controls, 4) Auditors, 5) Equity market incentives, 
and 6) External factors. 
 
5.1 Firm characteristics as determinants of earnings quality 
Several studies use multiple proxies for firm fundamentals, including simply industry 
membership, and provide broad evidence that firm operating characteristics are associated with the 
various proxies for earnings quality.  Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) provide preliminary evidence 
on the association between size, risk, capital intensity, and industry concentration and a firm’s 
choice of accounting principles.  LIFO adoption, in particular, is a common choice to examine (e.g., 
Jung, 1989; Lindahl, 1989).  Lev (1983) relates (theoretically and empirically) multiple proxies for 
the economic fundamentals of a firm’s operating environment to properties of its earnings (i.e., 
persistence and volatility).  Dechow (1994) relates multiple characteristics of a firm’s operating 
environment to the ability of accruals to capture underlying firm performance, where this ability is 
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measured by stock returns.  Four firm characteristics deserve a separate discussion: 1) Performance 
and losses; 2) Growth and investment; 3) Debt; and 4) Size. 
 
5.1.1 Firm performance 
The most commonly studied firm characteristic that affects EQ proxies is performance.  The 
studies hypothesize that weak financial performance provides incentives for earnings management.41  
Petroni (1992) documents downwardly biased discretionary reserves for claim losses for financially 
weak P&C insurers.  DeFond and Park (1997) document income smoothing in which firms manage 
earnings upward (downward) when unmanaged performance is poor (good) and when expected 
performance is strong (weak).42  Balsam, Haw, and Lilien (1995) suggest that firms use discretion to 
time the adoption of income increasing accounting methods when the firm’s change in ROA is 
lowest.  Keating and Zimmerman (1999) suggest that poorly performing firms use the discretion 
allowed in accounting standard adoption to their advantage.  Financially weak firms also disclose 
more internal control weaknesses (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a) and are more likely to correct 
previously reported earnings, which is interpreted as ex post evidence of earnings management 
(Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).   
Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) find no evidence that write-offs, after controlling for the 
likelihood that assets are impaired, are associated with poor performance.  The only study in our 
database that finds negative evidence is done by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994).  For a 
sample of firms with persistent losses, they find that the accruals reflect the underlying economics 
                                                 
41 Lee, Li, and Yue (2006) create a stylized model in which firms with higher performance overstate earnings more.  The 
model predictions result from assumptions about the cost of earnings management and about how earnings performance 
and earnings growth affect the proportion of true economic earnings in total reported earnings.  Their empirical evidence 
is mixed.  
42 Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2003), however, suggest that the results in DeFond and Park (1997) are sensitive to the 
method used to “back out” abnormal accruals. 
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and do not appear to be made to boost earnings.  They acknowledge, however, that their sample is a 
unique sample of troubled firms, not just firms with weak performance. 
 
5.1.2 Firm growth and investment 
There is some debate as discussed in Section 3 over whether growth, the unobservable 
construct, or accruals as a measure of growth, affects earnings persistence.  The bottom line is that 
high growth firms have less sustainable earnings (Nissim and Penman, 2000).  This finding is not 
surprising.  Earnings summarize performance of the firm’s earnings process during the reporting 
period.  If the fundamental process changes (i.e., grows), so will earnings, and properties of earnings 
like persistence and smoothness will be adversely affected.  Studies like Penman and Zhang (2002) 
provide more contextual evidence about how the accounting system affects the degree to which 
growth matters.  In addition to the impact of growth on the fundamental element of earnings 
properties, growth also is associated with greater measurement error and more manipulation 
opportunities (Richardson et al., 2005). 
We are not aware of papers that specifically analyze the role of growth as a determinant of 
timely loss recognition or benchmarking.  Researchers have, however, examined growth as a 
determinant of the external indicators of quality.  AAER firms have high market to book ratios and 
high accruals during manipulation years (see Dechow et al., 2009).  Doyle et al., (2007a) and 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) find that young growth firms disclose more internal control 
weaknesses.  Lee et al. (2006), however, do not find evidence supporting the association between 
restated amounts and growth. 
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5.1.3 Firm debt43 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest the debt covenant hypothesis: Firms closer to 
violating debt covenants will make income-increasing accounting choices to avoid covenant 
violations.  Early research used debt-equity ratios or other indirect proxies for the existence of debt 
covenants (e.g., Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey, 1981; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Daley and 
Vigeland, 1983; Johnson and Ramanan, 1988).44  These papers provide consistent cross-sectional 
evidence that more highly-levered firms choose income-increasing accounting methods.45  In 
addition, Balsam, Haw, and Lilien (1995) suggest that firms time the adoption of income-increasing 
accounting methods when leverage is highest.  LaBelle (1990) finds that greater leverage and lower 
interest coverage are associated with accounting method changes in Canada.  Specifically in the oil 
and gas industry, Johnson and Ramanan (1988) and Malmquist (1990) identify operating 
characteristics associated with the choice of successful efforts vs. full cost accounting, and find that 
leverage-related variables are incrementally important determinants of the choice. 
Three papers examine choices other than accounting methods.  Bartov (1993) finds that firms 
time asset sales to use the gains to reduce earnings volatility and to avoid debt covenant violation.  
The smoothing and debt covenant explanations for the real earnings management are incremental to 
each other.  Kinney and McDaniel (1989) find that more highly levered firms are more likely to 
correct previously reported earnings, which implies that they had misreported, and Efendi et al. 
(2007) find that firms with lower interest coverage ratios (higher ratio of interest to income) are 
more likely to restate.  In addition, Dechow et al. (1996) find higher leverage ratios for manipulation 
                                                 
43 We include debt as a firm characteristic, although debt may also be viewed in its role as a monitor, much like the 
monitors discussed in Section 3.3.  
44 Daley and Vigeland (1983) also find that the firms that choose income increasing voluntary accounting methods have 
higher ratios of dividends to retained earnings, which is another proxy for the extent to which debt covenants are likely 
to be binding. 
45 See Christie (1990) for a rigorous statistical meta-analysis of existing studies of theories of accounting method choice.  
He finds that size and leverage are consistently related to accounting choice.   
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firms identified in the AAERs than control firms, but Beneish (1999) does not find this relation for 
his sample of manipulation firms. 
The aforementioned papers interpret the correlation between leverage and earnings 
management as evidence that debt covenants provide incentives for firms to manage earnings, but 
they do not examine debt covenants specifically.46  Subsequent research tested the debt covenant 
hypothesis using data on specific debt covenants.  Sweeney (1994) provides evidence that firms 
make income-increasing accounting choices as they move closer to violating debt covenants.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that working capital accruals and a measure of abnormal 
accruals are both higher in the year prior to the year that a firm reports a covenant violation in its 
annual report.  In the year of violation, the accruals are high after controlling for management 
changes and audit qualifications.  Using a comprehensive sample of detailed debt covenants, Dichev 
and Skinner (2002) show that an unusually large (small) number of loan quarters have financial 
measures at or just above (below) covenant thresholds, consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis.  
In contrast, DeAngelo et al. (1994), discussed previously, find relatively little difference between 
accruals for firms with and without binding covenants. 
While the conclusion is that firms closer to covenants, measured directly or indirectly, are 
more likely to manage earnings, the implications of the conclusion for our assessment of earnings 
quality are ambiguous.  On the one hand, the fact that earnings are managed opportunistically 
generally implies that the earnings are less reliable.  On the other hand, the mechanisms used to 
manage earnings under the debt covenant hypothesis are typically accounting method choices that 
                                                 
46 Zimmer (1986) shows that accounting choice is related to leverage even in the absence of debt covenants using a 
sample of Australian firms.  Specifically, he finds that higher leverage is associated with interest capitalization (income-
increasing), but the significance is eliminated when he controls for whether firms use project-specific financing.  He 
interprets this as evidence that leverage does not capture covenants but rather that it is correlated with type of financing 
used by companies.   
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are fairly transparent.47  If the earnings management is transparent to decision-makers, either because 
the accounting choices are obvious (e.g., accounting method changes) or because the decision-
makers rationally infer that income-increasing actions are taken to avoid covenant violation, then the 
earnings quality – its decision usefulness – is not impaired from the perspective of the decision-
maker who detects it.  Evidence in Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999) suggests that equity markets 
may rationally infer earnings management using cues about the firm’s debt market incentives.  They 
show that the relation between UK asset revaluations and equity market responses is weaker for 
highly levered firms, which is interpreted as evidence that investors’ perceptions about whether the 
revaluation is managed increases with leverage. 
Leverage also is predicted to be associated with returns-based proxies for earnings quality, 
such as ERCs, when equity is viewed as a call option on the value of the firm (Dhaliwal, Lee, and 
Fargher, 1991; Core and Schrand, 1999).  Plummer and Tse (1999) also distinguish the information 
needs of equityholders and debtholders as a function of default risk.  They find that ERCs 
(contemporaneous returns and unexpected earnings) decrease as default risk increases for equity 
returns, but the opposite result holds for bond returns. 
 
5.1.4 Firm size 
Early papers investigated the association between firm size and accounting choice motivated 
by the political visibility hypothesis that predicts that large firms will make income-decreasing 
accounting method choices in response to greater political/regulatory scrutiny (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  The evidence is mixed.  Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) find 
that size is positively correlated with the choice of two income-deflating methods (depreciation and 
investment tax credit accounting), but not with two others (inventory and amortization for pension 
                                                 
47 The evidence in Bartov (1993) on real earnings management is an exception. 
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past service costs).  Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) document that larger firms are more likely to 
choose a set of accounting policies that in the aggregate are income-decreasing, suggesting that 
while size does not explain individual choice very well, it explains the firm’s overall strategy.  
Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981) find support for the political visibility hypothesis in the oil 
industry (i.e., large firms avoid using the interest costs capitalization method), but contradictory 
results in other industries.  Moreover, Zimmer (1986) finds that larger firms capitalize interest in 
Australia, which is inconsistent with the political cost argument.  Moses (1987) finds that firm size 
and market share (marginally) are associated with accounting method changes specifically to smooth 
(as opposed to decrease) earnings. 
Overall, in some specific settings, size is likely to be an important indicator of the type of 
visibility that increases expected political costs.  However, in other settings, the political costs may 
be most severe for firms in a targeted industry (Han and Wang, 1998) or for young firms (Beneish, 
1999).  While there is fairly compelling evidence that political pressure can create incentives for 
earnings management (Section 5.6), and size is often used as a proxy for pressure, the leap to an 
association between firm size and any dimension of EQ would be inappropriate.  Firm size could 
proxy for factors other than political visibility such as information environment, capital market 
pressure, or financial resources.  For example, several studies hypothesize fixed costs associated 
with maintaining adequate internal control procedures, and hence predict a positive relation between 
firm size and internal control quality.48  These studies show that small firms are more likely to have 
internal control deficiencies and are more likely to correct previously reported earnings (Kinney 
and McDaniel, 1989; Ge and McVay, 2005; Doyle, et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007). 
 
                                                 
48 Ball and Foster (1982) also make this point.  One argument they make for not using size as a proxy for political costs  
is that the cost of compliance may be fixed, such that small firms that bear the greatest cost. 
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5.1.5 Summary of firm characteristics as a determinant of earnings quality 
 Our review yields the following insights.  First, fundamental firm characteristics are 
associated with accounting method choice.  Any studies that predict accounting choices as an 
indication of earnings quality must control for these fundamental differences before inferring 
opportunism.  Second, the evidence that weak performance provides incentives for earnings 
management is fairly well-established.  The extent to which opportunities constrain the behavior, 
however, is a less actively researched topic (see DeAngelo et al., 1994).  Third, while the evidence 
suggests a relation between size and earnings management, it is impossible to generalize any sort of 
implications for a relation between size and earnings quality on any dimension, given that firm size 
could proxy for various underlying constructs (e.g., political visibility, information environment 
etc.). 
Finally, equity investors appear to unwind firm’s incentives arising from debt contracts to 
manage earnings (Aboody et al., 1999).  The evidence, however, on investors’ ability to unwind 
incentives and to incorporate an expectation of rational earnings management into their pricing is 
limited, even for debt-related incentives, which are among the strongest documented incentives for 
earnings management and potentially the most transparent to investors.  Other than Aboody et al. 
(1999) and Shivakumar (2000), we do not have studies in our database that condition equity market 
reactions to earnings on investors’ ability to unwind earnings management that represents a value-
maximizing activity that is the outcome of efficient contracting. 
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5.2 Financial reporting practices as determinants of earnings quality 
5.2.1 Accounting methods 
 We use the term “methods” broadly to include principles (e.g., full cost vs. successful 
efforts), estimates that are associated with accounting principles (e.g., straight-line vs. accelerated 
depreciation), or estimates (e.g., pension accounting assumptions).   
Two early papers examined the relation between methods and earnings smoothness. Barefield 
and Comiskey (1971) find that straight-line depreciation relative to accelerated depreciation creates a 
smoother earnings stream.  Beidleman (1973) concludes that firms’ pension and retirement expense 
and R&D expense choices normalize (smooth) earnings, however their choices related to remitted 
earnings from unconsolidated subsidiaries, SG&A expenses, and income effects from plant 
retirements do not.  The studies acknowledge that accounting methods are endogenous, but the 
empirical analyses do not address the issue.  Gonedes (1969) examined the association between 
method choice49 and the cost of equity capital as a measure of the “…degree of risk (uncertainty) 
perceived by decision-makers…”, which he proposed as a proxy for the informativeness of earnings. 
Two later papers generate simulated data to compare the mechanical earnings-related 
properties across accounting methods.  Dharan (1987) generates earnings streams using the 
installment method for revenue recognition and using the sales method, which includes the 
hypothetical manager’s estimate (with error) of future cash collections.  He finds that the sales 
method generally produces lower earnings volatility and cash flow forecast errors.  The relative 
benefits of the accrual model are larger when sales are easier to predict, and the benefits decline as 
the standard deviation of the residuals from a deterministic model of sales increase.  Healy, Myers, 
and Howe (2002) find that application of the (pseudo) successful efforts method to R&D 
                                                 
49 The three “method” choices examined were amortization of the investment credit, interperiod tax allocation, and the 
presentation of funds flow statements in annual reports. 
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expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry provides earnings streams that are more closely 
associated with fundamental values than immediate expensing or full capitalization.  Moses (1987) 
attempts a direct assessment of the impact of methods on earnings quality proxies in a large sample.  
He suggests that firms change accounting methods to achieve smoother earnings.  His analysis 
includes all methods changes; they are primarily associated with inventory and pension accounting.  
Income-increasing changes are more likely than income-deceasing changes, and the propensity for 
changing is positively associated with firm size, existence of a bonus plan, and incentives for 
meeting earnings targets.   
Five studies examine choices of specific accounting methods.  Loudder and Behn (1995) and 
Altamuro, Beatty and Weber (2005) suggest that R&D capitalization and pre-SAB 101 revenue 
recognition practices, both of which are generally income increasing, result in more informative 
earnings as measured by ERCs.  Lev and Sougiannis (1996) use a clever research approach to 
understand the implications of method choice for earnings quality.  They use real firm data to 
“simulate” earnings outcomes if R&D were (pseudo) capitalized and show that the capitalized 
amounts are associated with information used by equity markets to value high-R&D firms (i.e., 
value-relevance).  Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999) find that asset revaluations in the UK are 
positively related to future operating income and cash flows and investors respond positively to 
revaluations.  Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) exploit a change in fixed asset accounting rules in the 
early 1900s and find evidence of increased asymmetric timeliness using the Basu metric 
(conservatism), but no evidence of smoothing, where smoothing techniques could incorporate 
artificial accounting accruals or real cost management. 
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5.2.2 Other financial reporting practices 
McVay (2006) suggests that firms use discretion over income statement classification within 
a period to shift expenses into categories that would be perceived as less persistent.  Several papers 
indicate that firms time income recognition across periods within a fiscal year.  Kerstein and Rai 
(2007) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) document that the kink in earnings is strongest for fiscal 
years for which the incentives for earnings management are greatest relative to annual periods 
ending at the first three fiscal quarters.  Brown and Pinello (2007) suggest that firms use more 
earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises at interim quarters than at fiscal years 
because the financial auditing process increases opportunities for earnings management in interim 
periods. 
 
5.2.3 Principles based vs. rules based methods and earnings quality 
A potential advantage of principles-based standards is that removing alternative accounting 
treatments for a transaction in favor of single principle that reflects underlying performance would 
result in a more informative earnings number because it reduces earnings management.  Managers 
cannot opportunistically apply an inappropriate method or estimate but claim that they were 
following GAAP as a defense.  A potential disadvantage is that principles-based standards constrain 
a manager’s ability to provide relevant information?50 
Two studies conclude that principles-based standards likely will not diminish opportunistic 
earnings management.  Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson (1995) conduct a field experiment that 
asked “managers” to make tax reporting decisions.  Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) conduct a 
survey of auditors that not only assessed the likelihood that a manager would manage earnings but 
also the likelihood that an auditor would adjust for discretion.  However, Barth, Landsman, and Lang 
                                                 
50 See Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) for a thorough discussion of the debate. 
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(2008) hypothesize that International Accounting Standards (IAS) increases earnings quality in part 
because the standards are principles-based, and they find evidence that use of (IAS) is associated 
with less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and greater value relevance.51  They 
are careful to acknowledge that these ex post characteristics of earnings also are a function of 
differences in institutions, which affect the demand for information, enforcement, and fundamental 
firm characteristics of the IAS adopters.  While they attempt to control for these differences, the 
results are still subject to their caveat. 
 
5.2.4 Summary 
There is relatively sparse evidence on the ability of accounting methods to capture firm 
fundamentals, either across different methods or across different fundamentals.  We were at first 
surprised by the small number of papers in this category, but research design issues seem to be the 
explanation.  If firms follow different methods, it is because they have chosen to, which creates an 
endogeneity problem.  When accounting methods are mandatory (i.e., exogenous), there is no cross-
sectional variation to examine.  An alternative is to study firms in different mandatory reporting 
regimes (i.e., different countries or different time periods), which creates an omitted correlated 
variables problem.  After the mid-1970s, the limited set of papers we found use either simulations or 
examine specific methods, which improves internal validity but at the expense of generalizability.  In 
summary, the results on the implications of accounting methods for earnings quality are method 
specific. 
                                                 
51 The degree of earnings management is measured based on earnings variability, earnings variability relative to cash 
flow variability (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003), the correlation between accruals and cash flows, and meeting 
earnings targets.  Timely loss recognition is measured by the frequency of large losses, and value relevance is measured 
as the contemporaneous association between stock prices and earnings and equity book value. 
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The notion that accounting method choice is opportunistically used for earnings management 
purposes, thus reducing the overall quality of earnings, does not get much support.  It is not the case 
that cash flow methods dominate accrual-based methods that involve estimation (Dharan, 1987) or 
that more “aggressive” income recognition methods are viewed as opportunistic (Loudder and Behn, 
1995; Altamuro et al., 2005).  Moreover, investors appear to efficiently adjust their valuation 
decisions to reflect information that is not reported (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).  Investors also 
appear to adjust their valuations when they anticipate earnings management (Aboody et al., 1999).   
 
5.3 Governance and controls as determinants of earnings quality 
Using the terminology of Jensen and Meckling (1976), internal controls include monitoring 
mechanisms, optimally chosen by the principal in the principal-agent relationship, as well as 
bonding mechanisms, optimally chosen by the agent at some cost.  The mechanisms we discuss in 
this section include: 1) The Board of directors (BOD); 2) Internal control procedures,52 3) 
Managerial share ownership; 4) Managerial compensation; and 5) Managerial change.  The studies 
associated with the BOD and internal control procedures view internal controls as monitors of the 
financial reporting system that constrain a manager’s opportunity or ability to manage earnings, 
while the studies of managerial share ownership and managerial compensation are predicted to affect 
earnings quality because they provide incentives for earnings management.53  In both cases, internal 
controls affect earnings management, and discretionary accruals and accounting misstatements are 
popular measures of earnings quality. 
 
                                                 
52 We emphasize the distinction between “internal controls” as the term is used by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which 
includes what researchers commonly refer to as corporate governance mechanisms, from internal control “procedures.”  
We will use the term internal control procedures for the tasks performed to monitor the financial reporting system.  
53 See Ng and Steockenius (1979), Lambert (1984), Verrecchia (1986), Dye (1988) and Liang (2004). 
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5.3.1 The Board of directors and earnings quality 
Several papers document that more independent boards, measured by a greater proportion of 
outsiders for example, and higher audit committee quality, measured by independence and meeting 
frequency for example, are associated with less earnings management, measured by discretionary 
accruals, the likelihood of the firm avoiding an earnings decline and negative earnings surprises, 
accounting manipulations, and internal control quality (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 
2005; Farber, 2005; Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004).  Krishnan (2005) documents a positive 
association between audit committee quality and quality of internal control procedures.  García 
Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between commonly used 
governance proxies for effective monitoring and asymmetric timeliness.   
Larcker et al. (2007) start with 39 governance variables and use principal component analysis 
to extract governance factors.  They find mixed and weak evidence of associations between the 
fourteen governance factors and earnings quality measured by discretionary accruals and 
restatements.  Larcker and Richardson (2004) find that strong governance mitigates the negative 
relation between audit fees and accruals.   
The studies consistently suggest a positive association between audit committee quality and 
earnings management (with the exception of Larcker et al., 2007).  This result is not surprising 
because the audit committee’s primary responsibility is to oversee the financial reporting process.  
Thus inferences from studies that predict an association between audit committee quality and 
accruals quality have the greatest internal validity ceteris paribus.  The theory that underlies tests of 
an association between BOD quality and earnings management, however, is weaker.  Directors are 
usually involved with decisions at a high level such as setting overall strategy (Adams, Hermalin, 
and Weisbach, 2008).  Hence, while it may be reasonable to argue a correlation between BOD 
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quality and the quality of M&A decisions, the argument that cross-sectional variation in many BOD 
characteristics can explain cross-sectional variation in earnings management is less compelling.  
Tests based on an overall governance score as a proxy for internal controls that might constrain 
earnings management must assume that variation in the score is correlated with the quality of 
mechanisms that specifically affect earnings management opportunities or incentives.  Tests that 
assume that the monitoring role of governance affects dimensions of earnings quality other than 
earnings management, such as conservatism, face even greater challenges (e.g., Garcia Lara et al., 
2009). 
Many internal control mechanisms are substitutes or complements. For example, Krishnan 
(2005) emphasizes the complementarity of two internal control mechanisms (i.e., audit committees 
and internal control procedures).  Larcker et al. (2007) more thoroughly address the problem and 
argue that this causes econometric problems (e.g., inconsistent coefficient estimates) when using 
only a limited set of corporate governance measures.   
 
5.3.2 Internal control procedures 
Using internal control disclosures under SOX, Doyle et al. (2007b) find that firms with 
material weaknesses in internal control procedures over financial reporting have lower accruals 
quality (measured based on Dechow and Dichev, 2002), higher discretionary accruals, lower 
earnings persistence, and a higher likelihood of restatements than other firms.  Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2008) further find that firms that have remediated their internal control weaknesses tend to have 
improved accruals quality.54  The predicted association between internal controls and accruals and 
                                                 
54 Both Doyle et al. and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. attempt to control for the self-selection bias associated with a manager’s 
choice of internal controls.  The selection bias associated with using internal control deficiency reports under SOX as a 
proxy for poor quality is a separate issue and is discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
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restatements follows directly from the prediction that internal controls lower intentional and 
unintentional errors.   
 
5.3.3 Managerial ownership 
There are two competing theories about the incentives that managerial ownership provides 
for accounting choices: an entrenchment effect (i.e., controlling shareholders extrapolate private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders) and an incentive alignment effect (i.e., controlling 
shareholders’ benefits are closely tied to firm value).  These two effects predict different directions 
for the association between ownership concentration and earnings quality.  The evidence on which 
effect dominates is mixed.   
Two early studies find that management controlled firms are more likely to choose an 
accounting method (e.g., the depreciation method) that increases reported earnings or smoothes 
earnings than owner controlled firms (Smith, 1976; Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith, 1982), which 
supports the entrenchment effect.  Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) find that managerial ownership 
is negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals and is positively related to 
informativeness of earnings.  Wang (2006) documents identical results for founding family 
ownership.  Similarly, Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) document that managerial ownership has a 
mitigating effect on the positive association between audit fees and discretionary accruals.  These 
results support the incentive alignment effect.  In contrast, Larcker et al. (2007) find that insider 
power, primarily measured by managerial ownership, is positively associated with discretionary 
accruals and restatements.  LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find a negative relation between 
managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness, which they characterize as supporting a demand 
for conservatism to mitigate the potential entrenchment effect. 
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In countries with high ownership concentration, however, the primary agency problem is 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  Fan and Wong (2002) document 
that firms in East Asia with concentrated ownership have lower ERCs.  Kim and Yi (2006) find that 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals increases with the difference between controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights for Korean firms.  Both Fan and Wong (2002) and 
Kim and Yi (2006) conclude that their findings are consistent with the entrenchment effect.55 
 
5.3.4 Managerial compensation 
Bonus plans and earnings-based compensation: Christie (1990) provides a meta-analysis of early 
research that examined whether managers choose accounting methods to maximize earnings-based 
compensation (e.g., Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey, 1981) and 
concludes that earnings-based compensation, typically measured with a dichotomous variable, is 
associated with income-increasing accounting method/estimation choices.  Skinner (1993) provides 
evidence that the association between earnings-based compensation and accounting choice holds 
after controlling for the firm’s investment opportunity set. 
Healy (1985) finds that working capital accruals are lower when the upper and lower bounds 
of bonus plans are binding and are higher when the bounds are not binding.  Several papers 
challenge this early finding.  Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), using a confidential database of 
executive short term bonuses for which upper and lower bounds are known, find evidence that 
earnings do appear to be reduced by discretionary accruals based on a modified version of the Jones 
                                                 
55 The findings for the Asian firms are different from the findings based on U.S. data.  There could be two explanations 
for the differences between Wang’s results and those in Fan and Wong (2002).  First, founding family firms could be 
different from other firms with concentrated ownership because of the incentive to protect the family’s reputation.  
Second, Wang’s findings are based on data from the U.S., where legal protection for minority shareholders is stronger 
than in other countries (e.g., Korea). 
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(1991) model when bonuses are at their maximum.  However, they do not find evidence of 
downward earnings management when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive a 
bonus.  Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) find a negative correlation between discretionary accruals 
and non-discretionary earnings for 102 firms that are known to have bonus plans for the 1980-1990 
time period.  They suggest that this finding is more consistent with smoothing than with the big bath 
behavior at the lower bound.  Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) note that Healy’s finding also is 
consistent with a negative correlation between cash flows and accruals and a positive correlation 
between earnings and accruals given his proxies for the upper and lower bounds.   
 Using business-unit-level data on earnings and managerial bonuses, Guidry, Leone, and Rock 
(1999) find results consistent with Healy’s bonus-maximization hypothesis.  They use several 
proxies for discretionary accruals, including a measure related to inventory, total accruals (Healy, 
1985), and discretionary accruals generated from a modified version of the Jones (1991) model 
(Dechow et al., 1995). 
Equity-based compensation including executive stock options (ESOs): Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) find that firms in which the CEO’s total compensation consists mainly of the value of stock 
options report large discretionary accruals and that these CEOs tend to exercise more stock options 
and sell more shares in high-accrual years.  Burns and Kedia (2006) document a positive association 
between the likelihood of restatements and the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock 
price.  Efendi et al. (2007) find that firms that restate financial statements at the end of the 1990’s 
market bubble are more likely to have a CEO with a significant holding of in-the-money stock 
options.56  Johnson et al. (2009) document stronger compensation incentives from unrestricted stock 
                                                 
56 Several studies suggest that managers attempt to deflate the firm’s stock price, and hence the ESO’s strike price, prior 
to a grant via the timing of disclosures around grant dates.  Aboody and Kasznik (2000) examine firms’ voluntary 
disclosures and find that under a fixed granting schedule, bad news tends to precede grant dates and good news tends to 
follow.  They also find that stock returns are systematically lower prior to grant dates and increase afterwards (Chauvin 
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for the AAER firm executives than for those of control firms.  Erickson et al. (2006) and Armstrong 
et al. (2009), however, find no evidence of an association between equity-based incentive 
compensation and accounting manipulations. 
Balsam et al. (2003) find that discretionary accruals are lower prior to option grant dates, 
and the effect is stronger in settings in which the grant date is not predictable (Baker et al., 2003).  
Coles et al. (2006) examine discretionary accruals in quarters between the date of cancellation and 
subsequent reissue of options.  Discretionary accruals are relatively income-decreasing leading up to 
the reissue.  Likewise, McAnally et al. (2008) finds that firms intentionally miss earnings targets 
prior to known option grant dates, which reduces stock price (Skinner and Sloan, 2000), but that 
firms do not miss earning targets repeatedly in advance of grants. 
Insider trading: Beneish (1999) and Summers and Sweeney (1998) find that managers are more 
likely to sell their shares and redeem SARs during periods of overstated earnings, where these 
periods are identified ex post by AAERs.  Beneish (1999) acknowledges that these are cases of 
extreme earnings management and that his results might not be generalizable to periods of less 
extreme earnings management that nonetheless affects earnings quality.  Darrough and Rangan 
(2005) find that insider selling is positively related to discretionary current accruals and negatively 
related to changes in R&D spending in the year of an IPO.  They interpret both results as consistent 
with opportunistic earnings management.   
 
5.3.5 Managerial change 
Moore (1973), Pourciau (1993), and Geiger and North (2006) find evidence that incoming 
managers are more likely to exercise discretion in managing earnings (measured by abnormal 
                                                                                                                                                                   
and Shenoy, 2001; Yermack, 1997).  A related line of research examines backdating, in which grant dates are 
retroactively assigned to historically low share prices (Heron and Lie, 2006, Narayanan et al., 2006). 
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accruals) downward in the year of the change.  Pourciau (1993) also shows that earnings tend to be 
managed upward in the year following management change.  Incoming managers can blame 
departing managers for asset impairments.  In addition, they can lower the earnings benchmark 
against which future results are evaluated or create hidden reserves to manage future earnings. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) document that departing CEOs are more likely to cut R&D 
expenditures when they are closer to retirement.  The shorter career horizon creates stronger 
incentives to focus on short-term operating performance at the expense of long-term operating 
performance.  Pourciau (1993), however, does not find evidence that managers use accruals that 
increase earnings during their last year with the firm. 
DeAngelo (1988) finds evidence that managers use accounting discretion (i.e., abnormal 
accruals) to report favorable accounting earnings during a proxy contest for board seats after having 
been targeted by dissidents for poor earnings performance.  She also finds evidence of big-bath 
earnings management behavior when dissidents are elected following proxy contests.  In follow-up 
research, Collins and DeAngelo (1990) find that the market is more responsive to earnings during 
the proxy contest, which is opposite to the expected result if investors anticipate that managers are 
using accounting discretion to boost earnings. 
The question of managerial turnover and more generally the impact of individual 
characteristics of a manager on earnings management is important but the evidence is limited (see 
Francis, Huang, Rajgopal and Zang, 2008; Schrand and Zechman, 2009; Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 
2009).  Studies of the implications of manager change face two hurdles.  First, it is difficult to 
control for factors such as performance that could cause management turnover/selection and 
simultaneously affect EQ proxies.  Second, in studies of departures, it is difficult to identify whether 
and when managers expect to depart.  This difficulty might explain the difference in results in 
 100
Dechow and Sloan (1991), who study retirees with expected departure dates, and Pourciau (1993), 
who studies non-routine executive turnover. 
 
5.3.6 Summary of governance and controls as determinants of earnings quality 
The evidence that internal control procedures are associated with less earnings management 
and that managerial turnover is a disciplining mechanism associated with earnings management, as a 
specific dimension of earnings quality, is generally consistent.  The evidence on how other 
governance mechanisms and controls (i.e., BOD characteristics, managerial ownership, and 
managerial compensation) affect earnings management is weak or mixed. 
A notable deficiency of this literature is that our database contains no studies that attempt to 
understand whether managers internalize the earnings quality implications of investment and 
financing decisions.  Governance mechanisms and controls (other than internal control procedures) 
may not have a direct effect on earnings management, but these mechanisms likely do affect other 
managerial decisions, which in turn can affect dimensions of earnings quality.  For example, 
characteristics of the BOD will affect investment decisions, and investment can affect earnings 
persistence and sustainability (Penman and Zhang, 2002).  Likewise, an extensive literature 
documents an association between equity-based compensation and investment decisions, but our 
database does not contain any studies that attempt to predict that equity-based compensation will 
have consequences for EQ proxies other than earnings management.  This omission is surprising 
given that variation in compensation contract form is commonly predicted to affect variation in 
investment risk-taking (e.g., Shevlin and Rajgopal, 2002), which is associated with earnings 
sustainability and persistence, two prominent measures of earnings quality. 
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Despite the long-standing recognition that optimal contracts, and more generally internal 
controls as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), may lead to accounting choices that benefit the 
agent at the expense of the firm (i.e., opportunistic earnings management) or to efficient accounting 
choices that maximize the value of the firm, the debate is still open.57  Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) and Bowen et al. (2008) examine which of these two alternative explanations is dominant in 
explaining observed discretionary accounting choices.  Both papers conclude that contracting 
efficiency is the main explanation.  In addition, Bowen et al. (2008) find that accounting discretion 
associated with poor controls is positively related to future operating performance (i.e., operating 
cash flows and return on assets), which they interpret as evidence that earnings management is 
beneficial to shareholders. 
Their findings raise the question of whether and when equityholders recognize that 
discretionary accounting choices are ex post efficient vs. opportunistic.  Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) assume that the takeover market would discipline opportunism and use this to identify a 
sample of firms that are likely to be opportunistic.  While it is reasonable to assume that participants 
in the takeover market can unwind earnings management, it is an empirical question whether equity 
investors, or other parties such as analysts, are able to unwind earnings management.  The stock 
option grant papers provide evidence that equity investors infer that earnings may be managed 
around grant dates and incorporate an expectation of rational earnings management into their 
pricing.  However, research that explores the extent to which equity investors infer rational earnings 
                                                 
57 Dye and Verrecchia (1995), Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), and Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) use varied modeling 
techniques to yield predictions about accounting method choice and conditions that affect efficiency.  The predictions 
about accounting choices, including disclosure, depend on the parameterization of the model and the assumptions about 
the contracting environment, information asymmetry, and the costs to the manager of various firm decisions.  Managers 
sometimes choose accounting methods to convey information and sometimes choose methods that intentionally increase 
the noise in financial reports.  Discretion sometimes improves efficiency but sometimes decreases it.  The choice of a 
more noisy financial reporting system can be associated with increased efficiency, which may seem to be an unintuitive 
result. 
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management related to incentives provided by control mechanisms, and perhaps react favorably to it, 
is limited. 
 
5.4 Auditors as determinants of earnings quality 
The impact of auditors on EQ derives from their role in mitigating intentional and 
unintentional misstatements.  The ability of an auditor to mitigate misstatements is a function of both 
the auditor’s ability to detect a material misstatement and to adjust for or report it (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Researchers predict that an auditor’s ability to detect errors is a function of auditor effort and 
effectiveness.  Researchers predict that an auditor’s incentives to report or correct errors depends on 
factors such as litigation risk, reputation costs, and auditor independence (e.g., Caramanis and 
Lennox, 2008). 
The two most commonly studied features of auditors are audit firm size and fee structures.  
Both features can be correlated with an auditor’s ability to detect errors and an auditor’s incentives 
to report, which makes it difficult to disentangle the reason for the auditor’s impact on quality. 
 
5.4.1 Studies of auditor size 
Firms with Big-X auditors58 have significantly lower discretionary accruals than firms with 
non-Big-X auditors (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998; Francis, Maydew, and 
Sparks, 1999; Kim, Chung, and Firth, 2003).  Petroni and Beasley (1996) do not find that the 
accuracy and bias of the loss reserve account in property-casualty insurers in the insurance industry 
varies based on audit firm size, but Gaver and Paterson (2001) find that weak insurers do not 
understate their reserve account when they have both Big-six auditors and Big-six actuaries.  While 
these studies consistently suggest that effective auditing limits earnings management, Dechow et al. 
                                                 
58 Big-eight, Big-six, or Big-five, depending on the timing of the study. 
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(1996) suggest that having “Big” auditors does not prevent extreme accounting manipulations.  One 
explanation for the difference in results is that the dichotomous partition of audit firms based on 
audit firm size is too crude to capture auditor effectiveness in a small sample. 
Audit firm size also is correlated with EQ proxies other than accruals.  In a cross-country 
analysis, Francis and Wang (2008) document that the positive association between country-level 
investor protection and EQ, measured by abnormal accruals, the likelihood of reporting a loss, and 
asymmetric timeliness, is higher only for firms with Big-four auditors.  Teoh and Wong (1993) find 
that firms with Big-eight auditors have significantly higher ERCs.  Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) 
find that firms that switch auditors for service-related reasons have increasing ERCs after the auditor 
change.  However, firms that switch auditors for non-service-related reasons, related primarily to 
fees and fee disputes, have decreasing ERCs.   
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) attempt to explain why the ex post incidence of litigation 
against auditors is lower for Big-six auditors (see also, Palmrose, 1988).  One explanation is that big 
auditors force more conservative accounting, which leads to a lower litigation rate.  In a sample of 
firms that switch auditors, they show that Big-six predecessor auditors are more conservative in their 
accounting choices (i.e., income decreasing discretionary accruals), and they provide weak evidence 
that non-Big 6 successor auditors are less conservative. 
 
5.4.2 Studies of auditor fees 
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) document a positive association between the magnitude of fees for 
audit services and accruals quality measured based on Dechow and Dichev (2002).  Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) document a positive association between total fees (i.e., the sum of audit and 
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nonaudit fees) and discretionary accruals.59  A branch of the literature focuses on nonaudit fees.  
Greater nonaudit services could compromise auditor independence, reducing the auditor’s incentives 
to report/adjust misstatements.  However, greater nonaudit services could increase audit quality by 
increasing an auditor’s ability to detect errors assuming information transfer across service lines.  
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find that firms with higher nonaudit fees tend to have higher 
discretionary accruals and smaller earnings surprises.  Three subsequent empirical studies confirm 
the findings in Frankel et al., employing alternative measures of earnings quality (i.e., accruals 
quality, ERCs, restatements) or a different sample (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Ferguson, Seow, and 
Young, 2004; Francis and Ke, 2006).  Consistent with these empirical observations, an experimental 
study by Joe and Vandervelde (2007) finds that auditors identify fewer fraud risk factors in an audit 
task when they also perform a nonaudit task than when the nonaudit task is performed but by another 
firm. 
Several papers challenge or add context to the results on nonaudit fees as a determinant of 
EQ.  Chung and Kallapur (2003) make adjustments for several hypothesized methodological issues 
in Frankel et al. and find no association between nonaudit fees and discretionary accruals.  Larcker 
and Richardson (2004) show that the positive association between measures of nonaudit fees and 
discretionary accruals holds for only about 8.5% of the sample and that these firms tends to have 
weak corporate governance.  They find a negative association between nonaudit fees and 
discretionary accruals when using alternative measures for nonaudit fees.  Two other studies use 
alternative measures of earnings quality, performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and 
restatements, and also find conflicting results (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; Ruddock, 
Taylor, and Taylor, 2006).
                                                 
59 Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) find a positive association between audit fees and discretionary accruals.  However, they 
do not attribute their results to auditors’ economic bonding with clients.  They suggest that high discretionary accruals 
increase auditors’ assessment of risk level, and auditors accordingly charge higher fees. 
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5.4.3 Studies of other auditor characteristics 
Auditor effort: Direct studies of the effects of auditor effort are generally not possible because effort 
is unobservable, but experimental settings and surveys provide some evidence on auditor effort.  
Phillips (1999) suggests that auditors increase their effort when the risk of misstatements is high; 
accordingly, the presence of auditing can deter financial reporting irregularities (e.g., Schneider and 
Wilner, 1990).  Hirst (1994) finds that auditing judgments reflect earnings management incentives 
from management buyout and bonus plans, which suggests that an auditor’s ability to detect errors 
varies with his effort to understand incentives.  Nelson, Elliot, and Tarpley (2002) survey 253 
auditors from one of the Big-five audit firms who identify 515 experiences of attempted earnings 
management.  The surveyed auditors suggest that they do adjust for attempted earnings management, 
especially when attempted earnings management increases current-year earnings.  Using a unique 
archival dataset, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) document a significant negative relation between 
audit hours worked, as a proxy for auditor effort, and discretionary accruals for a sample of audits 
from Greece.60 
Industry expertise: Krishnan (2003) finds that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is lower for 
clients of auditors with industry expertise. 
Litigation risk: In an experiment, Barron, Pratt, and Stice (2001) find that auditors are more likely to 
adjust errors that overstate earnings than errors that understate earnings, and they are more likely to 
correct errors when litigation against the auditor of a competitor to the client firm for a similar 
misstatement resulted in a loss to the auditor.  They conclude that auditors are more likely to correct 
                                                 
60 However, an “in-basket” task experiment that asked managers to make discretionary accrual decisions and that varied 
the manager’s perceptions of internal and external auditor aggressiveness based on fabricated correspondence included in 
the experimental materials found no support for the hypothesis that internal and external auditors act as a deterrent to 
aggressive financial reporting (Uecker, Brief, and Kinney, 1981). 
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errors when litigation risk is high.  Using archival data, Heninger (2001) finds that shareholder 
lawsuits against auditors increase with discretionary accruals.   
Auditor tenure: Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) find no evidence that long auditor tenure is 
associated with low earnings quality, measured by the magnitude of discretionary accruals and the 
persistence of accruals.  Chen et al. (2008) show that audit partner tenure is negatively associated 
with the magnitude of discretionary accruals in a sample of Taiwanese companies. 
Revolving-door auditors: Menon and Williams (2004) report that hiring former auditing partners as 
officers, which they suggest might compromise auditor independence, is associated with two proxies 
for lower EQ: higher discretionary accruals and a higher likelihood of meeting analyst forecasts.  
However, using a longer sample period, Geiger, Lennox, and North (2008) find no evidence that 
such appointments are associated with lower financial reporting quality, as measured by 
discretionary accruals and the likelihood that the firm is the subject of an SEC enforcement action. 
 
5.4.4 Summary 
We began this section by discussing the theoretical foundation for the prediction that auditor 
effort/effectiveness can mitigate accounting misstatements.  Auditor effort/effectiveness, however, is 
unobservable.  Evidence from experiments and surveys suggest that greater effectiveness, 
specifically related to recognizing audit risk and adjusting the audit process,61 decreases observed 
earnings management.  The most direct empirical proxies for effort/effectiveness such as hours spent 
auditing and auditor industry expertise, also are negatively associated with earnings management.  
However, one must use caution when interpreting the evidence that uses indirect proxies for auditor 
effort/effectiveness such as fees and audit firm size.  To mitigate misstatements, auditors must both 
                                                 
61 Uecker, Brief, and Kinney (1981), however, conclude that the perceived aggressiveness of the auditor (both internal 
and external) does not deter earnings management behavior by management based on a field experiment that employed 
business managers. 
 107
detect and report material misstatements.62  Fees and size can measure both the auditor’s ability to 
detect errors and his incentives to report the misstatement. 
Larger audit firms are negatively associated with discretionary “low quality” accruals.  This 
outcome appears to result from both greater expertise (effectiveness) and stronger incentives to 
constrain misreporting (DeAngelo, 1981).  The auditor size results do not identify whether greater 
detection ability or greater reporting incentives affect misreporting.  The studies on auditor fees and 
tenure provide some evidence to identify the effects of detection ability versus reporting incentives.  
Higher audit fees are predicted to be positively correlated with auditor expertise, and hence with 
detection ability, but they also are predicted to be negatively associated auditor independence and 
hence with decreased reporting incentives (DeAngelo, 1981).  The preponderance of the evidence 
suggests that higher audit fees and longer auditor tenure are associated with higher accrual quality 
(or at least not associated with lower quality).  This evidence would seemingly suggest that the 
detection ability effect dominates the independence concerns on average.  Studies that attempt to 
further parse out the independence concerns support this conclusion given that the evidence on 
revolving door practice and non-audit fees certainly isn’t conclusive that independence is a 
significant concern.  
The auditors’ role in affecting earnings quality is limited to a conclusion that auditors 
specifically constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals.  This inference is valid given the 
auditor’s role in the financial reporting process.  Tests that use proxies for EQ other than indicators 
of earnings management, however, such as ERCs or statistical properties of earnings, are more likely 
                                                 
62 The empirical prediction that auditor characteristics would be associated with an actual number in the income 
statement (e.g., discretionary accruals) is based on the stronger assumption that auditors not only report the error but that 
they adjust for it.  Evidence in Whittred (1980) calls into question this stronger assumption.  Whittred (1980) finds that 
reporting delays, which could be due to longer auditor-client negotiations and more effort in auditing, are associated with 
qualified reports.  Thus, the auditor has exerted greater effort and detected the error, but the outcome is that earnings 
quality as reported in the income statement is lower for these firms.  The auditor reports the lower quality via the opinion 
decision.  
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to suffer from omitted correlated variables problems.  A significant portion of the cross-sectional 
variation in ERCs or variables related to properties of earnings (e.g., timely loss recognition and the 
likelihood of reporting a loss used in Francis and Wang, 2008) comes from the ability of the 
accounting system to capture the firm’s fundamental earnings process and not from the controllable 
and auditable dimension of quality.  Hence, while the empirical evidence in studies that use ERCs or 
properties of earnings as proxies for EQ are consistent with the predicted positive relation between 
auditor effort and earnings quality, the studies must deal with substantial concerns about alternative 
explanations for results, including auditor self-selection and omitted correlated variables. 
A notable underrepresented element of the literature is studies that recognize the important 
roles of entities other than auditors, such as actuaries, that can interact with the auditor to affect the 
earnings quality outcome (Gaver and Paterson, 2001).  Likewise, there are entities other than 
auditors that have a similar role in the financial reporting process, and thus may affect earnings 
quality, although research in this area is limited.  Morsfield and Tan (2006) document that IPO firms 
backed by venture capitalists exhibit lower discretionary accruals than other IPO firms in the IPO-
year.  Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) document that SEOs that have underwriters with higher reputations 
are associated with lower discretionary accruals than other SEOs.  Studies also suggest that 
institutional investors affect EQ (Bushee, 1998), but the motivation is different.  Institutions are 
predicted to affect EQ because of their anticipated information demands, not because they are 
directly involved in the financial reporting process.   
 
5.5 Capital market incentives as determinants of earnings quality 
 The papers in this section discuss how capital market incentives influence firms’ accounting 
choices and hence are potential determinants of earnings quality. 
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5.5.1 Incentives when firms raise capital 
The premise of this literature is that the cost/benefit trade-offs of accounting choices change 
during periods when a firm raises capital.  Greater litigation risk, for example, may increase the costs 
of opportunistic accounting choices.  Greater utility associated with the availability or price of 
capital may increase the benefits of opportunistic accounting choices.  Hence, the firm’s accounting 
choices, and thus its earnings quality, may differ when a firm is raising capital. 
A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) is a commonly examined setting.  Friedlan (1994) and 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) find that firms have income increasing discretionary accruals prior to 
setting the offer price in an IPO.  Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) find little evidence that accruals 
are abnormally high prior to a firm’s IPO.  To the extent there is evidence suggesting earnings 
management, they find it more prevalent among smaller and more levered firms and those that use 
lower quality underwriters and brokers.  Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), however, find unusually high 
abnormal accruals in the IPO issue-year and lower allowances for doubtful receivables.  Similar to 
Aharony et al. (1993), Morsfield and Tan (2006) find that monitoring is a mitigating factor; IPO-year 
abnormal accruals are lower for IPO firms with venture capitalists than for other IPO firms. 
We also observe evidence outside the IPO setting that firms’ accruals choices are affected by 
capital market incentives.  Haw, Qi, Wu, and Wu (2005) find that Chinese firms that meet or just 
miss the 10% ROE requirements to qualify to make a stock rights offering in China between 1996 
and 1998 have higher accruals.  Erickson and Wang (1999) find evidence of income increasing 
earnings management via accruals prior to stock-for-stock merger agreements.  In a management 
buyout (MBO), when the incentive is to understate performance to justify lower offer prices to 
existing shareholders, DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals in the MBO year for 64 deals prior to 1982 using the year-over-year change in working 
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capital accruals as a proxy.  Perry and Williams (1994), however, estimate discretionary accruals 
using the Jones model and find lower discretionary accruals prior to the buyout relative to an 
industry and size matched control sample for 175 MBOs from 1981-1988.  Results using outcome-
based measures of earnings management such as AAERs and restatements also suggest that capital 
raising activities are associated with earnings management (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; 
Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007). 
Two studies infer capital market incentives for accounting choices.  Bowen, Davis, and 
Rajgopal (2002) find that internet firms with greater cash burn rates, which they use as a proxy for 
external financing needs, are more likely to report advertising barter arrangements on the gross 
basis on the income statement, which is preferable for managers who believe they are being 
evaluated based on revenues.  Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) infer capital market incentives from 
cross-listing status and document differences in multiple proxies for EQ across cross-listed firms and 
a matched sample of firms from the same country.63  Cross-listed firms appear to engage in less 
earnings management (measured by earnings smoothing, accruals, and frequency of small positive 
earnings), report more conservative earnings (measured by timeliness of loss recognition), and have 
higher ERCs.  The differences are caused by both changes around cross-listing and differences in 
accounting quality before listing.  Ndubizu (2007) similarly finds that foreign firms appear to boost 
accruals at the time of cross-listing their stock in the U.S., however, he finds no differences between 
firms that raise capital at the time of cross-listing and a control group of cross-listing firms that do 
not.  Finally, Dietrich, Harris, and Muller (2000) find that firms make accounting method choices 
regarding fair value estimates of investment properties to boost earnings and time asset sales to help 
smooth earnings before raising debt. 
                                                 
63 The quality metrics are measured for both samples based on accounting data reported in local markets using locally 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
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 Reviewing these studies together yields the following conclusions: 
1) Evidence consistently suggests that incentives to influence equity market valuations affect firms’ 
accounting choices, in particular their accrual choices.  The hypothesis that equity markets would 
provide incentives for these accounting choices assumes that equity markets cannot detect the 
earnings management, although the papers do not test this.  The papers provide evidence only on 
whether managers believe that the specific mechanism they examine is detectable.   
2) The papers generally focus on event-driven incentives for accounting choices.  These accounting 
choices, however, can have long-term consequences, such as a diminished reputation for 
transparency that adverse selection models predict should have a negative impact on the firm’s cost 
of capital.64  The studies generally do not emphasize the trade-off between the short-term benefits of 
the accounting choice at the time of the event (e.g., the IPO) and the potential long-term reputation 
loss due to these one-off earnings management decisions. 
In fact, the finding that IPO cross-listed firms and non-IPO cross-listed firms have similar 
levels of accruals management (Ndubizu, 2007) suggests that the expected benefits of investor 
recognition (or visibility), rather than capital raising activities, provides incentives for accounting 
choices.  Similarly, Bowen et al. (2002) find a positive association between levels of activity on 
Motley Fool and use of the gross basis of reporting for advertising barter arrangements, which 
suggests that firms use accounting choice to influence visibility.  Like reputation discussed in the 
previous paragraph, investor recognition is a long-term objective that may influence a firms’ 
accounting choices.  While the importance of investor recognition is recognized in other areas of 
accounting research (e.g., studies of investor relations and analysts), little research directly examines 
                                                 
64 Christie and Zimmerman (1994) find that takeover targets are more likely to be using income increasing accounting 
choices than an industry matched sample.  The choices they examine have only a small effect on income but have a 
substantial impact on retained earnings over long periods.  They argue that these choices reflect “economic Darwinism.”  
Firms that use suboptimal accounting choices, or that select the accounting rules for opportunistic reasons rather than 
signaling reasons, are more likely to be taken over.  
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how the incentives provided by the potential benefits of investor visibility affect accounting choices 
and earnings quality.  
3) Only one paper in our database examines whether raising capital in debt markets provides 
incentives for accounting choice.  More work within public debt markets and on the trade-offs 
between debt and equity market incentives would be useful. 
 
5.5.2 Incentives for accounting choice provided by earnings-based targets65 
Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) provide evidence that firms manage deferred tax expense 
to avoid losses and to avoid earnings declines.  Rowchowdhury (2006) provides evidence of real 
earnings management to meet various earnings-based targets.  Das and Zhang (2003) suggest that 
firms use working capital accruals to be able to round up EPS to meet analysts’ forecasts, report 
positive earnings, or to sustain recent performance.  Kasznik (1999) finds that firms that provide 
management forecasts are more likely to manipulate discretionary accruals to meet their forecasts 
when they are concerned with litigation risk or fear a loss of reputation accuracy.  Barton and Simko 
(2002) suggest that incentives to meet targets are an important determinant of earnings management, 
but that opportunities constrain the firm’s choice.  They find that constrained firms with already 
overstated net asset values are less likely to report small negative earnings surprises or large positive 
earnings surprises and infer that the constrained firms could not manipulate earnings. 
Earnings targets undoubtedly provide incentives for earnings management.  The contribution 
of these studies is that they provide evidence on specific tools that firms use to manage earnings.  
However, the studies do not provide evidence on how firms choose among earnings management 
                                                 
65 Section 4.1.4 also reviews evidence related to benchmarks/targets.  In that section, we review studies that use meeting 
a target as a proxy for earnings quality.  Those studies test the determinants of reporting earnings that meet a target or the 
consequences of doing so.  The papers in this section, in contrast, treat meeting a target as the independent variable and 
examine the incentives that targets provide for earnings management. 
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tools.  Barton and Simko (2002) pursue the idea that a firm’s choice with respect to a particular tool 
might be constrained, but they do not pursue the alternatives when the firm is constrained. 
A well-recognized problem with studies that use analyst forecasts as a benchmark is that the 
analyst is an economic agent with his own incentives.  Beating an analyst forecast depends not only 
on the firm’s accounting choices, which may affect earnings quality, but also on the analyst’s 
forecasting actions.  The studies interpret a relation between “meeting or beating” the forecast and 
earnings management as evidence that the firm managed earnings, while the alternative explanation 
is that the analyst managed the forecast (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 2004).  To the extent the 
analyst’s actions are influenced by earnings quality considerations (unmanaged), the net impact on 
earnings quality arising from these incentives is indeterminate  
 
5.6 External factors as determinants of earnings quality 
External factors include political processes, tax and non-tax regulation,66 and macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
5.6.1 The political process 
Eight papers in our database predict that political processes motivate managers to engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management, commonly measured by discretionary accruals, during 
periods of political pressure because profits generate regulatory or political attention/scrutiny that 
can lead to costly intervention or because profits are a direct input to a political/regulatory decision.  
The settings examined include: 1) U.S. International Trade Commission import relief investigations 
                                                 
66 Regulators and regulation may be viewed as external monitors like auditors and boards, discussed in Sections 3.3 and 
3.4.  Consistent with the Kose and Kedia (2006) framework for internal controls, however, regulation is discussed as a 
distinct determinant of earnings quality because it is a force imposed on the firm rather than a monitoring choice made 
by the firm. 
 114
(Jones, 1991); 2) Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission antitrust investigations (Cahan, 
1992); 3) Political pressure on HMOs (Mensah, Considine, and Oakes, 1994); 4) Congressional 
hearings on the U.S. cable television industry (Key, 1997); 5) Oil companies during the 1990 Gulf 
crisis (Han and Wang, 1998); 6) New Zealand’s Price Justification Scheme and the Stabilisation of 
Prices Regulation in the 1970s (Navissi, 1999); 7) Gold price inflation, proposed taxes, and gold 
firms in Australia (Monem, 2003); and 8) Environmental Protection Agency pressures on potentially 
responsible parties (PRP) under the Superfund Act (Johnston and Rock, 2005). 
The studies investigate a wide variety of settings, but they consistently document that 
expected political costs affect accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  An assumption 
common to these studies is that the decision-maker uses the reported earnings number in his decision 
and does not undo the effects of the accounting choice.67  Thus, it is not surprising that these papers 
investigate discretionary accruals rather than other potentially more transparent accounting choices 
such as accounting method changes. 
 
5.6.2 Capital regulations 
Four papers focus exclusively on the relation between incentives to meet capital requirements 
and earnings management behavior.  They use either levels or changes specifications to test for the 
relation: 1) Petroni (1992) finds that P&C insurers experiencing financial difficulty underestimate 
policy loss reserves, consistent with incentives provided by insurance industry net worth 
requirements; 2) Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999) find that the 
magnitude of loan loss provisions for banks with low capital ratios significantly decreased after new 
capital standards became effective in 1989; 3) Schrand and Wong (2003) find that well-capitalized 
                                                 
67 The firm may only need to fool a politician’s constituents, which provides the politician with enough justification to 
support his position, even if the politician is able to unravel the underlying facts. 
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banks use the valuation allowance against deferred tax assets to create hidden reserves that they can 
later use to smooth earnings. 
An additional five papers study the impact of capital requirements relative to other 
incentives: 1) Moyer (1990) finds that bank’s use adjustments to the loan loss provision, loan 
charge-offs, and securities gains and losses to avoid violating capital adequacy requirements but she 
finds no support for the political sensitivity hypothesis (i.e., attempt to reduce income when revenue 
is high); 2) Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) use a simultaneous system of five equations to 
examine whether bank managers optimize over a variety of incentives including capital 
requirements, tax, and earnings goals, and they investigate multiple accruals accounts; 3) Mensah, 
Considine, and Oakes (1994) suggest that financially weak HMOs understate “incurred but not 
reported expenses” (IBNRs), consistent with incentives to avoid violation of net worth requirements, 
but they find no support for the hypothesis that political visibility (measured by size) increases the 
regulatory pressure; 4) Chen and Daley (1996), for a sample of Canadian banks from 1977 to 1987, 
find strong support for capital maintenance incentives, weaker support for tax incentives, and no 
support for equity valuation incentives; and 5) Gaver and Paterson (1999) find that changes in 
insurers’ choices on the realization of capital gains and stock transactions reflect changing 
incentives in risk-based capital requirements in 1994, while loss reserve estimates do not.  Rather, 
loss reserve decisions are consistent with tax incentives throughout the period of changing capital 
regulation. 
In a related vein, Muller (1999) finds that the decision by British firms to capitalize a brand 
rather than to write it off immediately at the time of an acquisition is influenced by whether the 
choice would result in shareholder approval for future acquisitions under London Stock Exchange 
requirements, which are capital-based.  
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5.6.3 Tax regulations 
Several studies exploit the LIFO conformity rule in the U.S. tax system to test whether 
incentives to minimize tax costs (i.e., present value of tax payments) affect accounting method 
choice, which in turn affects EQ.  For example, Lee and Hsieh (1985), Hunt (1985), and Dopuch and 
Pincus (1988) document both tax (e.g., the magnitude of tax savings) and nontax explanations (e.g., 
contracting costs) for the choice of inventory accounting methods.  Keating and Zimmerman (1999) 
exploit a natural experiment due to a 1981 tax law change that mitigated the impact of tax 
considerations on financial reporting depreciation choices and find an increase in the frequency of 
income-increasing depreciation estimate choices and a decrease in the frequency of income-
increasing depreciation method changes after the 1981 tax law change.  Guenther, Maydew, and 
Nutter (1997) exploit a change in book-tax conformity associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA) and find that firms that are required to switch from the cash method to the accrual method 
have higher (lower) accruals than firms that already use the accrual method prior to (following) the 
rule change. 
Five papers in our database examine the effects of rate changes associated with the TRA and 
suggest that the rate change had a one-time impact on accruals choices around the period of the 
change.  Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992), Guenther (1994), and Maydew (1997) conclude that 
firms shift income from the pre-TRA period to the lower tax-rate regime period by deferring revenue 
and accelerating expenses.  The evidence on income shifting in the opposite direction to avoid the 
U.S. corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT), however, is inconsistent (Boynton, Dobbins, and 
Plesko, 1992; Choi, Gramlich, and Thomas, 2001).   
Two additional studies suggest that changes in tax incentives associated with the TRA led to 
a shift in accounting choices that will affect EQ on an on-going basis.  The TRA increased the 
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marginal tax rate for companies with long-term manufacturing contracts, and Calegari (2000) 
documents that companies with long-term manufacturing contracts increase their leverage and 
decrease discretionary accruals with high book-tax conformity following the TRA.  Klassen, Lang, 
and Wolfson (1993) provide evidence that suggests that the U.S. tax rate reduction in 1987 results in 
geographic income shifting to the U.S. for multinational companies.68 
 
5.6.4 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
Studies of SOX assert that it increased the expected costs of earnings management 
(especially accounting fraud) and thus managers are likely to engage in less earnings management 
after the implementation of SOX.  Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) document that earnings management 
activities using accruals declined following SOX but that real earnings management activities 
increased after SOX.  Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2008) provide evidence that managers switch 
from using discretionary accruals to expectation management in order to meet analyst forecasts. 
 
5.6.5 Other 
Three papers in our database study other external factors that provide incentives for earnings 
management, but that do not fit into the categories defined above.  Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) 
find that firms in the oil industry that are facing potentially large litigation damage awards choose 
income-decreasing non-working capital accruals relative to a control sample.  Bowen, DuCharme, 
and Shores (1995) find that firms with greater incentives provided by ongoing implicit claims with 
third parties including customers, suppliers, employees, and short-term creditors make more income 
increasing inventory and depreciation accounting choices.  As an example of their proxies for the 
                                                 
68 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a comprehensive review of income shifting by multinationals, particularly 
following the TRA. 
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importance of implicit claims, they propose that implicit customer claims are positively associated 
with product uniqueness, and they measure variation in uniqueness by R&D expense.  Rosner (2003) 
finds that firms that subsequently declare bankruptcy have greater income-increasing abnormal 
accruals compared to a matched sample and suggests that the firms engaged in earnings management 
in an effort to avoid bankruptcy. 
 
5.6.6 Summary 
Capital regulations, specifically in the banking and insurance industries, provide strong 
incentives to manage earnings, and loss provisions are most commonly used to meet these 
regulations.  Other incentives are of second-order importance when capital requirements are likely to 
be binding.69   
The studies document that firms manage discretionary accruals during periods of heightened 
pressure (either external or internal) or in response to specific regulatory changes.  Thus, the results 
suggest that earnings quality is time-varying.  External factors such as changing pressures from 
antitrust regulation during merger discussions will create firm-specific time-varying EQ patterns.  
However, the majority of the external factors discussed are clustered in calendar time (e.g., the TRA 
or bank capital requirement changes) and the resulting effects on EQ will be clustered in calendar 
time as well.  External factors that affect accounting method choice, in contrast, will lead to cross-
sectional variation in EQ, but not time-variation (Calegari, 2000; Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson, 
1993). 
                                                 
69 This conclusion on net worth requirements, however, may not generalize to other settings.  The financial services 
industry has greater power to detect specific earnings management responses to regulations given the direct link between 
the capital requirements and the loss provision accounts and the significance and variation of the loss provision accounts 
across banks/insurance carriers.   
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Equity market incentives receive little support as a determinant of accounting choices when 
measured relative to incentives provided by external factors.  However, the tests of equity market 
incentives are likely to be of low power relative to tests of incentives provided by regulatory capital 
requirements to manage specific accounts such as the loan loss provision. 
The earnings management activities associated with these external factors may potentially 
mislead other financial statement users.  We did not catalogue any studies on how/whether firms 
communicate to equity markets during periods of regulatory scrutiny to offset the negative message 
they falsely send to regulators/politicians, or the extent to which firms may forgo accessing capital 
during these periods.  We also did not catalogue any studies that assess equity market reactions to 
earnings during these periods when investors might rationally infer the earnings management.70 
Several papers provide evidence that firms use multiple tools in response to a single 
incentive.  These results emphasize a point we have made previously: accruals management, ceteris 
paribus, may impair earnings quality, but it represents only one choice within the firm’s portfolio of 
accounting and real choices.  Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) examine both multiple tools and 
multiple incentives.  
Finally, there is (surprisingly) limited research on macroeconomic conditions as a 
determinant of EQ.  Although we had initially defined a category to collect these papers, our journal 
search found only one paper that focuses primarily on macroeconomic factors as a determinant of 
earnings quality (Liu and Ryan, 2006) and one paper that gives them significant albeit secondary 
                                                 
70 Two studies, however, provide related discussions/evidence.  Ronen and Aharoni (1989) develop a model that shows 
that higher tax rates are associated with choices of income-increasing accounting methods, excepting accounting 
methods subject to book tax conformity.  A key assumption of the model is that equity market participants will see 
through the earnings management and value the firm’s equity correctly.  Beatty and Harris (1999) compare security gains 
and losses in public banks to those in private banks, both of which are subject to capital requirements, to determine how 
earnings management differs under the assumption that public banks have greater incentives to engage in earnings 
management than private banks due to equity market incentives.  However, this paper does not test how and when banks 
trade-off the equity market incentives against other earnings management incentives that firms face. 
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attention (Aboody et al. , 1999).71  Both studies predict that macroeconomic factors are correlated 
with increased incentives for earnings management.  We did not find any studies that hypothesize 
macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of earnings quality for other reasons, for example, 
because of variation in the ability of accruals to capture performance fundamentals when the 
“fundamentals” are different. 
 
6. The consequences of earnings quality 
6.1 Capital market consequences of earnings quality 
The hypothesized capital market consequences of earnings quality include: short-window 
stock price returns around the earnings announcement date, contemporaneous long-window returns, 
and future stock price performance after the release of earnings-related information (Section 6.1.1); 
market-multiples (Section 6.1.2); cost of equity capital (Section 6.1.3); and cost of debt capital 
(Section 6.1.4).72 
 
6.1.1 Return responses to earnings quality 
Contemporaneous short-window returns: In the short-window returns tests, information is assumed 
to be of higher quality if it has a higher association with returns.  Inferring variation in EQ from the 
association between unexpected earnings and returns has been a prevalent research methodology 
since the publication of Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijewski (1989).  The key 
findings are: 
                                                 
71 Wilson (1987) finds that his results are driven by two observations (1981 and 1982) and conjectures that the cause 
might be a “macroeconomic phenomenon,” given that both were years of significant economic downturn.  Bernard and 
Stober (1989), however, find no evidence for this conjecture. 
72 Many of the studies that examine market consequences use multiple measures and are cited more than once. 
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1) The market responds more favorably when earnings are composed of cash flows than accruals 
(Wilson, 1987).  Bernard and Stober (1989), however, find that the results in Wilson (1987) are 
driven by two quarters.   
2) Investors discount discretionary accruals if they are made aware of them or if they can infer that 
they are more likely to represent earnings management (DeFond and Park, 2001; Balsam, Bartov, 
and Marquardt, 2002; Baber, Chen, and Kang, 2006; Gleason and Mills, 2008; Coles, Hertzel, and 
Kalpathy, 2006).  Louis and Robinson (2005) similarly find that when managers combine 
discretionary accruals with another credible signal (i.e., a stock split), investors do not discount 
them. 
3) Negative special items (write-offs or write-downs) are generally associated with a small negative 
stock price reaction of around one percent (Elliott and Shaw, 1988).  When a firm has a history of 
special items, the response coefficient associated with earnings before special items receive a lower 
weight (Elliot and Hanna, 1996).  Variation in reactions to inventory write-offs and restructuring 
charges suggest that they convey information about expected future performance (Francis, Hanna, 
and Vincent, 1996). 
4) Investors respond more strongly to pro-forma earnings than to GAAP earnings on average 
(Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson, 2003).  The coefficient is only significant for firms 
with relatively less informative GAAP earnings, as measured by historical ERCs (Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004).   
5) Indicators of general financial reporting quality concerns are associated with negative stock price 
reactions.  There is a strong negative stock market reaction to announcements of restatements and/or 
AAERs (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; and Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004).  The 
evidence is consistent, but the implications for EQ are ambiguous (see Section 3.3).  The revelation 
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of internal control procedure deficiencies as required under SOX Section 302 generate small 
negative stock responses of around 2 percent (Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare, 2008; Beneish, 
Billings, and Hodder, 2008).  Announcements about audit fees that may indicate to investors that 
earnings are of low quality are associated with negative short window returns (Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson, 2002; Hackenbrack and Hogan, 2002).   
6) Earnings with qualified audit opinions are associated with either negative price reactions 
(Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1986; Choi and Jeter 1992; Chen, Su, and Zhao, 2000) or no 
reaction (Chow and Rice, 1982; Dodd et al., 1984).   
Contemporaneous long-window returns (association studies): Many early studies examine whether 
earnings measured under different methods result in different market consequences.  A series of 
early papers conclude that investors interpret financial statement information conditional on the 
accounting method used (Mlynarczyk, 1969; Archibald, 1972; Ball, 1972; Gonedes, 1975 and 1978; 
Harrison, 1977; Sunder, 1975).  Other studies, however, challenge these results or present new 
analyses that suggest that analysts and other subjects tend to be functionally fixated on earnings 
(Dyckman, 1964; Kaplan and Roll, 1972; Cassidy, 1976; Harrison, 1977).  These studies make 
cross-sectional predictions about which methods reflect underlying economics to infer investor 
rationality.  More recently, Loudder and Behn (1995) use a similar methodology and conclude that 
investors understand R&D accounting based on predicted patterns in long window ERCs.  Altamuro, 
Beatty, and Weber (2005) however, assume that markets rationally interpret revenue recognition 
practices and interpret patterns in long-window ERCs as evidence that pre-SAB 101 earnings are 
more useful for firms that were required to switch than earnings measured based on SAB 101. 
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Audit quality is positively associated with contemporaneous long-window returns, where 
audit quality is measured either by greater independence (Francis and Ke, 2006) or Big-8 status 
(Teoh and Wong, 1993). 
Future returns: Several studies examine the association between EQ proxies measured in one period 
and future-period stock returns; predictable future returns suggest mispricing.  Large-sample studies 
suggest mispricing of various accrual metrics and components of accruals: total accruals (Sloan, 
1996); discretionary accruals (Xie, 2001); accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets as 
separate components of Sloan’s total accrual measure (Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003); and 
special items and accruals (Dechow and Ge, 2006).  Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008) show 
that investors correctly price various cash components of earnings except for the change in the cash 
balance.  Cheng and Thomas (2006) find that abnormal accruals are associated with future stock 
returns after controlling for cash flows, which they interpret as evidence that the accrual anomaly is 
not subsumed by the value-glamour anomaly.   
For specific accruals, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) show that firms with high R&D reserves 
are underpriced, and Penman and Zhang (2002) find that conservative accounting as it relates to 
LIFO reserves and R&D and advertising expenditures and changes in investment are associated with 
future returns.  Beaver and McNichols (2001), however, find that development accruals for P&C 
insurers are not associated with future stock returns. 
 The mispricing is greater for less reliable accruals, where reliability is determined by the 
researchers (Richardson et al., 2005).  It is mitigated when investors are given balance sheet 
information at the earnings release date that can help them back out discretionary accruals (Louis, 
Robinson, and Sbaraglia, 2008; Levi, 2007); and when firms have large positive book-tax 
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differences, which investors rationally interpret as a "red flag" for decreasing persistence (Hanlon, 
2005). 
 The mispricing even exists at the time of an IPO or SEO (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004).  These results contradict the notion that investors 
anticipate earnings management in cases when it is likely.  More consistent with investor 
anticipation, Shivakumar (2000) finds evidence of abnormal accruals prior to SEOs but not 
mispricing.  DuCharme et al. (2004) find that the likelihood of litigation is positively associated with 
abnormal accruals around equity offerings, which begs the question whether issuers anticipate the 
litigation risk. 
 
6.1.2 Market valuation 
Discretionary loss reserves are associated with lower market valuations in the P&C insurance 
industry (Petroni, Ryan, and Wahlen, 2000; Beaver and McNichols, 1998) and in the banking 
industry (Beaver and Engel, 1996).  Firms that consistently meet or beat prior period earnings have 
higher price-earnings ratios or market-multiples than matched samples (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 
1999; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007) even if there is evidence of earnings management to 
achieve the results (Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007).  Kasznik and McNichols (2002) document 
that firms that meet analyst expectations do not get rewarded with higher relative valuations unless 
they meet them consistently.  When firms eventually miss a target, they are likely to immediately 
lose the extra valuation (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2000; Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007).   
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6.1.3 Earnings quality and cost of equity capital 
The proxies used for cost of capital include: 1) A firm’s implied or ex ante cost of equity 
capital, which is the discount rate that equates current market value with the sum of the present value 
of expected future cash flows in an equity valuation model; 2) bid-ask spreads; and 3) beta.73  We 
conclude this section with a discussion of the emerging literature on accrual quality as a priced risk 
factor. 
 
Implied cost of equity capital: Francis et al. (2004), discussed extensively in Section 3, find that 
accrual quality, earnings persistence, smoothness, value relevance, and timeliness are associated 
with cost of equity capital in the predicted direction, while predictability and conservatism are not.74  
Accrual quality has the largest cost of equity capital effects.  Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 
(2003) find evidence of an association between country-level earnings quality measures including 
earnings aggressiveness (i.e., accruals), loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing, and country-level 
measures of total cost of capital. 
Hribar and Jenkins (2004) suggest that restatements are associated with increases in the 
implied cost of equity capital.  There is mixed evidence on whether revelations of internal control 
deficiencies affect a firm’s cost of equity capital (Beneish et al., 2008; Ogneva et al., 2007; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009).  Auditor independence is associated with a lower implied cost of 
equity capital for the audit client (Khurana and Raman, 2006). 
                                                 
73 See Frankel and Lee (1998), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Kasznik (2004), Brav et al. (2004), Easton and Monahan 
(2005), and Botosan and Plumlee (2005) for specifications and discussions of implied cost of equity capital metrics.  See 
Callahan, Lee, and Yohn (1997) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) for discussions of spreads (and PIN) as measures of 
the adverse selection component of the cost of capital.  See Section 3.1 for an extensive discussion of Francis et al. 
(2005), which provides evidence on accrual quality as a priced risk factor.   
74 However, McInnis (2009) does not find evidence of higher average stock returns for firms with high earnings 
smoothness.  He suggests that the association between earnings smoothness and cost of equity capital documented in 
prior research is driven by optimism in analysts’ long-term earnings forecasts. 
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Bid-ask spread: Evidence on the association between earnings quality and bid ask spreads is mixed 
and appears to depend heavily on the EQ proxy.  Dechow et al. (1996) find an increase in residual 
bid ask spread for AAER firms.  Chang et al. (2006) find that SOX requirements concerning 
CEO/CFO certifications are associated with lower spreads. Palmrose et al. (2004), however, do not 
find evidence of a significant change in spreads subsequent to restatements.   
There is a negative association between earnings predictability and bid-ask spreads (Affleck-
Graves et al., 2002), but a U-shaped relation between smoothness and spreads (Jayaraman, 2008).  
The smoothness measure is the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility, so the 
result suggests that when earnings are too smooth relative to cash flows, or much more volatile, then 
market prices appear to reflect greater asymmetry. 
Beta: Loss reserve revisions of P&C insurers as a measure of discretionary accruals (Petroni, Ryan, 
and Wahlen, 2000) and internal control deficiencies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009) are positively 
associated with beta. 
 
Accrual quality as a priced risk factor: Francis et al. (2005) (FLOS) rank their measure of accrual 
quality (discussed in Section 3.1.1) into quintiles and show variation across the quintiles in the cost 
of debt (interest to average debt), industry adjusted EP ratios, and betas from CAPM type 
regressions.  They also calculate the difference in returns each month between the top two quintiles 
and the bottom two quintiles and determine whether the AQ factor is priced (has a significant 
coefficient): 
Rj,m- Rf,m = αj+βj(RM,m- Rf,m)+sjSMBm + hjHMLm + ejAQfactorm + εjm 
FLOS find a significant coefficient on ej.  When the AQ factor is decomposed into the innate and 
discretionary component, they find that the result is driven mainly by the innate component although 
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the discretionary component is still significant.  FLOS’s interpretation is that accrual quality plays an 
economically meaningful role in determining the cost of equity capital.  
 The results and the theoretical underpinnings for the analysis have generated considerable 
controversy.  FLOS motivate the prediction that information uncertainty risk is priced using a model 
by Easley and O’Hara (2004), which suggests that information risk is not diversifiable and is priced 
in the presence of uninformed investors who are not able to adjust their portfolio weights in the same 
way as informed investors.  Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007, pp. 396-397), however, argue that 
when the number of traders becomes large, the information effect is diversified away.  A similar 
conclusion can be drawn from Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2005) who suggest that the cross-sectional 
effect of asymmetric information on cost of capital may be fully diversified away in a pure exchange 
economy with a large number of assets.   
In addition, Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008, p7) comment on the interpretation of the 
regression results: 
It is crucial to note that the average positive coefficient on the AQ_factor in these contemporaneous regressions of stock 
returns on factor returns does not imply that AQ is a priced risk factor. Rather an average positive regression coefficient 
means that, on average, firms have a positive contemporaneous exposure to the AQ_factor mimicking strategy. For 
example, the significant coefficient on the market portfolio does not suggest that the market factor is priced, but only 
confirms that the average beta in a sample of firms is positive and mechanically close to one. (italics added) 
 
Daniel and Titman (1996) make this same point for the Fama and French market-to-book and 
size factors.  Just because high market-to-book firms covary contemporaneously with each other 
does not imply that investors price this covariance risk.75 
In order to show that the AQ_factor is a priced risk factor, researchers must show, for 
example, that when ranking firms on AQ, firms with low accrual quality earn higher future returns; 
or that the AQ_factor beta explains the cross-section of expected returns/future returns; or that low 
accrual quality stock that are highly correlated with the AQ_factor have higher expected returns than 
                                                 
75 Daniel and Titman document that the return premium to high book-to-market is not due to their covariance with HML.  
This suggests that the market-to-book factor is not a priced risk but a “characteristic” that explains future returns.  
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low accrual quality stock that are not highly correlated with the factor.  This is the point made by 
Fama and French (1992) who suggested that beta was “dead” as a priced risk factor because market 
beta does not appear to explain the cross-section of future returns.   
Core et al. (2008) perform such tests and suggest that the AQ_factor is not priced.  In other 
words, low quality accrual firms may covary with each other, but investors do not price this 
covariance risk and so do not demand a higher expected return/cost of capital.  Ecker, Francis, Kim, 
Olsson, and Schipper (2006) examine whether sorting on AQ provides differences in returns.  
However, Core et al. counter that the equally-weighted portfolio formation along with daily 
rebalancing is likely to overstate the returns, particularly since AQ appears to be correlated with firm 
size.  Kravet and Shevlin (2009) argue that even well-accepted risk factors such as market, size, and 
book to market factors are also often insignificant in the second stage regression, as reported in Core 
et al., suggesting that the insignificance of the AQ factor coefficient does not necessarily rule out AQ 
factor as a priced risk factor.  Kravet and Shevlin follow the FLOS approach and document a 
significant increase in the pricing of the AQ factor (especially the discretionary component of the 
AQ factor) after restatement announcements, consistent with restatement leading to increased cost of 
equity capital.76 
Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) perform tests to determine whether accrual quality is a 
priced risk factor.  They investigate whether the systematic component of earnings quality (a proxy 
for information asymmetry) is priced and whether privately informed/insider earn higher profits 
when trading on stock with a higher exposure to the earnings quality factor.  They use four related 
measures of earnings quality: (i) the absolute value of abnormal accruals from a modified Jones 
model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996); (ii) the absolute value of abnormal current accruals 
                                                 
76 In addition, Liu and Wysocki (2006) show that AQ loses significance in the earnings-to-price and interest rate 
regressions when measures of operating volatility are introduced.  
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(that excludes depreciation); (iii) the absolute value of the residual from a Dechow and Dichev 
model; (iv) the standard deviation of the residual from (iii) using the time-series of the firm’s 
residual (i.e., as in FLOS).  Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005) find that a mimicking portfolio strategy 
that buys firms with high AQ beta earns positive abnormal returns earns positive abnormal returns.  
Core et al., however, find that this result is sensitive to the time period examined.  They find no 
results when using a longer time horizon.  In addition, Aboody et al. conclude that the AQ_factor 
loading is weak, particularly compared to the returns on their insider trading results. 
 
6.1.4 Debt market consequences of earnings quality 
Only three consequences papers in our database extend the definition of earnings quality to 
decision usefulness in debt markets.  Francis et al. (2005) find that firms with lower quality accruals 
have a higher cost of debt measured by: 1) the ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing 
outstanding debt (i.e., an ex post measure), and 2) S&P Issuer Credit Ratings (i.e., an ex ante 
measure).  Anderson et al. (2004) find that firms with higher board independence, higher audit 
committee independence, and larger board size have lower costs of debt measured as the yield 
spread.  They cite prior empirical studies (e.g., Klein, 2002) to justify these indirect proxies for 
financial reporting quality.  Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2007) find that one-year ahead bond returns 
of firms with high operating accruals are significantly lower than those of firms with low operating 
accruals, consistent with bond investors mispricing high and low accrual firms in much the same 
way that equity investors do. 
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6.1.5 Summary 
To summarize, the evidence that there is a lower market reaction when earnings are of lower 
quality and that the market reacts negatively to evidence of a decline in quality (Section 6.1.1) is 
fairly consistent across all earnings quality proxies.  An open question, however, is whether the 
negative response reflects a decline in the quality of the firm’s fundamental earnings process or a 
decline in the quality of the information to measure the process.  Researchers typically assert the 
latter explanation. 
The evidence in Section 6.1.2 on market valuations suggests that firms that consistently beat 
benchmarks are rewarded with higher valuations, but firms that manage earnings through 
discretionary loss reserves are not.  There are several explanations for this combination of results: 1) 
the market rewards some types of earnings management and not others; 2) greater market mispricing 
of less transparent earnings management; and 3) “rational bubbles” caused by an association 
between reported growth and investor synchronization risk (see, for example, Abreu and 
Brunnermeier, 2002).  More research on this observed phenomenon is necessary to disentangle these 
explanations.  
The evidence to date generally finds a negative association between earnings quality proxies 
and the cost of equity capital with the exception of the findings by Core et al. (2008).  Research on 
the relation between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital will surely evolve as the theories 
that relate information precision about diversifiable and non-diversifiable sources of risk to the cost 
of capital evolve. 
Finally, while the evidence from debt markets is limited, it is nonetheless consistent with 
evidence about earnings quality proxies in equity markets.  Debt markets provide a useful 
opportunity to validate the findings in equity markets.  In addition, variation in the decision-
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usefulness of earnings in debt markets relative to equity markets provides an opportunity 1) to 
examine accounting choices that are irrelevant to quality characteristics of interest to equity markets, 
and 2) to assess trade-offs between multiple incentives for producing high-quality earnings.   
 
6.2 Non-market consequences of earnings quality 
The categories of non-market consequences of EQ are: 1) litigation against the firm, 2) 
compensation, 3) executive and director turnover, 4) audit opinions, 5) analysts’ forecasts, and 6) 
real activities including disclosure decisions and investment/financing activities.  A noteworthy 
feature of these categories is that many of them are also the “determinants” variables that were 
discussed in Section 5, which emphasizes the importance of considering causality when interpreting 
the evidence. 
 
6.2.1 Consequences of earnings quality for litigation 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that the likelihood of litigation increases with restatements, 
and Lev, Ryan, and Wu (2008) find that a restatement that depicts a different pattern of earnings 
than was previously reported is associated with a greater likelihood of shareholder litigation.  Gong, 
Louis, and Sun (2008) and DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) exploit high-risk settings – 
stock-for-stock swaps and IPOs and SEOs, respectively – to examine whether abnormal accruals are 
associated with litigation propensity.  They find a positive association between abnormal accruals in 
the period leading up to the transactions and post-transaction litigation.   
Because the restatement studies (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Lev et al., 2008) control for the 
magnitude of the restatement, they conclude that it is the restatement itself that affects litigation 
propensity.  They suggest that a restatement is the type of evidence that increases the likelihood that 
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plaintiffs will prevail in shareholder litigation.  DuCharme et al. (2004) similarly interpret their 
finding as evidence that abnormal accruals are correlated with a plaintiff’s assessment of the 
probability that he will prevail. 
Gong et al. (2008) and DuCharme et al. (2004) focus on settings in which firms have 
significant incentives to manage earnings and hence assert that the abnormal accruals are likely to 
represent material misstatements outside the boundaries of GAAP.  There is no direct evidence that 
abnormal accruals within the boundaries of GAAP increase the likelihood of litigation.   
 
6.2.2 Consequences of earnings quality for compensation 
Several studies provide evidence on variation in the weights placed on different components 
or properties of earnings, that is, their respective pay-for-performance sensitivities.  Balsam (1998) 
finds that operating cash flow and non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are positively and 
significantly related to CEO cash compensation after controlling for returns; the highest association 
is with operating cash flow.  The weight on positive discretionary accruals is significantly greater 
when the accruals are used to reduce or eliminate a loss. 
Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1998) find a stronger absolute pay-for-performance relation 
between cash compensation changes and unexpected earnings for more persistent earnings, while 
Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin (2006) document that the weight placed on earnings relative to operating 
cash flow is lower for firms with lower earnings persistence, higher earnings variability, and higher 
total accruals. 
Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) find that transitory gains are included in earnings for 
compensation purposes while transitory losses are excluded.  Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994) find 
that compensation appears to be adjusted for nonrecurring charges (e.g., restructuring charges).  
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Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2008), however, find that compensation is as sensitive to highly 
discretionary securitization gains as it is to other components of earnings. 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) conclude that firms use more equity-based 
compensation when earnings are less informative.  Their main proxy for earnings informativeness is 
timeliness.  Cheng and Farber (2008) find that the proportion of option-based pay in a CEO’s 
package declines following a restatement.   
The compensation results suggest that expected earnings quality is associated with ex ante 
compensation contract composition, in levels, and changes in earnings quality are associated with ex 
post recontracting.  Boards also seem to incorporate the implications of discretionary accounting 
choices on pay-for-performance such as bonuses when the accounting choice is transparent and 
likely contractible.  For example, Balsam (1998) interprets his evidence as follows: “…it appears 
compensation committees distinguish between the components of income and reward managers 
when their accounting choices achieve the firms' goals.”   
 
6.2.3 Consequences of earnings quality for executive and director turnover 
Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) find that at least one executive is terminated in 60% of the 
sample firms that had restatements during 1997 or 1998, compared to a rate of 35% in a matched 
sample.  Only 15% of these executives are rehired in comparable positions.  Beneish (1999) found 
no evidence of abnormal turnover for CEOs or executives of the misstatement firms, although he did 
not identify whether the executives were implicated in the fraud.  Karpoff et al. (2008a) find that 
93% of individuals identified as having responsibility for a misstatement leave their jobs by the end 
of the enforcement period.  Srinivasan (2005) reports a 48% turnover rate for directors following an 
income decreasing restatement.  A matched sample has a turnover rate of 33%.  Technical and 
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income increasing restatement firms have director turnover rates of 18% and 28%, respectively, and 
pre-restatement turnover is 14-16% in all three samples.77  Menon and Williams (2008) find 
evidence of abnormally high turnover for CEOs and CFOs following auditor resignations.  Engel, 
Hayes, and Wang (2003) find a stronger sensitivity of turnover decisions to accounting information 
when earnings is more informative, where informativeness is measured by asymmetric timeliness.   
Taken together, the evidence suggests significant negative labor market consequences for 
individuals involved in accounting misstatements.  However, these public announcements of 
misstatements have direct implications for the firm’s credibility, which may be an additional factor 
in the turnover decision.  Moreover, these studies may not provide evidence that is useful for 
understanding whether a Board would view earnings management within the boundary of GAAP as 
impairing earnings quality.  Engel et al. (2003) is the only study that provides evidence on the 
turnover consequences of earnings informativeness rather than extreme, and detected, earnings 
management.   
 
6.2.4 Consequences of earnings quality for audit opinions 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that high-accrual firms are more likely to get modified 
audit opinions, particularly from Big-six auditors and when the accruals are income-increasing.  
Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001), however, find no evidence that abnormally high working 
capital accruals are associated with adverse audit opinions or auditor turnover.78  Butler, Leone, and 
Willenborg (2004) find that the relation between accruals (total accruals or abnormal total accruals) 
                                                 
77 While the results directionally suggest higher director turnover following restatements relative to a matched sample, 
the significance of the difference is not reported.  Moreover, the increase in turnover for the matched sample from 14-
16% in the hypothetical pre-restatement period to 33% in the post-restatement period is unexplained and raises questions 
about the impact of calendar time data clustering on the results.   
78 One explanation for the mixed results is that Francis and Krishnan (1999) examine reports in 1987 - 1988, which 
precedes the issuance of SAS 58 and 59, whereas Bradshaw et al. examine reports in 1988 – 1998. 
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and audit opinions is primarily driven by a relation between large negative accruals and going 
concern opinions.   
The mixed results appear to be related to the definition of accruals.  Bradshaw et al. (2001) 
state: “… a third interpretation of our auditor results is that earnings quality issues of the type that 
we investigate are beyond the scope of the audit.  In other words, auditors may understand that 
inflated accruals imply a greater likelihood of future earnings declines and GAAP violations, but are 
not required to communicate this information to investors through their audit opinions.”   
 
6.2.5 Consequences of earnings quality for analysts’ forecasts 
Brown (1983) examines the impact of five accounting method choices on earnings 
predictability, measured by analyst forecast errors.  He finds that lease capitalization (SFAS 13) 
improves predictability and changes in actuarial assumptions for pensions impair predictability.  He 
finds no evidence that changes in foreign currency accounting (SFAS 8), interest capitalization 
(SFAS 34), or LIFO adoption affect predictability.  Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) document greater 
forecast errors when a firm’s home country GAAP differs more significantly from IAS and that 
analyst forecast errors decreased after adoption of IAS.  Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and 
Larson (2003) show that analyst forecast revisions are more highly associated with unexpected pro 
forma earnings than with unexpected GAAP operating earnings.  Kim and Schroeder (1990) 
document predictable patterns in analysts’ forecasts related to discretionary accruals that managers 
use to maximize bonus compensation, which suggests that analysts anticipate managers’ accounting 
choices. 
The following studies, however, suggest that analysts’ forecasts do not always incorporate 
information related to earnings quality.  Elliott and Philbrick (1990) document that analysts’ forecast 
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revisions do not fully account for the current year's earnings effect of a variety of changes in 
accounting method, although the association between forecast errors and the earnings effect is 
generally insignificant.  Bradshaw, et al. (2001) show that analyst forecast errors are large for firms 
with abnormally high working capital accruals, after having verified that their accruals metric is in 
fact associated with subsequent earnings declines.  Finally, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) show that 
analysts’ stock recommendations are associated with abnormal accruals, which suggests that 
analysts fundamentally understand the lower earnings quality, but that analysts do not incorporate 
this predictable earnings management into their forecasts.   
In summary, if we assume that analysts are unbiased and qualified predictors of future 
earnings, we can use variation in their forecasts to infer attributes of earnings that improve its 
predictability.79  Brown (1983), Elliott and Philbrick (1990), Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), and 
Bhattacharya, et al. (2003) provide evidence on specific accounts/methods/estimates that improve 
predictability.  The analyses are joint tests of analyst “efficiency” and earnings quality. 
The fundamental assumption that analysts are unbiased and expert forecasters, however, is 
questionable.  Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) suggest that analysts understand the implications of 
accruals for earnings predictability, but that forecasts are biased.  Kim and Schroeder (1990) and 
Coles et al. (2006) suggest that when analysts can rationally anticipate accruals management, they 
appropriately incorporate the implications of accruals into their forecasts.  Large sample studies, 
however, do not reveal this pattern (Bradshaw, et al., 2001).80  Overall, the extent to which earnings 
                                                 
79 Using analyst forecasts and an assumption of analyst efficiency to infer earnings quality rather than market prices and 
an assumption of market efficiency has the advantage that the forecast relates only to earnings.  Market prices reflect 
information other than earnings.  Hence, tests that infer earnings quality using market prices and assuming market 
efficiency confound interpretation of the impact of earnings quality alone on decision usefulness.  A disadvantage, 
however, is that analysts’ incentives to issue accurate and unbiased forecasts may differ (Francis, Chen, Philbrick, and 
Willis, 2004).  Equity market investors, however, presumably have incentives to make unbiased forecasts of firm value 
and to incorporate these into their trading decisions.  
80 Two papers provide related evidence.  Burgstahler and Eames (2003) investigate the “kink” in the distribution of 
earnings around analyst forecasts and show that on average analysts anticipate earnings management that will avoid 
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management affects predictability depends on the analysts’ ability to detect the earnings 
management.   
 
6.2.6 Consequences of earnings quality for real activities (including voluntary disclosure) 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) document that firms with low earnings informativeness, 
measured by ERCs, are more likely to voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings.  Chen, DeFond, and 
Park (2002) document that firms with low or uncertain earnings informativeness have a greater 
propensity to voluntarily disclose balance sheet information in earnings announcements.  Chen et al. 
use multiple ex ante indicators to identify firms with low earnings informativeness (e.g., industry, 
loss firms, analyst forecast errors, capital market incentives, and firm age).  Lennox and Park (2002) 
find that when earnings are more informative (i.e., high ERCs), firms issue management forecasts as 
a particular form of voluntary disclosure.  They predict this finding assuming that managers forecast 
when they are reasonably confident about their accuracy due to reputation concerns.  The Lennox 
and Park finding is directionally opposite to the negative correlation between informativeness and 
disclosure in Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Chen et al. (2002). 
These studies show that disclosure decisions are endogenously determined by earnings 
quality.  Assuming that equity market participants set prices based on all available information, not 
just earnings, these findings raise questions about the validity of inferences from tests that measure 
the association between earnings quality proxies and market-consequences without considering the 
endogenously-determined availability of non-earnings information.  This concern is complicated by 
                                                                                                                                                                   
small losses.  Analysis of forecast errors further refines their conclusions about the exact types of earnings management 
analysts can anticipate.  Hirst and Hopkins (1998), in an experimental setting, find that buy-side analysts do not adjust 
valuations for earnings management, specifically cherry-picking sales of AFS securities.  When the gains are aggregated 
with net income, analysts treat do not treat the managed gains differently from unmanaged earnings at control firms.  As 
they manipulate the transparency of the reporting about the gains, the analysts are more likely to discount the managed 
earnings in their valuations.  Thus, analysts’ ability to understand earnings management is technique and setting specific.  
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the fact that some disclosures are inversely related to commonly used proxies for earnings quality 
(Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Chen, DeFond, and Park, 2002), while others are positively related 
(Lennox and Park, 2002). 
We found three papers that predict a real consequence of EQ other than disclosure.  Biddle 
and Hilary (2006) suggest that high accounting quality (i.e., conservatism, loss avoidance, and 
earnings smoothing) would reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers 
of capital and therefore would improve investment efficiency (see also Verdi, 2006).  They 
document that accounting quality is negatively associated with investment-cash flow sensitivity.  
McNichols and Stubben (2008) show that firms overinvest during misstatement periods.  They 
suggest that overinvestment likely arises from believing in misreported growth trends.  Finally, 
Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) infer from losses in market valuation following AAERs that firms 
incur substantial reputational penalties for the misstatement, presumably including the negative 
effects on the firm’s future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs.   
 
6.2.7 Conclusions from reviewing the literature on non-equity market consequences 
Comparing the results across these categories emphasizes the importance of considering the 
context when determining the appropriate proxy for decision-usefulness.  An investor’s decision to 
litigate depends on whether an earnings misstatement is severe or transparent enough to increase the 
probability of prevailing as a plaintiff.  The auditor’s reporting decision, in contrast, depends on 
whether an earnings misstatement is severe or transparent enough to decrease the probability of 
prevailing as a defendant.  A Board’s compensation contract design problem depends on the ex ante 
informativeness of available signals of the agent’s performance, while its variable cash compensation 
and recontracting decisions depend on the ex post informativeness of the available signals.
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7. Conclusion 
Our approach in this review is to define earnings quality broadly to be decision usefulness – 
in any decision by any decision maker.  As such, the number of relevant articles numbers over 300, 
and by necessity our discussion is broad.   
An alternative approach might have been to limit the scope of the review to studies of 
decision-usefulness only in an equity valuation context, in accordance with the original use of the 
term in financial statement analysis.  Under that approach, we would have argued that using the term 
earnings quality outside of the equity valuation context is inappropriate, and we would have 
criticized the studies that do so and simply ignored them in our review.  We would have demanded 
that researchers and others not use the term earnings quality outside the context of equity valuation 
models.  But we believe that ship has sailed and such a recommendation would therefore serve no 
purpose.  Rather we attempt to understand earnings quality more broadly in its current use. 
We emphasize two significant conclusions based on our survey of the earnings quality 
literature as a whole.  First, because all of the proxies for earnings quality that involve earnings (i.e., 
properties such as persistence, timely loss recognition, smoothness, and small profits, as well as the 
ERCs) have at their core the reported accrual-based earnings number, these proxies are affected by 
both the firm’s fundamental earnings process and by the measurement of that process.  The current 
research does not adequately recognize the distinction between the fundamental earnings process and 
the measurement of the process, which limits the conclusions we, as a profession, can make to 
statements about “earnings quality” rather than about the contribution of accounting measurement to 
the quality of reported earnings.   
Second, although all of the proxies based on reported earnings are affected by both the 
unobservable process and the measurement, the proxies are not equally affected by these two factors.  
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Therefore, the proxies are not measures of the same underlying construct, but rather they measure 
different elements of decision usefulness.  We hope the breadth of the discussion of each proxy has 
shed light on the context-specific dimensions of quality captured by each proxy and on the 
sometimes subtle distinctions between them. 
We introduced Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction to illustrate the earnings quality proxies 
that have been used to test the theoretical determinants and consequences of earnings quality.  Our 
objective in providing Figures 1 and 2 is not to suggest that researchers fill in the mosaic.  A 
significant point of this review is that the earnings quality proxies measure different facets of quality, 
and an implication of this statement is that not all of the cells in the figures represent sensible 
hypotheses.  It may be worth investigating certain cells, not because the theory predicts a relation, 
but because not finding a relation would provide useful counterfactual evidence. 
The figures do, however, highlight some potential opportunities for future research.  For 
example, SOX internal control deficiency firms provide a relatively new opportunity to examine the 
consequences of financial statement reliability.  The implications of benchmarking for compensation 
and analysts’ decisions also are interesting areas for future research.  We emphasize, however, that 
careful research design and a clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of these proxies 
in the setting examined is important for establishing a meaningful result.  Throughout the review, we 
noted situations where we think the inferences are weak because we question the hypothesized 
relation between a particular determinant and EQ or between EQ and a particular consequence.  
Most of the problem stems not from a weak theory but from treating the earnings quality proxies as 
substitutes for each other and not precisely matching the theory to the construct.  
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Figure 1. Summary of the investigated determinants of earnings quality 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the explanatory variables for (“determinants” of) the various earnings quality proxies.  The rows represent the most frequently hypothesized 
determinants of earnings quality and correspond to the organization of the discussion in Sections 5.1 through 5.6.  The columns represent our categories of 
commonly used earnings quality proxies.  A shaded box indicates that researchers have investigated whether the determinant explains variation in the earnings 
quality proxy.  The first number in a shaded box indicates the number of papers in our database that examine the association between a determinant and an EQ 
proxy.  The second number in a shaded box (if there is one) indicates the number of papers that provide negative evidence (inconsistent with the theory). 
 
Earnings quality proxy 
  
  Properties of earnings ERCs 
External indicators of 
financial reporting quality 
Determinant  
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
S
m
o
o
t
h
n
e
s
s
 
A
s
y
m
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
t
i
m
e
l
i
n
e
s
s
/
 
T
i
m
e
l
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
i
n
g
 
(
l
o
s
s
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
)
 
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
i
n
g
 
(
s
m
a
l
l
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
s
u
r
p
r
i
s
e
)
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
A
A
E
R
s
 
R
e
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
Firm 
characteristics Firm performance 1 5/2 2/1        1 2 2 
  Firm growth 6 1          1 1/1 2 
  
Financial statement 
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Figure 1. Summary of the investigated determinants of earnings quality, continued 
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controls Board characteristics 
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  I/C procedures 1  2             1   
  Managerial ownership    4/1 1 1     3   1/1   
  Earnings-based comp.    4/2           2/2     
  Equity compensation    5       1   4/2 4/2   
  Managerial change    2                 
Auditors Auditor size  2/1 4         1 1/1   1/1 
  Auditor fees    3/1                 
  Non-audit fees    6/3   1/1   1 2   2/1   
  Other auditor-related    7/2       1/1   1/1     
Capital market 
incentives IPO and SEO 
  
1  8/1           2 1   
  Mergers buyout    3/1                 
  Cross-listing    2 1 1 1   1       
 
Incentives to meet 
earnings-based targets 3 3/1         
External factors  Political process    8                 
  Capital regulations 5                   
  Tax regulations 7/2                   
  SOX   2                 
Country-level institutional factors 
  
1 2 2 4 4   5       
 167
Figure 2. Summary of the investigated consequences of earnings quality 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the outcomes resulting from (“consequences” of) the various earnings quality proxies.  The rows represent the most frequently hypothesized 
consequences of earnings quality and correspond to the organization of the discussion in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.  The columns represent our categories of 
commonly used earnings quality proxies.  A shaded box indicates that researchers have investigated whether the earnings quality proxy explains variation in the 
consequence variable.  The first number in a shaded box indicates the number of papers in our database that examine the association between a consequence and 
an EQ proxy.  The second number in a shaded box (if there is one) indicates the number of papers that provide negative evidence (inconsistent with the theory). 
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Capital markets Short-window returns 5 6       1   3 2 2 
  Long-window returns 3 1                 
  Future returns 10/1 6/1           1     
 Market multiples  3         3         
 Cost of equity capital 3 5/1 4/2 1 1   1 1 3/1 3/1 
 Debt market  1 1                 
Other than capital 
markets Litigation 
  
  2           2 2   
 Compensation 2 1   1         1   
 Executive turnover        1   1   2 3   
 Audit opinions 3/2 1/1                 
 Analyst decisions 1/1 3/1                 
 Real activities   1 1 1 1 1 2/1 1 1   
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Figure 3: Key links between determinants, earnings quality proxies, and consequences  
Figure 3 summarizes the key links between determinants, earnings quality proxies, and consequences.  Dark lines represent four or more papers and dotted lines 
represent two or more papers examining link.  Links that are made by only one paper are not included. 
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Figure 4: Construct validity across earnings quality proxies 
 
The links shown in this figure provide a graphical representation of proxies that have been validated using other proxies in papers within our database. 
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Table 1. Categories of “Earnings quality” proxies, determinants of EQ, and consequences of EQ 
 
This table outlines the sub-categories of the three categories of earnings quality proxies, the six categories of determinants of earnings quality, and the two 
categories of consequences of earnings quality.  For each, we report the section number in this document in which the item is discussed. 
 
 
Panel A: Earnings quality proxies 
  
Panel B: Determinants of EQ 
  
Panel C: Consequences of EQ 
        
Property of earnings 3.1  Firm characteristics 5.1  Capital markets 6.1 
Persistence and accruals 3.1.1  Performance and losses 5.1.1  Returns 6.1.1 
Smoothness 3.1.2  Growth and investment 5.1.2  Market valuations 6.1.2 
Asymmetric timeliness and   Debt, capital structure 5.1.3  Cost of equity capital 6.1.3 
   timely loss recognition 3.1.3  Size 5.1.4  Debt pricing 6.1.4 
Benchmarking 3.1.4       
   Financial reporting practices 5.2  Non-equity market consequences  
Earnings response coefficients 3.2     Litigation 6.2.1 
Accounting methods and ERCs 3.2.1  Governance and controls 5.3  Compensation 6.2.2 
Firm characteristics and ERCs 3.2.2  Board of directors 5.3.1  Executive turnover 6.2.3 
Information environment and ERCs 3.2.3  Internal control procedures 5.3.2  Audit opinions 6.2.4 
   Managerial ownership 5.3.3  Analyst decisions 6.2.5 
External indicators of financial    Compensation 5.3.4  Real activities 6.2.6 
reporting quality 3.3  Manager change 5.3.5    
AAERs 3.3.1       
Restatements 3.3.2  Auditors 5.4    
Internal control procedures 3.3.3  Auditor size 5.4.1    
   Auditor fees 5.4.2    
   Other auditor characteristics 5.4.3    
        
   Capital market incentives 5.5    
   When raising capital 5.5.1    
   Earnings-based targets 5.5.2    
        
   External factors 5.6    
   Political process 5.6.1    
   Capital regulations 5.6.2    
   Tax regulations 5.6.3    
   SOX 5.6.4    
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Table 2. Spearman correlations between earnings quality proxies (Sample period: 1987-2007) 
Table 2 reports the spearman correlation coefficients between commonly used specifications of earnings quality proxies, as defined in Exhibit 1.  Persistence is 
measured as the estimated β in the firm-level regression: Earningst+1=α+ βEarningst + εt.  Total accruals is defined as the difference between earnings and cash 
flows from operations.  |Accruals| is the absolute value of Total accruals.  Estimation errors is defined as the firm-level mean absolute value of the residual from 
∆WC =α+β1CFOt-1 +β2CFOt+ β3CFOt+1+εt.  σ(residual) is the firm-level standard deviation of the residual from the above regression.  σ (EARN)/σ (CFO) is the 
firm-level standard deviation of earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations.  Corr(ΔACC,ΔCFO) is the firm-level correlation 
between change in total accruals and change in cash flow from operations.  Timely loss recognition is defined as (β1+β2)/β1 from the firm-level regression: 
Earningst+1=α1+α2Dt+β1Rett+β2Dt·Rett +εt where D=1 if Ret<0.  ERC is defined as the estimated β from the firm-level regression of annual returns on earnings: 
Rett= α+βEarningst+εt.   The sample consists of 3,733 firms (47,187 firm-years) with eight or more consecutive annual observations.  Significance levels are 
shown in italics.  Each earnings attribute is winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Timely loss recognition is trimmed at the value of -5 and 5, resulting in 2,487 firms.  
Total accruals, |Accruals|, Estimation errors, and σ(residual) represent the additive inverse of these variables such that all variables are increasing in their 
hypothesized quality. 
 
 Accruals Smoothness  ERCs 
 Total 
accruals 
|Accruals| Estimation 
errors 
σ(residual) σ (Earn)/ 
σ (CFO) 
Corr(ΔACC,
ΔCFO) 
Timely loss 
recognition 
Coefficient R2 
Persistence 0.082 
<.0001 
0.128 
<.0001 
0.128 
<.0001 
0.129 
<.0001 
-0.151 
<.0001 
-0.254 
<.0001 
0.014 
0.485 
0.191 
<.0001 
0.079 
<.0001 
Total accruals  0.700 
<.0001 
-0.080 
<.0001 
-0.079 
<.0001 
-0.214 
<.0001 
-0.275 
<.0001 
0.003 
0.880 
0.128 
<.0001 
0.032 
0.052 
|Accruals|   0.308 
<.0001 
0.303 
<.0001 
-0.241 
<.0001 
-0.264 
<.0001 
-0.007 
0.742 
0.174 
<.0001 
0.030 
0.069 
Estimation errors    0.993 
<.0001 
-0.299 
<.0001 
-0.250 
<.0001 
0.026 
0.202 
0.214 
<.0001 
0.048 
0.004 
σ(residual)     -0.297 
<.0001 
-0.249 
<.0001 
0.029 
0.149 
0.217 
<.0001 
0.053 
0.001 
σ (EARN)/  
σ (CFO) 
     0.709 
<.0001 
-0.059 
0.004 
-0.339 
<.0001 
-0.152 
<.0001 
Corr(ΔACC,ΔCFO)       -0.072 
0.000 
-0.321 
<.0001 
-0.125 
<.0001 
Timely loss 
recognition 
       0.200 
<.0001 
0.172 
<.0001 
ERC coefficient         0.551 
<.0001 
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Exhibit 1: Summary of earnings quality proxies 
This exhibit lists the commonly used proxies for earnings quality and the most common specification(s) of the variable.  The exact specification of the proxies 
can vary by study.  For each, we summarize the theory for its use as a measure of quality and an abbreviated summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
proxy.  Details are in the review in Section 3. 
 
Empirical proxy Theory Strengths and weakness 
 
Persistence 
 
Earningst+1=α+ βEarningst + εt 
 
β measures persistence. 
 
 
Firms with more persistent earnings 
generate more accurate DCF-based 
equity valuations. 
 
 
Pros: Fits well with a Graham and Dodd view of earnings as a summary 
metric of expected cash flows useful for equity valuation.  
Cons: Difficult to control for persistence of the fundamental earnings process, 
but this persistence is likely to be a large contributor to persistence of reported 
earnings.  Thus, it is difficult to make statements about the effect of 
measurement on persistence.  Greater persistence may be achieved via 
opportunistic earnings management. 
 
 
Smoothness 
 
σ(Earnings)/ σ(Cash flows) 
 
A lower ratio indicates more 
smoothing of the earnings stream 
relative to cash flows. 
 
 
Managers opportunistically smooth 
earnings. Therefore, greater 
smoothness is artificial relative to 
the fundamental process; or, 
smoothness reduces noisy variation 
in cash flows as a measure of the 
process.  
 
Pros: In cross-country tests, measures of artificial smoothness appear to 
capture meaningful variation in earnings management.   
Cons: It is difficult to disentangle smoothness of reported earnings that 
reflects smoothness of the fundamental earning process from artificial 
smoothing. 
 
Timely loss recognition (TLR) 
 
Earningst+1=α0+α1Dt+β0Rett 
+β1DtRett +εt 
 
where D = 1 if Ret < 0.  Higher β1 is 
greater TLR. 
 
 
There is a demand for TLR to 
combat management’s natural 
optimism.  TLR represents high 
quality earnings.  
 
Pros: Aimed at disentangling the measurement of the process from the 
process itself. 
Cons: The net effect of TLR on earnings quality is unknown because TLR 
results in lower persistence during bad news periods than during good news 
periods (Basu, 1997).  Both persistence and TLR affect the decision 
usefulness of earnings.  TLR is a returns-based metric, see comments on 
ERCs. 
 
 
Benchmarks 
 
∗ Kinks in earnings distribution 
∗ Changes in earnings distribution 
∗ Kinks in forecast error distribution 
∗ String of positive earnings increases 
 
Unusual clustering in earnings 
distributions indicates earnings 
management around targets.  
Observations at or slightly above 
targets have low quality earnings.  
 
 
Pros: The measure is easy to calculate, the concept is intuitively appealing, 
and survey evidence suggests earnings management around targets. 
Cons: In addition to statistical validity issues, evidence that kinks represent 
opportunistic earnings management is mixed, with credible alternative 
explanations including non-accounting issues (e.g., taxes).  It is difficult to 
distinguish firms that are at kinks by chance versus those that have 
manipulated their way into the benchmark bins.   
 173
 
Exhibit 1, continued   
   
Empirical proxy Theory Strengths and weakness 
 
Accruals 
 
Accruals= Earningst - CFt 
Accruals=Δ(noncash working capital) 
Accruals= Δ(net operating assets) 
Specific accrual components 
 
 
Extreme accruals are low quality 
because they represent a less 
persistent component of earnings.   
 
Pros: The measure gets directly at the role of an accruals-based accounting 
system relative to a cash-flow based system. 
Cons: The fundamental earnings process differs for firms with extreme 
accruals versus less extreme accruals, which hinders interpretation. 
 
Residuals from accrual models 
 
Error term from regressing accruals 
on their economic drivers  
(See Exhibit 2) 
 
 
Residuals from accrual models 
represent management discretion or 
estimation errors, both of which 
reduce decision usefulness. 
 
Pros: The measure attempts to isolate the managed or error component of 
accruals.  The use of these models has become the accepted methodology in 
accounting to capture discretion. 
Cons: Tests of the determinants/consequences of earnings management are 
joint tests of the theory and the abnormal accrual metric as a proxy for 
earnings management.  Correlated omitted variables associated with 
fundamentals, especially performance, are of utmost concern given the 
dependence of normal accruals on fundamentals and the endogeneity of the 
hypothesized determinants/consequences with the fundamentals. 
 
 
ERCs 
 
Rett+1= α+β(EarningsSurpriset)+εt 
 
More informative components of 
earnings will have a higher β. More 
value relevant earnings will have a 
higher R2. 
 
Investors respond to information 
that has value implications.  A 
higher correlation with value 
implies that earnings better reflect 
the fundamental earnings process.   
 
Pros: The measure directly links earnings to decision usefulness, which is 
quality, albeit specifically in the context of equity valuation decisions.   
Cons: Assumes market efficiency.  In addition, inferences are impaired by 
correlated omitted variables that affect investor reaction (including 
endogenously determined availability of other information), measurement 
error of unexpected earnings, and cross-sectional variation in return-
generating processes. 
 
 
External indicators of 
   financial reporting quality 
 
∗ AAERs identified by SEC 
∗ Restatements 
∗ SOX reports of internal control 
deficiencies 
 
Firms had errors (AAERs and 
restatement firms) or are likely to 
have had errors (internal control 
deficiencies) in their financial 
reporting systems, which imply low 
quality.  
 
Pros: Unambiguously reflect accounting measurement problems (low Type I 
error rate).  The researcher does not have to use a model to identify low 
quality firms. 
Cons: For AAERs: small sample sizes, selection issues, and matching 
problems due to type II error rate.  For restatements and SOX firms: problems 
with distinguishing intentional from unintentional errors or ambiguities in 
accounting rules that lead to errors. 
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Exhibit 2: Summary of widely used models of accruals 
This table summarizes commonly used models to estimate normal levels of accruals.  Residuals from the model are used as a measure of “abnormal” accruals. 
 
Accrual model Theory Notes 
Jones (1991) model   
 
Acct=α+β1?Revt+β2PPEt+εt 
 
Accruals are a function of revenue growth and 
depreciation is a function of PPE.  All variables are 
scaled by total assets. 
 
Correlation or error with firm performance can bias 
tests. 
Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995)  
 
Acct=α+β1(?Revt - ?Rect) +β2PPEt+εt 
 
Adjusts Jones model to exclude growth in credit sales in 
years identified as manipulation years. 
R2 around 12%. Residual is correlated with accruals, 
earnings and cash flow. 
Performance matched (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005)  
 
DisAcct - Matched firm’s DisAcct 
 
Matches firm-year observation with another from the 
same industry and year with the closest ROA. 
Discretionary accruals are from the Jones-model (or 
Modified Jones model). 
 
Can reduce power of test. Apply only when 
performance is an issue. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach   
 
?WC =α+β1CFOt-1+β2CFOt+ 
                  β3CFOt+1+εt 
 
 
Accruals are modeled as a function of past, present, and 
future cash flows given their purpose to alter the timing 
of cash flow recognition in earnings. 
σ(εt) or absolute εt proxies for accrual quality as an 
unsigned measure of extent of accrual “errors.” 
Discretionary estimation errors (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, Schipper, 2005)  
 
TCAt=α+β1CFOt-1+ β2CFOt + 
β3CFOt+1+β4?Revt+β5PPEt+εt 
 
σ(εt)=α+λ1Sizet+λ2σ(CFO)t+λ3σ(Rev)t+ 
               λ4log(OperCycle)t+λ5Losst+νt 
 
Decomposes the standard deviation of the residual from 
the accruals model into an innate component that reflects 
the firm’s operating environment and a discretionary 
component (νt) that reflects managerial choice. 
 
Innate estimation errors are the predicted component 
from σ(ε)t regression. 
   
 
